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Case Studies: SEVICI

2016-11-10T11:57:25Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = SEVICI, Spain
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Both
|header3 =
|label3 = Contract duration:
|data3 = 20 Years
|header4 =
|label4 = Budget:
|data4 = EUR 92,2 M (For the implementation, operation and maintenance over the entire period)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:sevici1.png|300px]]
|caption = Figure 1: The SEVICI Project
| header5 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= Conception:
| data1 = 2004;
| label2= Contract Approved:
| data2 = July 2007;
}}
}}

==Introduction==

SEVICI concerns the development of a public bicycle rental scheme based on a public-private sector participation model. The project was implemented in the City of Seville in 2007. It included 2500 rental bicycles, 250 parking areas and 411 parking docks. The operation is performed at the docking station itself. Each docking station has an interactive information platform.

Cyclists can use a cycle-path track length of 120 km (not included in the tender). The service is considered to be part of the Seville pubic transport system. The concessionaire receives rental tariffs and also the right to use elements of the service and local area as advertising space.

The project is an innovative concept using PPP as a side business to support the core business, which is advertising.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Municipality of Seville awarded the contract under the auspices of articles 5.2b and 8 of the Revised Text of the Law on Public Sector Administrative Contracts, as passed through Royal Legislative Decree 2/2000, on 16th of June.

==The Concessionaire (Private Party)==

JCDecaux is the first advertising company to offer automatic bicycle rental schemes as part of their advertising contract for urban advertising spaces. JCDecaux developed the bicycle rental scheme. This is, however, a bundling with its core business, which is advertising. The concessionaire provided equity and loans.

==Users==

SEVICI forms part of the Seville urban transport system and is available to all public users. In 2011, almost 5 million trips were registered.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The City Council could not cover the cost of developing and operating a viable bicycle rental service. However, the advertising company by “bundling” advertisement and rental user tariffs could achieve feasibility. More specifically, while user tariffs correspond to approximately 50% of the project cost, revenue for the rest is generated by the advertising service.

==Project Timing==

Public bicycle rental schemes (SBP) have spread rapidly over Spain since 2004, following the success of the Vitoria-Gasteiz scheme, which allowed for a truly intermodal scheme to be established in the public transport system. Moreover, Seville is a prominent city in Andalusia, with significant tourism, which greatly benefits from adopting the SBP.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The bicycle rental scheme is part of the Seville public transport system. It is estimated that more than 5% of daily trips in the city are conducted by SEVICI.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

Two bidders responded to the Expression of Interest issued by the Municipality of Seville. The final bid was submitted by JCDecaux. The legal basis of the contract is under the auspices of articles 5.2b and 8 of the Revised Text of the Law on Public Sector Administrative Contracts, as passed through Royal Legislative Decree 2/2000, on the 16th of June.

===Contract Structure===

The contract involves the installation, management and maintenance of the individual public transport system through the availability of public bicycles for short-term rental, as well as the development of docking stations where these can be parked.

{| class="wikitable"
|+ Table 1: SERVICI tariffs
!Card used
!Fee
!30 minutes
!1st Hour
!2nd Hour
|-
|Short term ||11 € ||Free ||1 € ||2 €
|-
|Long term ||27.5 € ||Free ||0.5 € ||1 €
|}

The contract was assigned for a period of 20 years to the French company JCDecaux. Revenues are generated through bicycle rentals (see fees below) and the use of elements of the service and local area as advertising space. More specifically, the concessionaire is given 500 advertisement spaces.

Users can pay an annual fee, which gives them the right to free journeys of up to half an hour between SEVICI points or through a weekly, short duration fee. Costs are deducted from the credit cards provided by the subscriber.

User tariffs are currently (2013) being re-negotiated due to the economic crisis, which also affects advertisement demand.

===Risk Allocation===

Evolution of demand, revenue from advertisement and cost of maintenance may be considered the key risks of SEVICI. In the contract risks are allocated as shown in figure 2.

[[Image:sevici2.png]]

'''Figure 2: Risk allocation'''

===Performance===

The ex-post overall assessment of the contract is very positive. Some problems exist with respect to:
*Shortage of maintenance and lack of qualified staff to deal with unlawful actions and vandalism to cycles as well as docking stations;
*Poor customer service (poor complaints line, expensive call number, no physical contract with the users possible);
*No simple method to report a mechanical failure on a bike.

Performance indicators were foreseen in the contract, in accordance with the system’s basic RAM criteria (Reliability, Availability and Maintainability), and were as follows:

{| class="wikitable"
|+ Table 2: Performance indicators
! style="background-color:lightgreen"|
!style="background-color:lightgreen" |Figures
|-
|Initial number of bicycles ||2.500
|-
|Temporary out of service ||(105)
|-
|Permanent out of service ||(690)
|-
|Number of bicycles in use (average) ||1.705
|}

However, no penalties were foreseen.

The SERVICI has approximately 5 million trips per year. Users are relatively satisfied with the system.

[[Image:sevici3.png]]

'''Figure 3: Scoring of SEVICI by users (2011)'''

'''''Source: Barómetro Socioeconómico de Sevilla'''''

==References==
*J. Sastre, 2013, SEVICI In Roumboutsos, A., Farrell, S., Liyanage, C. L. and Macário, R, COST Action TU1001 Public Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory P3T3, 2013 Discussion Papers Part II Case Studies, ΙSBN 978-88-97781-61-5, COST Office, Brussels available at http://www.ppptransport.eu
*Sastre, J. and Romero, A. (2012) Development of the Public Bicycle Rental Scheme based on a Public Private Sector Participation Model: The Seville case study (SEVICI), Latin Infrastructure Quarterly
*Sastre, J. and Romero, A. (2012) Impact of bicycle sharing system in Spain. ALOMON, Consulting. Research Department
[[Category:Case Studies]]

Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain

2016-11-08T10:59:14Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Eje Aeropuerto (M-12) Airport Axis Toll Road, Madrid, Spain
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Both
|header3 =
|label3 = Contract Duration:
|data3 = 25 – 26 Years
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:M-12a.png|350px]]
|caption = Figure1: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12) Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain 
Source: Ejeaeropuerto.com

| header4 =
| label4 = Budget:
| data4 = EUR 358M (original)
| label6 = Final construction cost:
| data6 = EUR 382M (approx.) excluding land expropriation.
| label7 = Final projected investment:
| data7 = EUR 475 M
| header8 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= Conception:
| data1 = 2000
| label2= Call for tender:
| data2 = 2002
| label3= Contract approved and signed:
| data3 = 2002

}}

}}

==Introduction==

The Eje Aeropuerto or M-12 toll motorway is 9.4km long and provides access to the new Terminal 4 of the Madrid Bajaras Airport. It also provides an alternative route to the east of Madrid as it connects two important entry/exit points to the A-1 motorway and the A-2 motorway, at the M-40 intersection.

Approximately two kilometers run in a double tunnel under the Juan Carlos I Park. Emphasis was placed on security, and the M-12 was described as Europe’s best and safest motorway by the EuroTAp 2006 Programme (European Tunnel Assessment Programme).

The M-12 was awarded in 2002 to OHL Concessions, a member of the OHL Group (100%). The initial construction budget was EUR 358M, and the final construction budget approximately EUR 382M. However, due to additional payments related to land acquisition, the investment amount is still increasing. The last published annual accounts (2012) showed a total investment of EUR 444M. The concession is expected to end in 2027.

The M-12 opened to traffic in 2005. Concessionaire traffic gradually escalated to an average of 20,296 vehicles per day in 2007, but it has low down during last few years of economic downturn to 18,298 vehicles per day in 2012 and 17,884 in 2013, according with last published figures. However, traffic in the toll area was much lower, 7,200 vehicles per day in 2012 (first year this data is published) which represented a decrease by 8% from previous year. In 2013, this figure continues falling by 12% to 6,395 vehicles per day.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Ministry of Public Works is the responsible Authority on behalf of the public sector. In its activities it is supported by the:

* Infrastructure Secretariat, a high level executive body set up to develop global infrastructure planning, carry out project screening and selection, and undertake final decision making;
* Highways Department, responsible for regulatory requirements in the bidding process and technical coordination of the construction process;
* Toll Motorways Delegation, responsible for monitoring contracts and renegotiations.

==The Concessionaire (Private Party)==

Autopista EJE AEROPUERTO C.E.S.A. is the concessionaire, through the SPV AEROPISTAS S.L.U. The initial sponsor group was created by OHL group (80%) and the Empresa Nacional de Autopistas (ENA) (20%). However, OHL Concessions is now the sole shareholder after some shareholding changes. The SPV was created to finance the project via equity.

Project financing is provided by a syndicated loan granted to the SPV by Banesto (Santander Group), the Spanish savings bank Caja Madrid, and the British Royal Bank of Scotland for up to EUR 282 M in several tranchesat year 2023, more than four years before the concession end. The main tranche (A) reaches EUR 257 M and aims to finance the sole shareholder contribution for the project investment.

There have been legal disputes with the grantor since the construction period, mainly due additional work requirements and cost overruns in the price of the land.

Actual traffic has been lower than expected since the beginning of the concession and the economic downturn has had a negative impact on the project. As a consequence, the concessionaire reported losses since 2012 .

==Users==

The road is used as an alternative high-efficiency access motorway to the new Terminal 4 of the Madrid Bajaras Airport. The existing airport access was saturated and could not meet the high expected traffic requirements caused by the airport extension. It is also used as an alternative access to motorways A-1 and A-2, creating a new north-south axis, which has helped to reduce congestion in the north east of Madrid.

After the opening of the new road in 2005 average traffic volumes at the toll area were very low. Following the economic crisis, traffic levels fell to 7,200 vehicles per day in 2012 and 6,395 vehicles per day in 2013.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

Restrictions on the public budget and the potential for revenues were the principal motivations for the use of the PPP model. The project complements the global infrastructure plan for the Madrid region, named Radiales de Madrid, which aims to provide alternative solutions for the existing saturated road network. The plan introduced the PPP model as a means of building new alternative access routes using direct tolls as the repayment mechanism.

==Project Timing==

The airport access road was conceived in the late 1990’s to reduce congestion in the existing N-II motorway corridor in the north east of Madrid and to gain a new access route to the expanded airport. The airport was expected to become one of Europe‘s largest, and was included in a new urban development area.

The tender call took place in March 2002 and the contract was signed within the same year.

Important dates for the projects may be summarized as follows:

* Initial Call: March 2002;
* Grant approved: 8 November 2002,
* Creation of concessionaire: 10 December 2002;
* Target date for initial operations: May 2004;
* Financial close: 11 December 2003;
* Actual start of operations: 15 June 2005.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The project is located in the outer urban area of Madrid. It serves traffic to the airport, and provides a new north-south axis.

The M-12 offers an alternative to the previously congested Bajaras Airport access though the A-2 national motorway and supports direct link to the new Terminal 4. In addition, the project complements the road transport network in the region and provides direct accesses to new housing developments in the north-east area of Madrid.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The Spanish public works ministry, “Ministerio de Fomento”, launched an open call bidding process for an administrative concession for the construction, maintenance and operation of the toll road Eje Aeropuerto, from road M-110 to motorway A-10, from A-10 to M-40 ring road, the extension and improvements for the south access to Barajas airport, the A-1 partial broadening to three lanes from the Hortaleza link connection and the connection with the N-II alternative. This bidding followed the existing legislation in force, mainly Law 8/1972 of toll roads under concession model, Decree 215/1973 of general provision standards, and the Legislative Royal Decree 2/2000 that collects the Public Administration procurement texts.

The open call process for the project tendering was detailed in an specific administrative standard format approved in by a Ministerial Order in March 2002.

Participants were consortia made up of construction companies, operators and financial entities. Contract award was made on the basis of the “most advantageous” offer.

The contract was awarded relatively quickly in November 2002 by Royal Decree to the consortium created by the constructor “Obrascon Huarte Lain, S.A. (OHL)” and the operator “Empresa Nacional de Autopistas, S.A. (ENA)” and the project was expected to be in operation by July 2003.

===Contract Structure===

The contract is a typical BOT using the design offered by the Ministry of Public Works/Highways Department. However it includes interesting economic and financial innovations such as flexibility to extend the concession period, and an option for early exit. In addition, technological innovations in the main tunnel construction and the adoption of free flow electronic devices contributed to the project being awarded a European prize and gaining international recognition.

The original budget was EUR 350M. However the total investment is still increasing and is expected to be more than EUR 475M due to additional works and deviations in price of land use.

The remuneration scheme was based on user tolls, in the range of EUR 1.95- 2.45. Tolls are regulated by the government and indexed to inflation rates.

The contract has been renegotiated due to legal disputes and several issues, which caused cost overruns. As a result, the grantor offered some short-term financial support with a minimum revenue guarantee (three years) and participative loans provided after a compensation process. However this support was not eventually implemented.

Moreover, due to the fall in traffic levels following the economic crisis, the project is unable to generate sufficient cash flow to meet debt service requirements and payments for the increased price of land. As a consequence, the concessionaire has filed an insolvency procedure that is currently under consideration, and negotiations with the main stakeholders are taking place in order to find a viable solution.

===Risk Allocation===

Risk allocation does not seem to be expressly written in detail but it may be derived from general and specific administrative procedures and regulation. This is presented in Figure 2.

Design is predetermined in the draft project prepared by the Pubic Administration but the concessionaire has to elaborate the final construction project. The Highways department monitors the construction standards and requirements and approves whichever minor technical modification. Therefore, Design and construction risks are private but the concessionaire must follow the project design already defined by the grantor. Only additional works ordered by the grantor which are not included in the original project have to be compensated.

Maintenance, commercial and financial risks are transferred to the private sector.

Although not always clear, some general provisions included in the regulation suggest the regulatory risks are public. Two main provisions are the following:

* Public Administration Liability, applicable for some cases of early termination
* Economic and Financial Equilibrium, to compensate any damage arising from the Public Administration action.

However, expropriation risk originally transfer to private, in the end, given the huge deviation, is being assumed by the public sector.

In the event of force major the public sector assumes the risk and therefore the risk is kept in the public side.

The Public Administration may support projects under adverse conditions, as has been the case for Autopista Eje Aeropuerto related to two main issues: the huge deviation in price for the land acquisition and the traffic drop derived from the dramatic economic downturn.

Indeed, by the end of 2009 the Spanish Government set a mechanism to provide financial support through public participative loans instruments to compensate deviations in land expropriation price exceeding 175% the projected rates for the payments to take place after January 2010.

Similarly, by the end of 2010, the Government implemented a temporary compensation account, as minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) to cover 80% of the projected traffic through same participative loan instruments.

Nevertheless these two mechanisms were subject to availability in the annual public budgets. Due to strong public budget limitations, funds were only paid in 2012 for the compensation account, but this financial support was not provided to the concessionaire in the following years.

[[Image: M-12b.png]] 
'''Figure 2: Original risk allocation'''

===Performance===

A traffic forecast was offered by the state in the tender documents. The wining offer included a new traffic forecast, which has been used as a reference for potential renegotiations.

The concessionaire placed the emphasis on safety, and a number of innovations were included in the project. Key performance indicators concern maintenance standards, to ensure high quality and comfort. The technology used in the tunnel allowed it to be evaluated as the safest one in Europe by EuroTAP Program.

No performance KPI are set and only some general requirements for operation and maintenance are in place.Since operations started traffic performance has been poor, well below the forecast, and users’ reluctance to pay tolls has been evident, especially for taxis which were supposed to be the main users. There was a two-year ramp up period in the forecast, but this was insufficient to capture the initial build-up of traffic and its decline since the economic downturn.

On November 2013, the concecionaire and its parent company, jointly petitioned for voluntary insolvency proceeding to be initiated, which was later accepted by the Commercial Court and published in the Official State Gazette.

==References==

*Aseta (2012). Toll roads in Spain

*Autopista Eje Aeropuerto, SACE , SAU (2012). Cuentas anuales e Informe de gestión 2012.

*Eje Aeropuerto: http://www.ejeaeropuerto.com/ (web page).

*Ministerio de Fomento (2011 and 2012). Annual report on toll road sector in Spain.

*Ministerio de Fomento (2012). Traffic in toll road. Monographic report.

*Official State Gazette (2002): Specific Administrative procedures for Autopista Eje Aeropuerto tender and Granting approval Decree.

*OHL Concesiones, S.A. (2013). Consolidated financial statements report for 2013.

*F. J. Villalba-Romero, C. Liyanage, 2014, Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, in A. Roumboutsos, S. Farrell and K. Verhoest, COST Action TU1001 – Public Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory: 2014 Discussion Series: Country Profiles & Case Studies, ISBN 978-88-6922-009-8

Case Studies: Port of Agaete

2016-10-12T18:09:54Z

Nimda: Created page with "{{Infobox |header1 = Port of Agaete, Spain |header2 = |label2 = Project Type: |data2 = Brownfield |header3 = |label3 = Type of Project Financing: |data3 = Public (const..."

{{Infobox
|header1 = Port of Agaete, Spain
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Brownfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public (construction); Concession (Operation)
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 8 years (construction)
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 5.7 M EUR 
Initial construction budget (in 1982): 3.1 M EUR (Ptas. 515 mill.) 
Updated additional budget (in 1987): 2.6 M EUR (Ptas. 427 mill.)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Agaete.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Port of Agaete, Spain ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 1981:
| data1 = Initial planning project (''Project I'').
| label2= 19 May 1982:
| data2 = Public tendering.
| label3= 16 June 1982:
| data3 = Public works awarded to private construction firm (SATO).
| label4= 30 August 1982:
| data4 = Start of public works. Public opinion against the project due to concerns on visual impact.
| label5= 16 June 1983:
| data5 = Second planning (''Modified Project II'') is started. Public works are temporarily paused.
| label6= 1 July 1983:
| data6 = Public works are definitively halted.
| label7= 23 October 1985:
| data7 = Administration and management of local ports are transferred from the central government to the regional government (by Royal Decree 2250/1985).
| label8= January 1986:
| data8 = Regional government updates the existing project (''Modified Project III'') Public works are restarted by the same building company (now, SATOCAN).
| label9= 1987:
| data9 = Agreement between the regional government and the island government (Cabildo Insular) to update the budget and speed up the works. Modified Project IV, with technical updates.
| label10= 1993:
| data10 = Completion of main work; Commercial use of the port is negotiated between regional government and central government.
| label11= December 1994:
| data11 = Passenger and road traffic license is awarded to Fred Olsen, a ferry operator between Gran Canaria (Agaete) and Tenerife (Santa Cruz). Fred Olsen operates as a monopoly due to ‘lack of capacity’. Pays a fee to regional government.
| label12= 1999:
| data12 = Additional works required adapting the port to ‘fast-ferry’ operations. Fred Olsen performs works.
| label13= 2014:
| data13 = Large increase in passenger traffic since 2000.A second passenger license is currently being negotiated (sharing existing facilities). There is a project for further enlargement of the port of Agaete (Plan de Puertos de Canarias, 2013) to be carried out from 2015 onwards.
| label14= January 2015:
| data14 = Passenger services opened to competition. Two private ferry operators (Fred Olsen and Líneas Armas) will share port facilities.

}}
}}

==Introduction==

Agaete is a small village (pop. 5,600 in 2014) located in the northwest corner of the island of Gran Canaria, in the Canary Islands. Until the beginning of the 1980s, the local economy was relatively isolated and centered on agriculture, although it also had a small fishing harbour with minimal facilities for local fishermen. During the 1990s, the 30 km-road that connected Agaete with the rest of the island and the capital city, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (pop. 650,000 in 2014, including its surrounding metropolitan area) was greatly improved, and the village became a crucial maritime link; within a transport network (promoted by the regional government) to connect Gran Canaria with Tenerife, the second main island in the archipelago.

Since the end of the 1970s, local authorities had already claimed for improvements in their small port. A first project was designed by the Spanish government in 1981 through the Ministry of Public Works in Madrid. The project was not well received by local residents because it was based on a large dock, whose huge sea-wall had a high visual impact. Despite opposing public opinion, the works were awarded in 1982 in a competitive tendering process to SATO (Sociedad Anónima de Trabajos y Obras), a Spanish construction company with solid national experience. It was the only company that participated in the tender.

However, both political and social pressure increased, and the works were finally stopped (just one year after their initiation) in search for an alternative design. Meanwhile, the construction company was re-founded as SATOCAN, with local capital. The modified project included a new dock with a special design to alleviate the impact of sea waves during bad weather conditions. This design was also heavily criticised by local authorities because it was not well connected to the village and had to be re-elaborated.

In 1985, a major administrative change occurred: the regional government (Gobierno de Canarias) assumed all the competencies for small and medium-sized ports in the Canary Islands. Additional changes were, thus, made to the project (saving the local beach, construction of a new road and reducing the visual impact), and the third design was finally accepted, with an updated budget, partially provided by the island’s government (Cabildo Insularde Gran Canaria). The works were concluded in 1993, although additional improvements to facilitate its usage as commercial port were also implemented in subsequent years.

As any other port, the Agaete project itself is a monopoly. There are small fishery harbours in nearby villages, but the only competitor for the Gran Canaria-Tenerife Ro-Ro traffic is the Port of Las Palmas, 32 km away. The commercial use of the Port of Agaete was awarded as a monopoly to a single operator (Fred Olsen) in 1994, apparently due to technical (safety) reasons. However, in 2015 (after no major changes in the infrastructure), a second license was awarded to a competitor (Líneas Armas).

Agaete has become the crucial maritime link between Gran Canaria and Tenerife. In the 1990-2000s, it was the center of an ambitious regional plan to create “a motorway” between the two main islands, with improvements in the connecting roads and access from Las Palmas de Gran Canaria through a motorway. There are regular bus services for ferry passengers from this city to Agaete, provided by Fred Olsen.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Spanish Ministry for Public Works, through the Administrative Ports Planning Group (Grupo Administrativo de Puertos) contracted the initial works. After 1986, the works and supervising competencies were transferred to the regional government (Gobierno de Canarias), firstly through the Dirección General de Puertos (an administrative body), and now (since 2012), through Puertos Canarios, a public agency.

The initial works were carried out under the Spanish legal framework for ports and public works (particularly, the Law for Public Contracts). In 1985, the RD2250/85 (government decree) transferred the management of the small and medium-sized ports to the Government of the Canary Islands (a Spanish Autonomous Community since 1982). The use of Agaete as a commercial port was negotiated in 1992 and the Regional Statute was suitably adapted in 1996 (Ley Orgánica 4/96). Today, the legislative framework is defined in the Law of Ports of the Canary Islands (Ley 14/2003).

As described above, national authorities initiated the project, but competencies were later transferred to the regional government. The local government (the island’s government also participated in the final financing) was involved at the beginning of the project and in 1996, to authorise the commercial usage. Since then, all the responsibility is assumed by the regional government.

==Private Sector Contribution==

===Construction===

The project’s main sponsor was the public sector (Spanish Government, Regional Government, Island’s Government). SATOCAN was the only construction company involved in the project. There were no major issues with respect to the procedure, apart from the fact that the project suffered from several changes in design after being awarded. However, the new project was not opened to new concurrence: it was directly awarded to SATOCAN, in accordance with legal provisions. The involvement of SATOCAN was limited. Its only responsibility was performing the public works.

===Operation===

The port following construction was concessioned to Fred Olsen (1994). In 2015, a second concession was granted to Líneas Armas.

==Sources of Financing==

The project was contracted in accordance with the Spanish Law for public contracts through an open procedure. It was divided in several stages, at the end of each, the builder receiving the corresponding payment (standard building contract). All the payments were made by the Spanish Government after the corresponding budget assignments.

Concessioners pay a fee to the local government.

==Users==

The main user of the Port of Agaete is Fred Olsen, a private-owned shipping company that provides regular ferry services between Gran Canaria and Tenerife. Fred Olsen also operates other routes in the islands and also offers additional services (cargo, tourism accommodation, etc.) Local fishermen and private recreational yachts also make occasional use of the safe dock. Today, the main usage of the port is the provision of regular passenger and Ro-Ro services.

==Key Purpose Project Delivery Model Selection==

Spanish legislation at the moment attributed exclusive ownership and port management rights to the State (central government). After construction, the port would remain under the control of the public sector. No private interest was evident at the initial stages of the project.

Afterwards, the private operator (Fred Olsen) contributed with minor works to improve port facilities.

==Project Timing==

At the beginning of the 1980s, the village of Agaete and, in general, the northwest of the island of Gran Canaria, seemed relatively isolated and relegated in terms of transport infrastructure, compared to the more touristic and sunnier southeast part of the island. Most people living in the north commuted to work to the island’s capital city or simply visited for shopping or entertainment. The port of Agaete was mainly used as a fishing harbour by local residents, while the main attractions for occasional visitors were local restaurants and the “Dedo de Dios” (God’s Finger, a peculiar rock which was destroyed by a tropical storm in 2005). The village’s economy was mainly based on agriculture and minor services, with small growth rates.

The Canary Islands’ economy was also relatively stagnated during the 1980s, after two decades of expansion based on tourism services and construction. Since 1957, the region’s GDP had multiplied by 12, reaching a share of 4% of the national figure, with a GDP per capita of approximately 10,000 euros in 1985.

At the beginning of the project, the ferry services did not seem necessary because there was a maritime connection between Gran Canaria and Tenerife from the Las Palmas de Gran Canaria Port. The main competitive advantage of the new service (from Agaete to Tenerife) was that the time on-board was reduced to one hour.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The Port of Agaete became a key link in the regional transport market. Agaete’s population and level of economic activity has benefited from the project. The number of permanent residents has increased by 27% between 1981 and 2014, but the number of seasonal residents (foreign retirees in winter and people from the rest of the island in summer) is also very important. The budget of the local council has doubled between 1980 and 2010.

In 1995, the population density was:

* In Agaete: 115 inhab. per sq.km
* In Gran Canaria: 487 inhab. per sq.km
* In the Canary Islands: 260 inhab. per sq.km

No major industrial activities were noted before and after the project. Fishing activities remained the same. Commercial activity increased after 2000, largely due to the increased number of transit passengers and tourism.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===
The port construction and refurbishment project was awarded to SATO (later re-founded as SATOCAN) after a competitive tendering that did not attract many participants. In fact, it was the only bidder.

The operation of ferry transport services was directly awarded to Fred Olsen that was the only company interested. Apparently, another company (Trasmediterranea) also expressed its initial interest, but was seemingly discouraged due to technical issues (not enough capacity at the dock to operate with safety). The duration of the project assignment procedure was three months.

===Contract structure===

Both the construction and operation contracts were fairly standard. They were designed by the Spanish Government and included clauses and provisions that were common in the Spanish legislation, including penalties for unjustified delays (in the construction stage).

===Risk Allocation===

The risk allocation is shown in Figure 2.

[[Image:Agaete1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

In 2012, the regional government obtained €1.2 million from public funds for the usage of the dock facilities (by Fred Olsen). It also obtained 17,000 euros for renting warehouses and terminal facilities. Indicative figures of its performance:

* 2 private ferry companies (in 2015)
* 43 licensed fishermen
* Traffic in 2013: 773,509 passengers
* Estimated traffic in 2020: 900,000 passengers

==Project Outcomes==

The project has changed dramatically the lives and prospects of the inhabitants of the northwest corner of Gran Canaria and has created a relevant link for inter-island traffic. Beyond its economic results, the port of Agaete is now a vital entry for the island and a way to reduce the political differences among islands.

==References==

* De Rus, G. (1997): How Competition Delivers Positive Results in Transport-A Case Study, The World Bank Group Viewpoint Note No. 136. Washington DC.
* Puertos Canarios. http://puertoscanarios.es/EN/. Official website Canary Ports.

Case Studies

2016-10-12T17:57:36Z

Nimda: /* Ports */

== Roads and Motorways ==

[[Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO|A19 Dishforth DBFO]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road |Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession|Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Ionia Odos Motorway|Ionia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: M6 Toll (BNRR)|M6 Toll (BNRR)]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: M80 Haggs to Stepps|M80 Haggs to Stepps]], UK

[[Case Studies: Olympia Odos Motorway|Olympia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Via-Invest Zaventem|Via-Invest Zaventem]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: E-39 Klett - Baardshaug|E-39 Klett-Baardshaug]], Norway

[[Case Studies: Istrian Y Toll Motorway|Istrian Y Toll Motorway]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Moreas Motorway, Greece|Moreas Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Central Greece Motorway (E65), Greece|Central Greece Motorway (E65)]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road, Italy|Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road]], Italy

[[Case Studies: E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand, Norway|E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand]], Norway

[[Case Studies: A2 Motorway, Poland|A2 Motorway]], Poland

[[Case Studies: A22 Algarve, Portugal|A22 Algarve]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: A23 Beira Interior, Portugal|A23 Beira Interior]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway, Spain|C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway, Spain|Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: M-45 Toll Motorway, Spain|M-45 Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain|Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci, Serbia |Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: H5 Koper-Izola Motorway, Slovenia| H5 Koper-Izola Motorway]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway , Slovenia| A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway ]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca , Serbia|Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase, Serbia|Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: E18 Muurla-Lohja, Finland|E18 Muurla-Lohja ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75, Finland | Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75 ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation | Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD)]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation | “Slavyanka” Roads ]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: M-25 London Orbital, U.K. | M-25 London Orbital ]], U.K.

== Bridges/Tunnels ==

[[Case Studies: Rio-Antirio Bridge, Greece |Rio-Antirio Bridge]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Lusoponte Bridge, Portugal | Lusoponte Bridge ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Blanka Tunnel Complex, Czech Republic| The Blanka Tunnel Complex]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: “Herrentunnel”Lübeck, Germany |“Herrentunnel”Lübeck]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Coen Tunnel|Coen Tunnel]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation| Orlovski Tunnel ]], Russian Federation

== Rail ==



[[Case Studies: FERTAGUS Train|FERTAGUS Train]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link|Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Combiplan Nijverdal, The Netherlands | Combiplan Nijverdal]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Gardermobanen, Norway | Gardermobanen ]], Norway

== Ports ==

[[Case Studies: Piraeus Container Terminal|Piraeus Container Terminal]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Sines Container Terminal|Sines Container Terminal]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Valencia Cruise Terminal|Valencia Cruise Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock|Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock]], Belgium


[[Case Studies: Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal, Rijeka, Croatia |Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development, Cyprus | Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona, Spain | Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal, Spain | Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Durrës Port East Terminal, Albania | Durrës Port East Terminal]], Albania

[[Case Studies: OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende, Belgium | OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende ]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Port of Agaete | Port of Agaete]], Spain

== Urban Transport ==

[[Case Studies: Brabo 1, Flanders|Brabo 1, Flanders]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: The Caen' TVR|The Caen' TVR]], France

[[Case Studies: Metro Sul do Tejo|Metro Sul do Tejo]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Reims' Tramway|The Reims' Tramway]], France

[[Case Studies: SEVICI|SEVICI]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester, United Kingdom | Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester]], United Kingdom

[[Case Studies: Athens Tramway, Greece | Athens Tramway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part, Poland | Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part]], Poland

[[Case Studies: Vélo’v, France| Vélo’v ]], France

[[Case Studies: The Lyon's Tramway T4, France| The Lyon's Tramway T4 ]], France

[[Case Studies: Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe, Germany | Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Metro do Porto S.A., Portugal | Metro do Porto S.A. ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Metro de Malaga, Spain | Metro de Malaga ]], Spain

== Airports ==

[[Case Studies: Larnaca and Paphos International Airports|Larnaca and Paphos International Airports]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Tirana International Airport|International Airport of Tirana]], Albania

[[Case Studies: Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”| Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, Germany | Berlin-Brandenburg Airport ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion, Portugal | Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Modlin Regional Airport, Warsaw, Poland | Modlin Regional Airport ]], Poland

== Terminals and Depots ==



[[Case Studies: Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen|Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: The Hague New Train Central Station |The Hague New Train Central Station]], The Netherlands

== Service Infrastructure ==

[[Case Studies: Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive), Albania | Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive)]], Albania

File:Agaete1.png

2016-10-12T17:56:42Z

Nimda:

File:Agaete.png

2016-10-12T17:56:29Z

Nimda:

Case Studies: Modlin Regional Airport, Warsaw, Poland

2016-10-12T17:53:32Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Modlin regional airport, Poland
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Brownfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 5 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 331 807 669,05 PLN (approximately 82M EUR)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Modlin.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Modlin Airport Terminal, Poland'' 
''Source: Kuryłowicz& Associates http://www.apaka.com.pl/en#/projekty/lotnisko-w-modlinie''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 2003:
| data1 = Members of Parliament, members of the local government and entrepreneurs signed a letter of intent concerning the location of the airport on the premises of former military airfield in Modlin.
| label2= May 2005:
| data2 = Draft business plan was developed for investment project entitled "Establishment of a new communication airport by means of modernization of the existing and building new infrastructure for handling aircraft, passengers and cargo on the premises of the former military airfield".
| label3= October 2006:
| data3 = Civil Aviation Office issued a letter of commitment to provide a license to establish a public airport in Modlin. Permit for the establishment of a civil airport.
| label4= 10 September 2009:
| data4 = Building permit is granted. The Voivode of Mazowieckie issued a building permit.
| label5= 8 February 2010:
| data5 = The facility is entered in the register of civil airports kept by Civil Aviation Office.
| label6= 12 March 2010:
| data6 = The investment project received an environmental decision.
| label7= 8 October 2010:
| data7 = Official start of construction.
| label8= 29 October 2010:
| data8 = Agreement with Mostostal for the construction of the terminal signed.
| label9= 1 February 2012:
| data9 = The management of WizzAir announces that as on 18 July 2012 they will move all their flights from Chopin Airport to Warsaw/Modlin Airport.
| label10= 8 February 2012:
| data10 = The Irish airline Ryanair announces it will launch flights from Warsaw Modlin Airport
| label11= 6 June 2012:
| data11 = Regional Building Inspector issued an operational permit for the airside of the airport, and the runway obtained a positive decision of the Air Force Institute of Technology.
| label12= 7 July 2012:
| data12 = An Open Day at the airport.
| label13= 13 July 2012:
| data13 = On 13 July, the President of Civil Aviation Office accepted airport taxes for Warsaw/Modlin Airport as requested by the company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin Sp. z o.o.
| label14= 15 July 2012:
| data14 = First scheduled flights. WizzAir and Ryanair operating from Modlin. The new airport taxes tariff will become effective on 15 July.
| label15= 22 December 2012:
| data15 = Closing airport runaway indefinitely for safety reasons. The construction was built using improper materials. By a Decision of the Regional Building Inspector the concrete part of runway was closed, as a result of which the airport was able to handle only those aircrafts for the landing of which a runway length of 1500 m was sufficient.
| label16= 4 July 2013:
| data16 = Re-opening airport after construction works to fix the runway.
| label17= 17 July 2013:
| data17 = Wizz Air announced it would not return to Modlin despite its re-opening.
| label18= 30 September 2013:
| data18 = First scheduled flights after re-opening - Ryanair returned to Modlin.

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The project entails the building of a new airport for Warsaw (capital city of Poland) and Mazovia Region for low-cost airlines and charter flights. The project is based on an old military runway located 35 km from Warsaw.

First plans assumed:

* rebuilding and lengthening of the runway
* building new taxiways and airport terminal
* rebuilding existing railway siding and building railway station on the airport (both not realised)
* building fright terminal (not realised).

Realisation of the project was delayed by a few years. After a few months of operation, the airport was closed due to technical and safety reasons.

The re-opening of the Modlin Airport was in June 2013, however, only one airline decided to operate from it.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa Modlin Sp. z o.o. Contracting authority is a public entity with participation of regional self-government (30,37% shares), the Town of NowyDwór Mazowiecki (4,81%), State-owned enterprise "PortyLotnicze", 30.39% and Military Property Agency, 34,43%.

==Sources of Financing==

The total budget for the project amounted to 331 807 669,05 PLN (approximately 82M EUR), including:

* European Regional Development Fund subsidiary: 64 736 000 PLN (approximately 16M EUR)
* National budget subsidiary: 11 424 000 PLN (approximately 2,85M EUR)
* Owners sources: 255 647 669,05 PLN (approximately 64 M EUR)

==Users==

Warsaw Modlin is the first airport in Poland established specifically with the intention to be used by low-cost airlines and charter carriers. Starting from June 2012, it operates as a regional public airport complementary to the Warsaw Chopin Airport. The airport handles international short- and medium-distance flights. Air operations are carried out 24hrs a day.

The airport's specific orientation at low-cost airlines is reflected in certain components of the infrastructure, particularly the terminal with no designated business waiting area, no luxury commercial or food court areas and no jet ways.

Nowadays, Modlin Airport is used by one, big, regular passenger airline (Ryanair), and realises negligible charter flights and general aviation. A small cargo terminal is planned (2015/16). Table 1 lists the forecast and actual traffic volumes.

Table 1-Forecasted and actual traffic volumes 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Year'''
! '''Forecast'''
! '''Actual'''
! '''% Actual vs Forecast traffic'''
|-
| 2012
| 900 000
| 857 481
| 95%
|-
| 2013
| 2 300 000
| 344 566
| 15%
|-
| 2014
| 2 900 000
| 1 703 219
| 59%
|}

==Project Timing==

The concept of building the airport was formulated in 2003. The initial agenda for the investment project was announced in 2005, and after this date preparation works run. Construction works started in 2010 and ended in 2013. Substantial complementary infrastructure not realised included essential connections such as the foreseen railway connector and station, and other infrastructure such as the cargo terminal.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

Modlin Airport is located only 35 km North-West from the center of Warsaw, but is not well connected - Modlin Airport has no convenient, direct connection to the capital city, (bus connection takes up to 2 hours (average 40-60 minutes), while the railway connection takes up to 1,5 h and needs one change to bus).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

The investment process was divided in 20 small contracts. Separate tendering process was inter alia for:

* demolition of existing buildings
* logging the trees
* dispose of the cut wood
* modernising runway and taxiway
* construction of the airport traffic control tower
* construction of the roads and parking areas
* construction of the water and waste infrastructure
* construction of the telecommunication networks
* construction of the fence
* modernisation of hangars
* construction of the ILS/DME system ( instrument landing system)
* construction of the passenger terminal
* procurement of furniture
* check-in counters for passenger terminal
* luggage control equipment for passenger terminal
* refuse bins with and without ashtray for passenger terminal and many more.

The Central Anti-Corruption Agency (CBA) found irregularities in the application of the Public Procurement Law, including, inter alia, an undervaluation of contracts and sharing contracts for parts. The material gathered was submitted to the Prosecutor's Office.

===Tendering===

The main elements of ongoing contracts were: upgrading of runway, construction of airport terminal and other structures and facilities (over 20 tenders). During the execution of works, the Contracting Authority (The company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin) granted three basic contracts with 62 additional works.

===Contract Structure===

“The company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin did not have formal procedures for conducting the investment process, taking into account the risks that may occur at each of its stages, and also did not have sufficient staff resources, allowing for self-management and monitoring of contracts.

Notably, the preparation of vague and inconsistent provisions of the agreement and terms of reference resulted in additional works with direct assignment of more than 5 million zl. The Supreme Audit Office considered the assigned works as unjustified.

The documentation developed for the runway construction did not state clearly the type of aggregate to be used for the concrete mix in the construction of the belt. As a result, the contractor did not have documentation that warrants the exclusion of particles with high water absorption, which may be damaged by frost and defrosting. The related close down of the airport caused financial losses in the range of PLN 34.4 M.

===Risk Allocation===

There is no detailed information about risk share between SPV (Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin Sp. z o.o.), designer, constructor and other entities.
As a result of the over 6 months close down of the airport operation and delay in ILS (Instrument Landing System) installation, several lawsuits are currently in court, e.g. SPV contra main contractor of construction runway (PLN 34,4M), Wizzair Airlines contra SPV (PLN 11 M), LS Airport Services contra SPV (over PLN 1 M).

[[Image:Modlin1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The primary business objectives for the airport in Modlin were too optimistic. Reasons of not meeting objectives are not only the result of potential traffic overestimation, but also the failure to build reliable transportation connections (no appropriate rail and road connections) to Warsaw.

In addition, the business results reflected in the airport shut down for a few months after its launch. This event shifted the chances of achieving break event point for investments by 4-7 years . The location of the airport was controversial to both aviation experts (position into delta of 2 rivers, withseveral misty days), as well as environmentalists (breeding place of many valuable bird species). The construction process became risky due to the fragmentation of works. The latter, not only led to accusations of breach of the Public Procurement Act, but also contributed to the lack of control over the quality of the work of the contracting authority.

Despite the lack of infrastructure and transport links to the airport causing considerable inconvenience to passengers, it is now the 6th airport in the country, with the highest growth rate in number of passengers.

==Project Outcomes==

The main problem of Modlin Airport is the lack of transport infrastructure to/from airport, as a result of partly external factors and partly the low effectiveness of bodies managing the airport and the Region.

The plan of transport infrastructure for Euro 2012 was unrealistic and additionally, several planned main roads in Poland were not realised because of the financial crisis of 2009.

The plans for the railway connection were realised partly. Coaches to service Warsaw-Modlin Airport line were bought, however, building the rail infrastructure (rail station at the airport and upgrading the track) outgrew the Regional self-government and after several years of preparation works, the issue was passed to PKP (national railways).

Inconvenient passenger transport connections, delays in ILS system operation and break in airport operation resulted in Wizzair discreditation to Modlin Airport.

Suburban airport last year handled over 1.7 million passengers. Thus, Modlin in terms of passenger traffic volume, was in the sixth place in Poland and ahead of, among others, Poznan airport. According to forecasts, in 2015, the number of passengers in Modlin is to increase to 2.5 million. Although it is only used by Ryanair, it is fast expanding its route network. With this development, the airport terminal in Modlin may become too small fairly quickly. Expectation was for it to handle nearly 3 million passengers a year. Therefore, there are plans to enlarge the airport .

==References==

* http://en.modlinairport.pl/modlin-en-new/web/airport/about-the-airport-2/calendar.html
* http://warszawa.gazeta.pl/warszawa/1,34889,17394180,Modlin_szybko_sie_zapcha__Lotnisko_szykuje_sie_do.html
* http://www.biznes.newseria.pl/news/lotnisko_w_modlinie_zyski,p43543087
* http://www.modlinairport.pl/uploads/old_www/Prognoza%20ruchu%20pasazerskiego_1.pdf

Case Studies: Modlin Regional Airport, Warsaw, Poland

2016-10-12T17:53:18Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Modlin regional airport, Poland
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Brownfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 5 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 331 807 669,05 PLN (approximately 82M EUR)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Modlin.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Modlin Airport Terminal, Poland'' 
''Source: Kuryłowicz& Associates http://www.apaka.com.pl/en#/projekty/lotnisko-w-modlinie''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 2003:
| data1 = Members of Parliament, members of the local government and entrepreneurs signed a letter of intent concerning the location of the airport on the premises of former military airfield in Modlin.
| label2= May 2005:
| data2 = Draft business plan was developed for investment project entitled "Establishment of a new communication airport by means of modernization of the existing and building new infrastructure for handling aircraft, passengers and cargo on the premises of the former military airfield".
| label3= October 2006:
| data3 = Civil Aviation Office issued a letter of commitment to provide a license to establish a public airport in Modlin. Permit for the establishment of a civil airport.
| label4= 10 September 2009:
| data4 = Building permit is granted. The Voivode of Mazowieckie issued a building permit.
| label5= 8 February 2010:
| data5 = The facility is entered in the register of civil airports kept by Civil Aviation Office.
| label6= 12 March 2010:
| data6 = The investment project received an environmental decision.
| label7= 8 October 2010:
| data7 = Official start of construction.
| label8= 29 October 2010:
| data8 = Agreement with Mostostal for the construction of the terminal signed.
| label9= 1 February 2012:
| data9 = The management of WizzAir announces that as on 18 July 2012 they will move all their flights from Chopin Airport to Warsaw/Modlin Airport.
| label10= 8 February 2012:
| data10 = The Irish airline Ryanair announces it will launch flights from Warsaw Modlin Airport
| label11= 6 June 2012:
| data11 = Regional Building Inspector issued an operational permit for the airside of the airport, and the runway obtained a positive decision of the Air Force Institute of Technology.
| label12= 7 July 2012:
| data12 = An Open Day at the airport.
| label13= 13 July 2012:
| data13 = On 13 July, the President of Civil Aviation Office accepted airport taxes for Warsaw/Modlin Airport as requested by the company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin Sp. z o.o.
| label14= 15 July 2012:
| data14 = First scheduled flights. WizzAir and Ryanair operating from Modlin. The new airport taxes tariff will become effective on 15 July.
| label15= 22 December 2012:
| data15 = Closing airport runaway indefinitely for safety reasons. The construction was built using improper materials. By a Decision of the Regional Building Inspector the concrete part of runway was closed, as a result of which the airport was able to handle only those aircrafts for the landing of which a runway length of 1500 m was sufficient.
| label16= 4 July 2013:
| data16 = Re-opening airport after construction works to fix the runway.
| label17= 17 July 2013:
| data17 = Wizz Air announced it would not return to Modlin despite its re-opening.
| label18= 30 September 2013:
| data18 = First scheduled flights after re-opening - Ryanair returned to Modlin.

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The project entails the building of a new airport for Warsaw (capital city of Poland) and Mazovia Region for low-cost airlines and charter flights. The project is based on an old military runway located 35 km from Warsaw.

First plans assumed:

* rebuilding and lengthening of the runway
* building new taxiways and airport terminal
* rebuilding existing railway siding and building railway station on the airport (both not realised)
* building fright terminal (not realised).

Realisation of the project was delayed by a few years. After a few months of operation, the airport was closed due to technical and safety reasons.

The re-opening of the Modlin Airport was in June 2013, however, only one airline decided to operate from it.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa Modlin Sp. z o.o. Contracting authority is a public entity with participation of regional self-government (30,37% shares), the Town of NowyDwór Mazowiecki (4,81%), State-owned enterprise "PortyLotnicze", 30.39% and Military Property Agency, 34,43%.

==Sources of Financing==

The total budget for the project amounted to 331 807 669,05 PLN (approximately 82M EUR), including:

* European Regional Development Fund subsidiary: 64 736 000 PLN (approximately 16M EUR)
* National budget subsidiary: 11 424 000 PLN (approximately 2,85M EUR)
* Owners sources: 255 647 669,05 PLN (approximately 64 M EUR)

==Users==

Warsaw Modlin is the first airport in Poland established specifically with the intention to be used by low-cost airlines and charter carriers. Starting from June 2012, it operates as a regional public airport complementary to the Warsaw Chopin Airport. The airport handles international short- and medium-distance flights. Air operations are carried out 24hrs a day.

The airport's specific orientation at low-cost airlines is reflected in certain components of the infrastructure, particularly the terminal with no designated business waiting area, no luxury commercial or food court areas and no jet ways.

Nowadays, Modlin Airport is used by one, big, regular passenger airline (Ryanair), and realises negligible charter flights and general aviation. A small cargo terminal is planned (2015/16). Table 1 lists the forecast and actual traffic volumes.

Table 1-Forecasted and actual traffic volumes 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Year'''
! '''Forecast'''
! '''Actual'''
! '''% Actual vs Forecast traffic'''
|-
| 2012
| 900 000
| 857 481
| 95%
|-
| 2013
| 2 300 000
| 344 566
| 15%
|-
| 2014
| 2 900 000
| 1 703 219
| 59%
|}

==Project Timing==

The concept of building the airport was formulated in 2003. The initial agenda for the investment project was announced in 2005, and after this date preparation works run. Construction works started in 2010 and ended in 2013. Substantial complementary infrastructure not realised included essential connections such as the foreseen railway connector and station, and other infrastructure such as the cargo terminal.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

Modlin Airport is located only 35 km North-West from the center of Warsaw, but is not well connected - Modlin Airport has no convenient, direct connection to the capital city, (bus connection takes up to 2 hours (average 40-60 minutes), while the railway connection takes up to 1,5 h and needs one change to bus).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

The investment process was divided in 20 small contracts. Separate tendering process was inter alia for:

* demolition of existing buildings
* logging the trees
* dispose of the cut wood
* modernising runway and taxiway
* construction of the airport traffic control tower
* construction of the roads and parking areas
* construction of the water and waste infrastructure
* construction of the telecommunication networks
* construction of the fence
* modernisation of hangars
* construction of the ILS/DME system ( instrument landing system)
* construction of the passenger terminal
* procurement of furniture
* check-in counters for passenger terminal
* luggage control equipment for passenger terminal
* refuse bins with and without ashtray for passenger terminal
and many more.

The Central Anti-Corruption Agency (CBA) found irregularities in the application of the Public Procurement Law, including, inter alia, an undervaluation of contracts and sharing contracts for parts. The material gathered was submitted to the Prosecutor's Office.

===Tendering===

The main elements of ongoing contracts were: upgrading of runway, construction of airport terminal and other structures and facilities (over 20 tenders). During the execution of works, the Contracting Authority (The company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin) granted three basic contracts with 62 additional works.

===Contract Structure===

“The company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin did not have formal procedures for conducting the investment process, taking into account the risks that may occur at each of its stages, and also did not have sufficient staff resources, allowing for self-management and monitoring of contracts.

Notably, the preparation of vague and inconsistent provisions of the agreement and terms of reference resulted in additional works with direct assignment of more than 5 million zl. The Supreme Audit Office considered the assigned works as unjustified.

The documentation developed for the runway construction did not state clearly the type of aggregate to be used for the concrete mix in the construction of the belt. As a result, the contractor did not have documentation that warrants the exclusion of particles with high water absorption, which may be damaged by frost and defrosting. The related close down of the airport caused financial losses in the range of PLN 34.4 M.

===Risk Allocation===

There is no detailed information about risk share between SPV (Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin Sp. z o.o.), designer, constructor and other entities.
As a result of the over 6 months close down of the airport operation and delay in ILS (Instrument Landing System) installation, several lawsuits are currently in court, e.g. SPV contra main contractor of construction runway (PLN 34,4M), Wizzair Airlines contra SPV (PLN 11 M), LS Airport Services contra SPV (over PLN 1 M).

[[Image:Modlin1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The primary business objectives for the airport in Modlin were too optimistic. Reasons of not meeting objectives are not only the result of potential traffic overestimation, but also the failure to build reliable transportation connections (no appropriate rail and road connections) to Warsaw.

In addition, the business results reflected in the airport shut down for a few months after its launch. This event shifted the chances of achieving break event point for investments by 4-7 years . The location of the airport was controversial to both aviation experts (position into delta of 2 rivers, withseveral misty days), as well as environmentalists (breeding place of many valuable bird species). The construction process became risky due to the fragmentation of works. The latter, not only led to accusations of breach of the Public Procurement Act, but also contributed to the lack of control over the quality of the work of the contracting authority.

Despite the lack of infrastructure and transport links to the airport causing considerable inconvenience to passengers, it is now the 6th airport in the country, with the highest growth rate in number of passengers.

==Project Outcomes==

The main problem of Modlin Airport is the lack of transport infrastructure to/from airport, as a result of partly external factors and partly the low effectiveness of bodies managing the airport and the Region.

The plan of transport infrastructure for Euro 2012 was unrealistic and additionally, several planned main roads in Poland were not realised because of the financial crisis of 2009.

The plans for the railway connection were realised partly. Coaches to service Warsaw-Modlin Airport line were bought, however, building the rail infrastructure (rail station at the airport and upgrading the track) outgrew the Regional self-government and after several years of preparation works, the issue was passed to PKP (national railways).

Inconvenient passenger transport connections, delays in ILS system operation and break in airport operation resulted in Wizzair discreditation to Modlin Airport.

Suburban airport last year handled over 1.7 million passengers. Thus, Modlin in terms of passenger traffic volume, was in the sixth place in Poland and ahead of, among others, Poznan airport. According to forecasts, in 2015, the number of passengers in Modlin is to increase to 2.5 million. Although it is only used by Ryanair, it is fast expanding its route network. With this development, the airport terminal in Modlin may become too small fairly quickly. Expectation was for it to handle nearly 3 million passengers a year. Therefore, there are plans to enlarge the airport .

==References==

* http://en.modlinairport.pl/modlin-en-new/web/airport/about-the-airport-2/calendar.html
* http://warszawa.gazeta.pl/warszawa/1,34889,17394180,Modlin_szybko_sie_zapcha__Lotnisko_szykuje_sie_do.html
* http://www.biznes.newseria.pl/news/lotnisko_w_modlinie_zyski,p43543087
* http://www.modlinairport.pl/uploads/old_www/Prognoza%20ruchu%20pasazerskiego_1.pdf

Case Studies: Modlin Regional Airport, Warsaw, Poland

2016-10-12T17:52:24Z

Nimda: Created page with "{{Infobox |header1 = Modlin regional airport, Poland |header2 = |label2 = Project Type: |data2 = Brownfield |header3 = |label3 = Type of Project Financing: |data3 = Publ..."

{{Infobox
|header1 = Modlin regional airport, Poland
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Brownfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 5 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 331 807 669,05 PLN (approximately 82M EUR)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Modlin.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Modlin Airport Terminal, Poland'' 
''Source: Kuryłowicz& Associates http://www.apaka.com.pl/en#/projekty/lotnisko-w-modlinie''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 2003:
| data1 = Members of Parliament, members of the local government and entrepreneurs signed a letter of intent concerning the location of the airport on the premises of former military airfield in Modlin.
| label2= May 2005:
| data2 = Draft business plan was developed for investment project entitled "Establishment of a new communication airport by means of modernization of the existing and building new infrastructure for handling aircraft, passengers and cargo on the premises of the former military airfield".
| label3= October 2006:
| data3 = Civil Aviation Office issued a letter of commitment to provide a license to establish a public airport in Modlin. Permit for the establishment of a civil airport.
| label4= 10 September 2009:
| data4 = Building permit is granted. The Voivode of Mazowieckie issued a building permit.
| label5= 8 February 2010:
| data5 = The facility is entered in the register of civil airports kept by Civil Aviation Office.
| label6= 12 March 2010:
| data6 = The investment project received an environmental decision.
| label7= 8 October 2010:
| data7 = Official start of construction.
| label8= 29 October 2010:
| data8 = Agreement with Mostostal for the construction of the terminal signed.
| label9= 1 February 2012:
| data9 = The management of WizzAir announces that as on 18 July 2012 they will move all their flights from Chopin Airport to Warsaw/Modlin Airport.
| label10= 8 February 2012:
| data10 = The Irish airline Ryanair announces it will launch flights from Warsaw Modlin Airport
| label11= 6 June 2012:
| data11 = Regional Building Inspector issued an operational permit for the airside of the airport, and the runway obtained a positive decision of the Air Force Institute of Technology.
| label12= 7 July 2012:
| data12 = An Open Day at the airport.
| label13= 13 July 2012:
| data13 = On 13 July, the President of Civil Aviation Office accepted airport taxes for Warsaw/Modlin Airport as requested by the company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin Sp. z o.o.
| label14= 15 July 2012:
| data14 = First scheduled flights. WizzAir and Ryanair operating from Modlin. The new airport taxes tariff will become effective on 15 July.
| label15= 22 December 2012:
| data15 = Closing airport runaway indefinitely for safety reasons. The construction was built using improper materials. By a Decision of the Regional Building Inspector the concrete part of runway was closed, as a result of which the airport was able to handle only those aircrafts for the landing of which a runway length of 1500 m was sufficient.
| label16= 4 July 2013:
| data16 = Re-opening airport after construction works to fix the runway.
| label17= 17 July 2013:
| data17 = Wizz Air announced it would not return to Modlin despite its re-opening.
| label18= 30 September 2013:
| data18 = First scheduled flights after re-opening - Ryanair returned to Modlin.

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The project entails the building of a new airport for Warsaw (capital city of Poland) and Mazovia Region for low-cost airlines and charter flights. The project is based on an old military runway located 35 km from Warsaw.

First plans assumed:

* rebuilding and lengthening of the runway
* building new taxiways and airport terminal
* rebuilding existing railway siding and building railway station on the airport (both not realised)
* building fright terminal (not realised).

Realisation of the project was delayed by a few years. After a few months of operation, the airport was closed due to technical and safety reasons.

The re-opening of the Modlin Airport was in June 2013, however, only one airline decided to operate from it.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa Modlin Sp. z o.o. Contracting authority is a public entity with participation of regional self-government (30,37% shares), the Town of NowyDwór Mazowiecki (4,81%), State-owned enterprise "PortyLotnicze", 30.39% and Military Property Agency, 34,43%.

==Sources of Financing==

The total budget for the project amounted to 331 807 669,05 PLN (approximately 82M EUR), including:

* European Regional Development Fund subsidiary: 64 736 000 PLN (approximately 16M EUR)
* National budget subsidiary: 11 424 000 PLN (approximately 2,85M EUR)
* Owners sources: 255 647 669,05 PLN (approximately 64 M EUR)

==Users==

Warsaw Modlin is the first airport in Poland established specifically with the intention to be used by low-cost airlines and charter carriers. Starting from June 2012, it operates as a regional public airport complementary to the Warsaw Chopin Airport. The airport handles international short- and medium-distance flights. Air operations are carried out 24hrs a day.

The airport's specific orientation at low-cost airlines is reflected in certain components of the infrastructure, particularly the terminal with no designated business waiting area, no luxury commercial or food court areas and no jet ways.

Nowadays, Modlin Airport is used by one, big, regular passenger airline (Ryanair), and realises negligible charter flights and general aviation. A small cargo terminal is planned (2015/16). Table 1 lists the forecast and actual traffic volumes.

Table 1-Forecasted and actual traffic volumes 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Year'''
! '''Forecast'''
! '''Actual'''
! '''% Actual vs Forecast traffic'''
|-
| 2012
| 900 000
| 857 481
| 95%
|-
| 2013
| 2 300 000
| 344 566
| 15%
|-
| 2014
| 2 900 000
| 1 703 219
| 59%
|}

==Project Timing==

The concept of building the airport was formulated in 2003. The initial agenda for the investment project was announced in 2005, and after this date preparation works run. Construction works started in 2010 and ended in 2013. Substantial complementary infrastructure not realised included essential connections such as the foreseen railway connector and station, and other infrastructure such as the cargo terminal.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

Modlin Airport is located only 35 km North-West from the center of Warsaw, but is not well connected - Modlin Airport has no convenient, direct connection to the capital city, (bus connection takes up to 2 hours (average 40-60 minutes), while the railway connection takes up to 1,5 h and needs one change to bus).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

The investment process was divided in 20 small contracts. Separate tendering process was inter alia for:

- demolition of existing buildings
- logging the trees
- dispose of the cut wood
- modernising runway and taxiway
- construction of the airport traffic control tower
- construction of the roads and parking areas
- construction of the water and waste infrastructure
- construction of the telecommunication networks
- construction of the fence
- modernisation of hangars
- construction of the ILS/DME system ( instrument landing system)
- construction of the passenger terminal
- procurement of furniture
- check-in counters for passenger terminal
- luggage control equipment for passenger terminal
- refuse bins with and without ashtray for passenger terminal
and many more.

The Central Anti-Corruption Agency (CBA) found irregularities in the application of the Public Procurement Law, including, inter alia, an undervaluation of contracts and sharing contracts for parts. The material gathered was submitted to the Prosecutor's Office.

===Tendering===

The main elements of ongoing contracts were: upgrading of runway, construction of airport terminal and other structures and facilities (over 20 tenders). During the execution of works, the Contracting Authority (The company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin) granted three basic contracts with 62 additional works.

===Contract Structure===

“The company Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin did not have formal procedures for conducting the investment process, taking into account the risks that may occur at each of its stages, and also did not have sufficient staff resources, allowing for self-management and monitoring of contracts.

Notably, the preparation of vague and inconsistent provisions of the agreement and terms of reference resulted in additional works with direct assignment of more than 5 million zl. The Supreme Audit Office considered the assigned works as unjustified.

The documentation developed for the runway construction did not state clearly the type of aggregate to be used for the concrete mix in the construction of the belt. As a result, the contractor did not have documentation that warrants the exclusion of particles with high water absorption, which may be damaged by frost and defrosting. The related close down of the airport caused financial losses in the range of PLN 34.4 M.

===Risk Allocation===

There is no detailed information about risk share between SPV (Mazowiecki Port Lotniczy Warszawa-Modlin Sp. z o.o.), designer, constructor and other entities.
As a result of the over 6 months close down of the airport operation and delay in ILS (Instrument Landing System) installation, several lawsuits are currently in court, e.g. SPV contra main contractor of construction runway (PLN 34,4M), Wizzair Airlines contra SPV (PLN 11 M), LS Airport Services contra SPV (over PLN 1 M).

[[Image:Modlin1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The primary business objectives for the airport in Modlin were too optimistic. Reasons of not meeting objectives are not only the result of potential traffic overestimation, but also the failure to build reliable transportation connections (no appropriate rail and road connections) to Warsaw.

In addition, the business results reflected in the airport shut down for a few months after its launch. This event shifted the chances of achieving break event point for investments by 4-7 years . The location of the airport was controversial to both aviation experts (position into delta of 2 rivers, withseveral misty days), as well as environmentalists (breeding place of many valuable bird species). The construction process became risky due to the fragmentation of works. The latter, not only led to accusations of breach of the Public Procurement Act, but also contributed to the lack of control over the quality of the work of the contracting authority.

Despite the lack of infrastructure and transport links to the airport causing considerable inconvenience to passengers, it is now the 6th airport in the country, with the highest growth rate in number of passengers.

==Project Outcomes==

The main problem of Modlin Airport is the lack of transport infrastructure to/from airport, as a result of partly external factors and partly the low effectiveness of bodies managing the airport and the Region.

The plan of transport infrastructure for Euro 2012 was unrealistic and additionally, several planned main roads in Poland were not realised because of the financial crisis of 2009.

The plans for the railway connection were realised partly. Coaches to service Warsaw-Modlin Airport line were bought, however, building the rail infrastructure (rail station at the airport and upgrading the track) outgrew the Regional self-government and after several years of preparation works, the issue was passed to PKP (national railways).

Inconvenient passenger transport connections, delays in ILS system operation and break in airport operation resulted in Wizzair discreditation to Modlin Airport.

Suburban airport last year handled over 1.7 million passengers. Thus, Modlin in terms of passenger traffic volume, was in the sixth place in Poland and ahead of, among others, Poznan airport. According to forecasts, in 2015, the number of passengers in Modlin is to increase to 2.5 million. Although it is only used by Ryanair, it is fast expanding its route network. With this development, the airport terminal in Modlin may become too small fairly quickly. Expectation was for it to handle nearly 3 million passengers a year. Therefore, there are plans to enlarge the airport .

==References==

* http://en.modlinairport.pl/modlin-en-new/web/airport/about-the-airport-2/calendar.html
* http://warszawa.gazeta.pl/warszawa/1,34889,17394180,Modlin_szybko_sie_zapcha__Lotnisko_szykuje_sie_do.html
* http://www.biznes.newseria.pl/news/lotnisko_w_modlinie_zyski,p43543087
* http://www.modlinairport.pl/uploads/old_www/Prognoza%20ruchu%20pasazerskiego_1.pdf

Case Studies

2016-10-12T17:34:30Z

Nimda: /* Airports */

== Roads and Motorways ==

[[Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO|A19 Dishforth DBFO]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road |Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession|Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Ionia Odos Motorway|Ionia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: M6 Toll (BNRR)|M6 Toll (BNRR)]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: M80 Haggs to Stepps|M80 Haggs to Stepps]], UK

[[Case Studies: Olympia Odos Motorway|Olympia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Via-Invest Zaventem|Via-Invest Zaventem]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: E-39 Klett - Baardshaug|E-39 Klett-Baardshaug]], Norway

[[Case Studies: Istrian Y Toll Motorway|Istrian Y Toll Motorway]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Moreas Motorway, Greece|Moreas Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Central Greece Motorway (E65), Greece|Central Greece Motorway (E65)]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road, Italy|Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road]], Italy

[[Case Studies: E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand, Norway|E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand]], Norway

[[Case Studies: A2 Motorway, Poland|A2 Motorway]], Poland

[[Case Studies: A22 Algarve, Portugal|A22 Algarve]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: A23 Beira Interior, Portugal|A23 Beira Interior]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway, Spain|C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway, Spain|Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: M-45 Toll Motorway, Spain|M-45 Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain|Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci, Serbia |Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: H5 Koper-Izola Motorway, Slovenia| H5 Koper-Izola Motorway]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway , Slovenia| A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway ]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca , Serbia|Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase, Serbia|Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: E18 Muurla-Lohja, Finland|E18 Muurla-Lohja ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75, Finland | Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75 ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation | Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD)]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation | “Slavyanka” Roads ]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: M-25 London Orbital, U.K. | M-25 London Orbital ]], U.K.

== Bridges/Tunnels ==

[[Case Studies: Rio-Antirio Bridge, Greece |Rio-Antirio Bridge]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Lusoponte Bridge, Portugal | Lusoponte Bridge ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Blanka Tunnel Complex, Czech Republic| The Blanka Tunnel Complex]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: “Herrentunnel”Lübeck, Germany |“Herrentunnel”Lübeck]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Coen Tunnel|Coen Tunnel]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation| Orlovski Tunnel ]], Russian Federation

== Rail ==



[[Case Studies: FERTAGUS Train|FERTAGUS Train]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link|Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Combiplan Nijverdal, The Netherlands | Combiplan Nijverdal]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Gardermobanen, Norway | Gardermobanen ]], Norway

== Ports ==

[[Case Studies: Piraeus Container Terminal|Piraeus Container Terminal]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Sines Container Terminal|Sines Container Terminal]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Valencia Cruise Terminal|Valencia Cruise Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock|Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock]], Belgium


[[Case Studies: Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal, Rijeka, Croatia |Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development, Cyprus | Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona, Spain | Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal, Spain | Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Durrës Port East Terminal, Albania | Durrës Port East Terminal]], Albania

[[Case Studies: OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende, Belgium | OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende ]], Belgium

== Urban Transport ==

[[Case Studies: Brabo 1, Flanders|Brabo 1, Flanders]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: The Caen' TVR|The Caen' TVR]], France

[[Case Studies: Metro Sul do Tejo|Metro Sul do Tejo]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Reims' Tramway|The Reims' Tramway]], France

[[Case Studies: SEVICI|SEVICI]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester, United Kingdom | Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester]], United Kingdom

[[Case Studies: Athens Tramway, Greece | Athens Tramway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part, Poland | Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part]], Poland

[[Case Studies: Vélo’v, France| Vélo’v ]], France

[[Case Studies: The Lyon's Tramway T4, France| The Lyon's Tramway T4 ]], France

[[Case Studies: Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe, Germany | Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Metro do Porto S.A., Portugal | Metro do Porto S.A. ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Metro de Malaga, Spain | Metro de Malaga ]], Spain

== Airports ==

[[Case Studies: Larnaca and Paphos International Airports|Larnaca and Paphos International Airports]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Tirana International Airport|International Airport of Tirana]], Albania

[[Case Studies: Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”| Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, Germany | Berlin-Brandenburg Airport ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion, Portugal | Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Modlin Regional Airport, Warsaw, Poland | Modlin Regional Airport ]], Poland

== Terminals and Depots ==



[[Case Studies: Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen|Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: The Hague New Train Central Station |The Hague New Train Central Station]], The Netherlands

== Service Infrastructure ==

[[Case Studies: Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive), Albania | Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive)]], Albania

File:Modlin1.png

2016-10-12T17:33:31Z

Nimda:

File:Modlin.png

2016-10-12T17:33:20Z

Nimda:

Case Studies: Metro de Malaga, Spain

2016-10-12T17:29:19Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Metro de Malaga, Spain
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = PPP
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 35 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 762-795M EUR
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Malaga.png|400px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Current lines of Metro de Malaga, Spain ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 1995: Conception
| data1 =
| label2= 31 October 2003:
| data2 = Call for tender
| label3= 13 October 2004:
| data3 = Contract Award
| label4= 2 December 2004:
| data4 = Contract signed
| label5= 2006:
| data5 = Initial Works plan approval (modified)
| label6= 3 February 2006:
| data6 = Finance Close
| label7= 2008:
| data7 = Start of works
| label8= 2010:
| data8 = Concession agreement revision
| label9= 2012:
| data9 = Works plan revision
| label10= 27 September 2013:
| data10 = Institutional agreement to start operations
| label11= 18 July 2014:
| data11 = New concession and financing agreement
| label12= 30 July 2014:
| data12 = Start of Operations (1st phase)
| label13= 2017:
| data13 = Expected completion of works

}}
}}

==Introduction==

“Metro de Malaga” is a light rail network serving the city of Malaga, Andalusia, Spain. The project concerns the construction of the first two lines of a new underground railway system in Malaga, one of Spain’s largest cities, with a population of some 550,000 inhabitants, with the metropolitan area having a population of more than one million. The light rail network is operated by Metro de Malaga, a concessioner formed by the Public Works Agency of the Andalusia regional government, several builders and operators, as well as the financial institution Cajamar (a regional commercial bank).

The first two lines (Line 1 and Line 2) of the light metro system, covering the areas to the west and south-west of the city and spanning 11.3km in total length, entered commercial service at the end of July 2014. The Line 1 runs for 6.7km from Andalucía Tech to El Perchel, in the Central district of Malaga, located on the right bank of Guadalmedina. The 4.5km-long underground section of the line comprises of 11 stations, including the El Perchel station that is shared with Line 2. The section provides easy access to the University campus, the City of Justice and Carlos Haya Hospital. The Line 2 runs 4.6km along the coastal belt from Palacio de los Deportes to El Perchel and is completely underground. It has seven stations, including the one shared with the Line 1 and provides easy access to districts of Carretera de Cádiz and the Martin Carpena Arena. The two lines cross at the El Perchel station, which offers access to Renfe's AVE high-speed commuter rail service, as well as the intercity bus hub.

Construction for the project was agreed to start in 2006 and the first two lines of the metro were completed by June 2014. However, the two lines comprise only 81% of the planned network under the first development phase of the broader metro network. The remaining 19% of the network includes: 1) the under-construction El Perchel-Guadalmedina section, scheduled for completion in 2017; 2) a 295m-long underground section from the Guadalmedina station to the Atarazanas station in the city centre and 3) a 1.8km over-ground track extension of Line 2, from Guadalmedina station towards the Hospital Civil station situated north of the city centre.

This previous solution was adopted after long institutional negotiations and contract revision. In effect, there were project improvements concerning design, intermodal transfer and safety, as well as a political controversy mainly due to a new proposal about the central section from underground to surface. Consequently, there were significant delays and cost overruns of the original project. As a result of the new agreement, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing of the Government of Andalusia launched at its cost a tender for the infrastructure works required for the Guadalmedina-Atarazanas section in July 2014. The remaining sections of the planned network are scheduled for completion by the end of 2017 (see Figure 1).

The original budget was 403 M EUR (including 41 M EUR for rolling stock). However, due to significant changes in the final design and as a consequence, delays in works completion, investment at commencement of operations in 2014 exceeded 600 M EUR, of which 570 M EUR concerned construction costs. According to the last institutional agreement, at project completion due at the end of 2017, the total investment after covering remaining sections, is expected to be between of 765 and 795 M EUR.

The rolling stock is mainly composed of 14 CAF Urbos 3 tram units, each capable of accommodating 221 passengers. The vehicles with a maximum speed of 70km/h are equipped with triple braking system, which includes an electric brake on the engine, as well as mechanical and electromagnetic brake axles on the rail track.

The signalling system used in the first two lines of the metro is based on Alstom's Urbalis 400 communications-based train control (CBTC) solution. The system uses wireless communication technology and automatic train protection (ATP) system to enhance operational efficiency by increasing the number of trains per hour, while enabling a swift response to any incident.

The two lines are expected to have an annual ridership of 17.1 million passengers, which is set to exceed 20 million by 2018 after the network is completed.

The project was proposed as part of the Intermodal Transport Plan for Malaga, a six-line light metro network, in 1999. The Government of Andalusia started planning for the development of two lines of the proposed network in 2002 and signed a collaboration agreement with the Malaga City Council in the following year. The two lines awarded were the first phase of a total of 6 lines to be in operation in the entire metropolitan city. These six future metro lines will also be a central part of the Railway Corridor project on the Costa del Sol (intercity plan) that will be launched between Estepona (West) and Nerja (east). It will be a cross route linking the two ends of the Malaga coastline and will mitigate the severe circulatory problems experienced in the N-340, the A-7 and AP-7 (see Figure 2).

[[Image:Malaga1.png|400px]] 
''Figure 2: Future line development of Metro de Malaga, Spain''

There is some level of exclusivity in the project. The project may compete with other transportation modes, mainly buses and taxis. However, this new way of transportation would be more efficient in terms of time and cost. There is also an alternative sustainable transport mode based on a cycling route running along the sea front.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Malaga Metro is a light railway network promoted by the regional government of the autonomous community, Junta de Andalucia, as part of an Infrastructure Regional Plan to be developed under a Public Private Partnership strategy.

In Spain, the central government keeps main competencies in railways, ground transport, airports, ports and other main infrastructures of general interest or those across several Autonomous Communities and national territory. While the autonomous governments may get transferred into its Statute, all related competences only affect its own autonomous territory. The regional governments have been very active in providing public infrastructures. Likewise, the main autonomous communities have utilized diverse PPP models based on mixed payment mechanisms, to provide other public facilities and services in the transport sector. At regional level, although each autonomous community may have a different organization, it most usually follows a similar state pattern, with a Public Works and Housing Department (Consejeria), which often has an Infrastructure office and Public Agencies to implement the Regional Governments policies.

In the autonomous community of Andalucia, the regional government, through the Consejería de ObrasPúblicas y Transportes, has developed a master Infrastructure Regional Plan. To accomplish this plan, the Consejería created in 1996 the public institution Gestion de Infraestructuras de Andalucía. S.A. (GIASA), responsible for road, hydraulic and transport infrastructure. Later in 2011, this institution merged with another public institution the Ferrocarriles de la Junta de Andalucía, creating the sole Agencia de ObraPública de la Junta de Andalucía, which is currently the contracting agency responsible for most public infrastructure. This agency carries out the planning, tendering, contracting and financing/funding tasks, and often participates in the project company. This is the case of Metro de Malaga, in which the regional government acts as concession grantor and shareholder of the concession with a share of approximately 24%.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The project sponsors and other interested parties are the following:

* Junta de Andalucia,
* European Investment Bank (EIB)
* Metro de Malaga, S.A
* Private partners
* Malaga Town council
* Central Government

Original shareholders of the SPV were, Junta de Andalucia (25.00%), FCC (26.73%), Azvi (12.62%), Sando (12.62%) Comsa (11.14%), Vera (11.14%), and Cajamar (0.75%) (regional commercial bank).

However, currently Metro de Malaga is owned by the regional government Junta de Andalucía (23.69%) and a number of private investors with the following shares: Globalvía (15.35%), FCC (10.01%), Cajamar (18.86%), Azvi, through Cointer (11.96%), Comsa-Emte (10.56%), Sando (8.57%) and Vera (1.03%). Currently, equity sums € 136.5 million.

The key subcontractors (builders) are the following:

* FCC (large national /international builder)
* Azvi (large regional/ medium national builder)
* Comsa (medium national builder)
* Sando (small national / biggest local builder)
* Vera (small national / second biggest local builder)

Recently, a process to change ownership started and some shareholding changes might take place.

Globalvia is the concessioner holding integrated by FCC and Bankia groups, who are currently (2015) in negotiations to sale Gobalvia to a Malaysian Fund.

Some shareholders, representing a total of 39.4% of shares (Sando -8.57%-, Azvi, through Cointer,-11.96%-, and Cajamar-18.86%-), have a selling position. This group recently failed to complete its stake sale to Blackstone Fund (USA), but is still looking for other alternatives.

Other main contractors involved are as follows:

* Agencia de Obra Publica, as grantor and partner, co-lead the project.
* Metro Bilbao provides technical assistance for the implementation of the project.
* CAF was awarded a 41 M EUR contract to deliver 14 Urbos 3 tram units for the Malaga Metro. CAF Transport Engineering is responsible for technical assistance coordination for the commissioning of the metro.
* A joint venture between Vimac and two other companies was awarded a contract for electrification and electromechanical installations that include the installation of six traction substations and corresponding distribution and interconnection centres (CDI's), 18,500 m.
* Alstom delivered this signalling system for the two lines of the metro under a contract awarded in 2006.

Figure 3 illustrates main parties and roles in the project.

[[Image:Malaga2.png]] 
''Figure 3: Participants in Metro de Malaga project''

==Sources of Financing==

The total investment for the light metro network planned in the first phase is estimated to be 765-795 M EUR. In addition to the shareholder’s equity contributions, the European Investment Bank granted in 2006 a 20-year loan of 325 M EUR for the project, while the remaining financing comes from the government of Andalusia and the Malaga city council.

EIB loan has two tranches, the first one signed on February 3, 1996 for 50 M EUR and the second one signed on March 26, 2010 for 275M EUR. The loan is covered with a guarantee line granted by the regional government of Junta de Andalucia, which also covers other projects such as the Metro de Sevilla.

In summary, the financing structure is the following:

* Shareholder capital: 136.5 M EUR.
* Public contributions: 212 M EUR (may be incremented at completion) (33% of total investment)
* EIB loans: 325 M EUR. (Max. 50% of total investment)

==Users==

The main users are individual passengers, with current lines mainly serving commuters from several neighbourhoods to downtown and industrial parks, as well as university students.

The main stakeholders include the Regional government, Town council, Local districts council, and the Metropolitan consortium.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The main reason for selecting the delivery method/financing scheme is the identification of this project as part of the Regional Infrastructure Plan to procure urban mobility that includes the public private partnership as selected strategy for its implementation.

In the selection of this project, the reasons considered in choosing Private (co)financing, have been:

* Large scale project
* Long term project approach
* Public funding restrictions and institutional financing availability
* Adopting technology innovation

The business model may be considered as a rather finance-based approach and consists of a mix of public funding with operating subventions and usage payments in accordance with performance indicators, as well as private funding from user charges.

==Project Timing==

Metro de Malaga required more than a decade of project discussions and nearly eight years of works, and has significantly changed mobility in the area of Cadiz road and the new Teatinos neighbourhoods. Since the last tram operated in Malaga streets in 1961, several project ideas have been raised from different public authorities. But it was in 1995, when the Junta de Andalucia included a light metro for the Malaga Intermodal Transport Plan for the first time.

When the project was approved in 2006, the regional and national economy was booming after more than a decade of economic growth. The economic downturn impacted the local economy and regional GDP, while also the per capita income was lower than expectations at operations commencement in 2014. The unemployment level was higher than forecasted and mobility levels decreased. However, after the summer of 2014, the economy is clearly growing again, mainly pushed by the tourist sector which is showing historical records of activity.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

For the time, Metro de Malaga is exclusively an urban project, which covers the west part of the city along the coast and the new developments for residential and industrial areas. The north and east part of the city, as well as the centre area are still out of the scope of the project and most likely will require a long time to be considered.

Areas covered by lines 1 and 2 needed to improve mobility out of the existing traffic congestion. The area covered by line 1, along the Cadiz road, is, by far, the highest population density area of the region and new developments along the coast makes the density level even higher, therefore, basic traffic assumptions were meaningful and correct. Similarly, line 2 runs by a growing area, which hosts new university buildings, a dynamic technological and industrialized zone, new commercial and business parks and new residential developments, which, in spite of the economic downturn, show considerable economic activity, even higher than planned a decade earlier.

Nevertheless, there is clear need for extending existing lines and building new, in order for the project to become a global city transportation mode and achieve outstanding use. In fact, the two lines awarded were the first phase of a total of 6 lines to be in operation in the entire metropolitan city.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

Open call is the usual procurement method in Spain, though it is also common to include a negotiation process in the final stage to deal with changes in the project and open issues not included in the tendering process. Considering all arising issues in the Metro de Malaga project, after the open call and selection process, long negotiations (not part of the tender) were required.

Four Bidders were considered in the 1st Stage. The winner consortium was Metromar, led by the main building company FCC, and jointed with Comsa, Azvi and local Sando and Vera building companies, as well as the local financial institution Cajamar. The other three competing consortiums were led by national builders, SACYR, Ferrovial-Necxo, and Dragados-CAF, respectively.

===Contract Structure===

The light metro project follows a Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain (DBFOM) contract. The concession comprises of two lines, depot and maintenance facilities, a fleet of vehicles and intermodal facilities. However, since the project faced design and construction changes, public provision also consisted of Design, Built and Finance, mainly for the amended part of the project.

In addition, financial guarantees were provided by the grantor. Moreover, financial guarantees were granted to the European Investment bank from Junta de Andalucia.

The contract also includes public contributions in operations to cover the operating costs (technical tariff).

The contract does not include renegotiation clauses in line with the usual Spanish procurement standards. There are clauses and penalties for timely and quality completion of Works. Also, some penalties are included in the contract for contract breach or non-compliance of general duties set in the contract. Early contract termination is included.

Performance guarantees were required to the winner consortium both for project construction and operation.

''Repayment mechanism''

The type of expected remuneration during the operating phase included:

* User charges
* Usage payment
* Subventions

The concession grantor makes payments as operating subvention (fix) and user payments (variable) which are the main source of income/revenues. As a result, user charges become secondary revenues/income.
User charges (fares) are proposed by the concessioner, but need approval by the public authorities (grantor).

===Risk Allocation===

The risk allocation scheme is presented in Figure 4.

[[Image:Malaga3.png]] 
''Figure 4: Risk allocation''

In principle, design and construction risks are totally transferred to the private sector. However in practice, lack of proper detail and inadequate planning in project preparation by the grantor (which is the reference for the final project design), alter at a big extend, the risk transfer scheme originally included in the contract. Exploitation and commercial risks are at some extent mitigated by the operating public contribution scheme. Financing risk is also mainly mitigated by the financial guarantee provided by the grantor. In conclusion, overall, much of the risk level is kept by the public sector.

===Performance===

Operation started recently in 2014 and more time is required for an appropriate assessment.

There are some performance indicators which may incur penalties related to:

* Network availability: service and rolling material fleet
* Network reliability: rolling material fleet and fixed installations
* Timekeeping service: Delays
* Commercial reputation: cleaning, lighting, ticketing operations

The cost/budgeted of investments ratio is: 150%, and may be increased to 200% after the whole project finishes. The reasons behind this overrun were the modifications carried out during the main works, especially in terms of underground conversion and extensions, as well as improvements in stations. There are also significant innovations impacting investment and operation costs.

The concessioner and authorities claim that traffic and revenues are in line with forecast in the initial operation phase, and are expected to considerably increase once the project is completed (mainly when downtown stations from Gualdamedina to Atarazanas open), most likely to take place after 2017.

According to a press release issued by the concessioner at 2014 year closing, Metro de Malaga has achieved 2.05 million passengers in only five months of operation. This is much in the range of the forecast, just 1% above the 2.03 expected number of users. In 2014’s last quarter, the transport service achieved 436,000 users/month equivalent to over 17,000 passenger/day. For the first annual period of 2015, it is expected to reach 4.9 million users.

''Re-negotiations''

There have been several rounds of renegotiations after the project award (3 or more) sometime for a long period (more than a year). The main reason(s) of re-negotiation are:

* Contract design (misallocation of risks including revenue guarantees, Investment requirements / Exclusive private financing)
* Political and social environment (mainly institutional conflicts and disagreements)

The final outcome of the renegotiations was mainly an increase in the public contribution to offset the cost overrun and an extension of the concession period to similar time to the delays at works commencement.

The resulting delays were 2 years for the beginning of works and 4 years for the completion of works/opening of operation.

==Project Outcomes==

At present, the general level of the project's perceived success is low because of the cost of the works and delays in opening.

The Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that can be considered are the number of users and the additional lines and stations that provide transportation services throughout the city.

The Critical Failure Factors (CFFs) are the following:

* Poor or lack of ex-ante evaluation
* Inadequate works planning
* Additional works requirements.

With regard to acceptability, apart from the initial opposition to large and long works from the affected commercial business, users are in general satisfied.

The main objectives were to provide sustainable urban mobility and reduce congestion. In effect, the expected benefits of the project are time gains for users, cost savings for car users shifted to the metro, cost savings from reduced bus service operations that could be invested in complementary lines and decongestion effects in the city centre.

Economic impact

* Cost savings for daily commuters and private car users derived from less traffic congestion,
* Improved access to downtown to many commuters

Social impact

* Positive effect in reducing private car traffic running on the surface, in terms of pollution, noise and global warming.

Environmental impact

* Contribution to reducing pollution.

==References==

* AccountsChamber of Andalucia. (2013).Public Private activities analysis of Public Works Agency of Junta de Andalucia.
* Andalusian Advisory Council.(2014): Changes in Metro de Malaga Public Work contract.
* Concession de Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos. Los casos de Metro de Sevilla y Metro de Málaga
* General presentationof Public Works Agency of Junta de Andalucia(2012)
* http://www.latoga.es/detallearticulo.asp?id=1060683210&nro=156&nom=Noviembre/Diciembre%202005
* Metro de Malaga concession agreements and tendering conditions document (Pliego de CláusulasAdministrativasParticulares)
* Metro de Malaga web page: http://metromalaga.es/
* Nores, J.L. y Fernandez, F.J. (2005) Contrato de Concesion e Obra Publica – Andalucia. Nº 156 | Noviembre/Diciembre 2005
* Press articles (mainly local press, Diario Sur and Malaga Hoy)
* www.aopandalucia.es/.../05_Concesion_Metro_Sevilla_y_Malaga.pdf

Case Studies: Metro de Malaga, Spain

2016-10-12T17:28:17Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Metro de Malaga, Spain
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = PPP
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 35 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 762-795M EUR
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Malaga.png|400px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Current lines of Metro de Malaga, Spain ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 1995: Conception
| data1 =
| label2= 31 October 2003:
| data2 = Call for tender
| label3= 13 October 2004:
| data3 = Contract Award
| label4= 2 December 2004:
| data4 = Contract signed
| label5= 2006:
| data5 = Initial Works plan approval (modified)
| label6= 3 February 2006:
| data6 = Finance Close
| label7= 2008:
| data7 = Start of works
| label8= 2010:
| data8 = Concession agreement revision
| label9= 2012:
| data9 = Works plan revision
| label10= 27 September 2013:
| data10 = Institutional agreement to start operations
| label11= 18 July 2014:
| data11 = New concession and financing agreement
| label12= 30 July 2014:
| data12 = Start of Operations (1st phase)
| label13= 2017:
| data13 = Expected completion of works

}}
}}

==Introduction==

“Metro de Malaga” is a light rail network serving the city of Malaga, Andalusia, Spain. The project concerns the construction of the first two lines of a new underground railway system in Malaga, one of Spain’s largest cities, with a population of some 550,000 inhabitants, with the metropolitan area having a population of more than one million. The light rail network is operated by Metro de Malaga, a concessioner formed by the Public Works Agency of the Andalusia regional government, several builders and operators, as well as the financial institution Cajamar (a regional commercial bank).

The first two lines (Line 1 and Line 2) of the light metro system, covering the areas to the west and south-west of the city and spanning 11.3km in total length, entered commercial service at the end of July 2014. The Line 1 runs for 6.7km from Andalucía Tech to El Perchel, in the Central district of Malaga, located on the right bank of Guadalmedina. The 4.5km-long underground section of the line comprises of 11 stations, including the El Perchel station that is shared with Line 2. The section provides easy access to the University campus, the City of Justice and Carlos Haya Hospital. The Line 2 runs 4.6km along the coastal belt from Palacio de los Deportes to El Perchel and is completely underground. It has seven stations, including the one shared with the Line 1 and provides easy access to districts of Carretera de Cádiz and the Martin Carpena Arena. The two lines cross at the El Perchel station, which offers access to Renfe's AVE high-speed commuter rail service, as well as the intercity bus hub.

Construction for the project was agreed to start in 2006 and the first two lines of the metro were completed by June 2014. However, the two lines comprise only 81% of the planned network under the first development phase of the broader metro network. The remaining 19% of the network includes: 1) the under-construction El Perchel-Guadalmedina section, scheduled for completion in 2017; 2) a 295m-long underground section from the Guadalmedina station to the Atarazanas station in the city centre and 3) a 1.8km over-ground track extension of Line 2, from Guadalmedina station towards the Hospital Civil station situated north of the city centre.

This previous solution was adopted after long institutional negotiations and contract revision. In effect, there were project improvements concerning design, intermodal transfer and safety, as well as a political controversy mainly due to a new proposal about the central section from underground to surface. Consequently, there were significant delays and cost overruns of the original project. As a result of the new agreement, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing of the Government of Andalusia launched at its cost a tender for the infrastructure works required for the Guadalmedina-Atarazanas section in July 2014. The remaining sections of the planned network are scheduled for completion by the end of 2017 (see Figure 1).

The original budget was 403 M EUR (including 41 M EUR for rolling stock). However, due to significant changes in the final design and as a consequence, delays in works completion, investment at commencement of operations in 2014 exceeded 600 M EUR, of which 570 M EUR concerned construction costs. According to the last institutional agreement, at project completion due at the end of 2017, the total investment after covering remaining sections, is expected to be between of 765 and 795 M EUR.

The rolling stock is mainly composed of 14 CAF Urbos 3 tram units, each capable of accommodating 221 passengers. The vehicles with a maximum speed of 70km/h are equipped with triple braking system, which includes an electric brake on the engine, as well as mechanical and electromagnetic brake axles on the rail track.

The signalling system used in the first two lines of the metro is based on Alstom's Urbalis 400 communications-based train control (CBTC) solution. The system uses wireless communication technology and automatic train protection (ATP) system to enhance operational efficiency by increasing the number of trains per hour, while enabling a swift response to any incident.

The two lines are expected to have an annual ridership of 17.1 million passengers, which is set to exceed 20 million by 2018 after the network is completed.

The project was proposed as part of the Intermodal Transport Plan for Malaga, a six-line light metro network, in 1999. The Government of Andalusia started planning for the development of two lines of the proposed network in 2002 and signed a collaboration agreement with the Malaga City Council in the following year. The two lines awarded were the first phase of a total of 6 lines to be in operation in the entire metropolitan city. These six future metro lines will also be a central part of the Railway Corridor project on the Costa del Sol (intercity plan) that will be launched between Estepona (West) and Nerja (east). It will be a cross route linking the two ends of the Malaga coastline and will mitigate the severe circulatory problems experienced in the N-340, the A-7 and AP-7 (see Figure 2).

[[Image:Malaga1.png|400px]] 
''Figure 2: Future line development of Metro de Malaga, Spain''

There is some level of exclusivity in the project. The project may compete with other transportation modes, mainly buses and taxis. However, this new way of transportation would be more efficient in terms of time and cost. There is also an alternative sustainable transport mode based on a cycling route running along the sea front.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Malaga Metro is a light railway network promoted by the regional government of the autonomous community, Junta de Andalucia, as part of an Infrastructure Regional Plan to be developed under a Public Private Partnership strategy.

In Spain, the central government keeps main competencies in railways, ground transport, airports, ports and other main infrastructures of general interest or those across several Autonomous Communities and national territory. While the autonomous governments may get transferred into its Statute, all related competences only affect its own autonomous territory. The regional governments have been very active in providing public infrastructures. Likewise, the main autonomous communities have utilized diverse PPP models based on mixed payment mechanisms, to provide other public facilities and services in the transport sector. At regional level, although each autonomous community may have a different organization, it most usually follows a similar state pattern, with a Public Works and Housing Department (Consejeria), which often has an Infrastructure office and Public Agencies to implement the Regional Governments policies.

In the autonomous community of Andalucia, the regional government, through the Consejería de ObrasPúblicas y Transportes, has developed a master Infrastructure Regional Plan. To accomplish this plan, the Consejería created in 1996 the public institution Gestion de Infraestructuras de Andalucía. S.A. (GIASA), responsible for road, hydraulic and transport infrastructure. Later in 2011, this institution merged with another public institution the Ferrocarriles de la Junta de Andalucía, creating the sole Agencia de ObraPública de la Junta de Andalucía, which is currently the contracting agency responsible for most public infrastructure. This agency carries out the planning, tendering, contracting and financing/funding tasks, and often participates in the project company. This is the case of Metro de Malaga, in which the regional government acts as concession grantor and shareholder of the concession with a share of approximately 24%.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The project sponsors and other interested parties are the following:

* Junta de Andalucia,
* European Investment Bank (EIB)
* Metro de Malaga, S.A
* Private partners
* Malaga Town council
* Central Government

Original shareholders of the SPV were, Junta de Andalucia (25.00%), FCC (26.73%), Azvi (12.62%), Sando (12.62%) Comsa (11.14%), Vera (11.14%), and Cajamar (0.75%) (regional commercial bank).

However, currently Metro de Malaga is owned by the regional government Junta de Andalucía (23.69%) and a number of private investors with the following shares: Globalvía (15.35%), FCC (10.01%), Cajamar (18.86%), Azvi, through Cointer (11.96%), Comsa-Emte (10.56%), Sando (8.57%) and Vera (1.03%). Currently, equity sums € 136.5 million.

The key subcontractors (builders) are the following:

* FCC (large national /international builder)
* Azvi (large regional/ medium national builder)
* Comsa (medium national builder)
* Sando (small national / biggest local builder)
* Vera (small national / second biggest local builder)

Recently, a process to change ownership started and some shareholding changes might take place.

Globalvia is the concessioner holding integrated by FCC and Bankia groups, who are currently (2015) in negotiations to sale Gobalvia to a Malaysian Fund.

Some shareholders, representing a total of 39.4% of shares (Sando -8.57%-, Azvi, through Cointer,-11.96%-, and Cajamar-18.86%-), have a selling position. This group recently failed to complete its stake sale to Blackstone Fund (USA), but is still looking for other alternatives.

Other main contractors involved are as follows:

* Agencia de Obra Publica, as grantor and partner, co-lead the project.
* Metro Bilbao provides technical assistance for the implementation of the project.
* CAF was awarded a 41 M EUR contract to deliver 14 Urbos 3 tram units for the Malaga Metro. CAF Transport Engineering is responsible for technical assistance coordination for the commissioning of the metro.
* A joint venture between Vimac and two other companies was awarded a contract for electrification and electromechanical installations that include the installation of six traction substations and corresponding distribution and interconnection centres (CDI's), 18,500 m.
* Alstom delivered this signalling system for the two lines of the metro under a contract awarded in 2006.

Figure 3 illustrates main parties and roles in the project.

[[Image:Malaga2.png]] 
''Figure 3: Participants in Metro de Malaga project''

==Sources of Financing==

The total investment for the light metro network planned in the first phase is estimated to be 765-795 M EUR. In addition to the shareholder’s equity contributions, the European Investment Bank granted in 2006 a 20-year loan of 325 M EUR for the project, while the remaining financing comes from the government of Andalusia and the Malaga city council.

EIB loan has two tranches, the first one signed on February 3, 1996 for 50 M EUR and the second one signed on March 26, 2010 for 275M EUR. The loan is covered with a guarantee line granted by the regional government of Junta de Andalucia, which also covers other projects such as the Metro de Sevilla.

In summary, the financing structure is the following:

* Shareholder capital: 136.5 M EUR.
* Public contributions: 212 M EUR (may be incremented at completion) (33% of total investment)
* EIB loans: 325 M EUR. (Max. 50% of total investment)

==Users==

The main users are individual passengers, with current lines mainly serving commuters from several neighbourhoods to downtown and industrial parks, as well as university students.

The main stakeholders include the Regional government, Town council, Local districts council, and the Metropolitan consortium.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The main reason for selecting the delivery method/financing scheme is the identification of this project as part of the Regional Infrastructure Plan to procure urban mobility that includes the public private partnership as selected strategy for its implementation.

In the selection of this project, the reasons considered in choosing Private (co)financing, have been:

* Large scale project
* Long term project approach
* Public funding restrictions and institutional financing availability
* Adopting technology innovation

The business model may be considered as a rather finance-based approach and consists of a mix of public funding with operating subventions and usage payments in accordance with performance indicators, as well as private funding from user charges.

==Project Timing==

Metro de Malaga required more than a decade of project discussions and nearly eight years of works, and has significantly changed mobility in the area of Cadiz road and the new Teatinos neighbourhoods. Since the last tram operated in Malaga streets in 1961, several project ideas have been raised from different public authorities. But it was in 1995, when the Junta de Andalucia included a light metro for the Malaga Intermodal Transport Plan for the first time.

When the project was approved in 2006, the regional and national economy was booming after more than a decade of economic growth. The economic downturn impacted the local economy and regional GDP, while also the per capita income was lower than expectations at operations commencement in 2014. The unemployment level was higher than forecasted and mobility levels decreased. However, after the summer of 2014, the economy is clearly growing again, mainly pushed by the tourist sector which is showing historical records of activity.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

For the time, Metro de Malaga is exclusively an urban project, which covers the west part of the city along the coast and the new developments for residential and industrial areas. The north and east part of the city, as well as the centre area are still out of the scope of the project and most likely will require a long time to be considered.

Areas covered by lines 1 and 2 needed to improve mobility out of the existing traffic congestion. The area covered by line 1, along the Cadiz road, is, by far, the highest population density area of the region and new developments along the coast makes the density level even higher, therefore, basic traffic assumptions were meaningful and correct. Similarly, line 2 runs by a growing area, which hosts new university buildings, a dynamic technological and industrialized zone, new commercial and business parks and new residential developments, which, in spite of the economic downturn, show considerable economic activity, even higher than planned a decade earlier.

Nevertheless, there is clear need for extending existing lines and building new, in order for the project to become a global city transportation mode and achieve outstanding use. In fact, the two lines awarded were the first phase of a total of 6 lines to be in operation in the entire metropolitan city.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

Open call is the usual procurement method in Spain, though it is also common to include a negotiation process in the final stage to deal with changes in the project and open issues not included in the tendering process. Considering all arising issues in the Metro de Malaga project, after the open call and selection process, long negotiations (not part of the tender) were required.

Four Bidders were considered in the 1st Stage. The winner consortium was Metromar, led by the main building company FCC, and jointed with Comsa, Azvi and local Sando and Vera building companies, as well as the local financial institution Cajamar. The other three competing consortiums were led by national builders, SACYR, Ferrovial-Necxo, and Dragados-CAF, respectively.

===Contract Structure===

The light metro project follows a Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain (DBFOM) contract. The concession comprises of two lines, depot and maintenance facilities, a fleet of vehicles and intermodal facilities. However, since the project faced design and construction changes, public provision also consisted of Design, Built and Finance, mainly for the amended part of the project.

In addition, financial guarantees were provided by the grantor. Moreover, financial guarantees were granted to the European Investment bank from Junta de Andalucia.

The contract also includes public contributions in operations to cover the operating costs (technical tariff).

The contract does not include renegotiation clauses in line with the usual Spanish procurement standards. There are clauses and penalties for timely and quality completion of Works. Also, some penalties are included in the contract for contract breach or non-compliance of general duties set in the contract. Early contract termination is included.

Performance guarantees were required to the winner consortium both for project construction and operation.

''Repayment mechanism''

The type of expected remuneration during the operating phase included:

* User charges
* Usage payment
* Subventions

The concession grantor makes payments as operating subvention (fix) and user payments (variable) which are the main source of income/revenues. As a result, user charges become secondary revenues/income.
User charges (fares) are proposed by the concessioner, but need approval by the public authorities (grantor).

===Risk Allocation===

The risk allocation scheme is presented in Figure 4.

[[Image:Malaga3.png]] 
''Figure 4: Risk allocation''

In principle, design and construction risks are totally transferred to the private sector. However in practice, lack of proper detail and inadequate planning in project preparation by the grantor (which is the reference for the final project design), alter at a big extend, the risk transfer scheme originally included in the contract. Exploitation and commercial risks are at some extent mitigated by the operating public contribution scheme. Financing risk is also mainly mitigated by the financial guarantee provided by the grantor. In conclusion, overall, much of the risk level is kept by the public sector.

===Performance===

Operation started recently in 2014 and more time is required for an appropriate assessment.

There are some performance indicators which may incur penalties related to:

* Network availability: service and rolling material fleet
* Network reliability: rolling material fleet and fixed installations
* Timekeeping service: Delays
* Commercial reputation: cleaning, lighting, ticketing operations

The cost/budgeted of investments ratio is: 150%, and may be increased to 200% after the whole project finishes. The reasons behind this overrun were the modifications carried out during the main works, especially in terms of underground conversion and extensions, as well as improvements in stations. There are also significant innovations impacting investment and operation costs.

The concessioner and authorities claim that traffic and revenues are in line with forecast in the initial operation phase, and are expected to considerably increase once the project is completed (mainly when downtown stations from Gualdamedina to Atarazanas open), most likely to take place after 2017.

According to a press release issued by the concessioner at 2014 year closing, Metro de Malaga has achieved 2.05 million passengers in only five months of operation. This is much in the range of the forecast, just 1% above the 2.03 expected number of users. In 2014’s last quarter, the transport service achieved 436,000 users/month equivalent to over 17,000 passenger/day. For the first annual period of 2015, it is expected to reach 4.9 million users.

''Re-negotiations''

There have been several rounds of renegotiations after the project award (3 or more) sometime for a long period (more than a year). The main reason(s) of re-negotiation are:

* Contract design (misallocation of risks including revenue guarantees, Investment requirements / Exclusive private financing)
* Political and social environment (mainly institutional conflicts and disagreements)

The final outcome of the renegotiations was mainly an increase in the public contribution to offset the cost overrun and an extension of the concession period to similar time to the delays at works commencement.

The resulting delays were 2 years for the beginning of works and 4 years for the completion of works/opening of operation.

==Project Outcomes==

At present, the general level of the project's perceived success is low because of the cost of the works and delays in opening.

The Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that can be considered are the number of users and the additional lines and stations that provide transportation services throughout the city.

The Critical Failure Factors (CFFs) are the following:

* Poor or lack of ex-ante evaluation
* Inadequate works planning
* Additional works requirements.

With regard to acceptability, apart from the initial opposition to large and long works from the affected commercial business, users are in general satisfied.

The main objectives were to provide sustainable urban mobility and reduce congestion. In effect, the expected benefits of the project are time gains for users, cost savings for car users shifted to the metro, cost savings from reduced bus service operations that could be invested in complementary lines and decongestion effects in the city centre.

Economic impact

* Cost savings for daily commuters and private car users derived from less traffic congestion,
* Improved access to downtown to many commuters

Social impact

* Positive effect in reducing private car traffic running on the surface, in terms of pollution, noise and global warming.

Environmental impact

* Contribution to reducing pollution.

==References==

* AccountsChamber of Andalucia. (2013).Public Private activities analysis of Public Works Agency of Junta de Andalucia.
* Andalusian Advisory Council.(2014): Changes in Metro de Malaga Public Work contract.
* Concession de Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos. Los casos de Metro de Sevilla y Metro de Málaga
* General presentationof Public Works Agency of Junta de Andalucia(2012)
* http://www.latoga.es/detallearticulo.asp?id=1060683210&nro=156&nom=Noviembre/Diciembre%202005 Metro de Malaga concession agreements and tendering conditions document (Pliego de CláusulasAdministrativasParticulares)
* Metro de Malaga web page: http://metromalaga.es/
* Nores, J.L. y Fernandez, F.J. (2005) Contrato de Concesion e Obra Publica – Andalucia. Nº 156 | Noviembre/Diciembre 2005
* Press articles (mainly local press, Diario Sur and Malaga Hoy)
* www.aopandalucia.es/.../05_Concesion_Metro_Sevilla_y_Malaga.pdf

Case Studies: Metro de Malaga, Spain

2016-10-12T17:27:51Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Metro de Malaga, Spain
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = PPP
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 35 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 762-795M EUR
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Malaga.png|400px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Current lines of Metro de Malaga, Spain ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 1995: Conception
| data1 =
| label2= 31 October 2003:
| data2 = Call for tender
| label3= 13 October 2004:
| data3 = Contract Award
| label4= 2 December 2004:
| data4 = Contract signed
| label5= 2006:
| data5 = Initial Works plan approval (modified)
| label6= 3 February 2006:
| data6 = Finance Close
| label7= 2008:
| data7 = Start of works
| label8= 2010:
| data8 = Concession agreement revision
| label9= 2012:
| data9 = Works plan revision
| label10= 27 September 2013:
| data10 = Institutional agreement to start operations
| label11= 18 July 2014:
| data11 = New concession and financing agreement
| label12= 30 July 2014:
| data12 = Start of Operations (1st phase)
| label13= 2017:
| data13 = Expected completion of works

}}
}}

==Introduction==

“Metro de Malaga” is a light rail network serving the city of Malaga, Andalusia, Spain. The project concerns the construction of the first two lines of a new underground railway system in Malaga, one of Spain’s largest cities, with a population of some 550,000 inhabitants, with the metropolitan area having a population of more than one million. The light rail network is operated by Metro de Malaga, a concessioner formed by the Public Works Agency of the Andalusia regional government, several builders and operators, as well as the financial institution Cajamar (a regional commercial bank).

The first two lines (Line 1 and Line 2) of the light metro system, covering the areas to the west and south-west of the city and spanning 11.3km in total length, entered commercial service at the end of July 2014. The Line 1 runs for 6.7km from Andalucía Tech to El Perchel, in the Central district of Malaga, located on the right bank of Guadalmedina. The 4.5km-long underground section of the line comprises of 11 stations, including the El Perchel station that is shared with Line 2. The section provides easy access to the University campus, the City of Justice and Carlos Haya Hospital. The Line 2 runs 4.6km along the coastal belt from Palacio de los Deportes to El Perchel and is completely underground. It has seven stations, including the one shared with the Line 1 and provides easy access to districts of Carretera de Cádiz and the Martin Carpena Arena. The two lines cross at the El Perchel station, which offers access to Renfe's AVE high-speed commuter rail service, as well as the intercity bus hub.

Construction for the project was agreed to start in 2006 and the first two lines of the metro were completed by June 2014. However, the two lines comprise only 81% of the planned network under the first development phase of the broader metro network. The remaining 19% of the network includes: 1) the under-construction El Perchel-Guadalmedina section, scheduled for completion in 2017; 2) a 295m-long underground section from the Guadalmedina station to the Atarazanas station in the city centre and 3) a 1.8km over-ground track extension of Line 2, from Guadalmedina station towards the Hospital Civil station situated north of the city centre.

This previous solution was adopted after long institutional negotiations and contract revision. In effect, there were project improvements concerning design, intermodal transfer and safety, as well as a political controversy mainly due to a new proposal about the central section from underground to surface. Consequently, there were significant delays and cost overruns of the original project. As a result of the new agreement, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing of the Government of Andalusia launched at its cost a tender for the infrastructure works required for the Guadalmedina-Atarazanas section in July 2014. The remaining sections of the planned network are scheduled for completion by the end of 2017 (see Figure 1).

The original budget was 403 M EUR (including 41 M EUR for rolling stock). However, due to significant changes in the final design and as a consequence, delays in works completion, investment at commencement of operations in 2014 exceeded 600 M EUR, of which 570 M EUR concerned construction costs. According to the last institutional agreement, at project completion due at the end of 2017, the total investment after covering remaining sections, is expected to be between of 765 and 795 M EUR.

The rolling stock is mainly composed of 14 CAF Urbos 3 tram units, each capable of accommodating 221 passengers. The vehicles with a maximum speed of 70km/h are equipped with triple braking system, which includes an electric brake on the engine, as well as mechanical and electromagnetic brake axles on the rail track.

The signalling system used in the first two lines of the metro is based on Alstom's Urbalis 400 communications-based train control (CBTC) solution. The system uses wireless communication technology and automatic train protection (ATP) system to enhance operational efficiency by increasing the number of trains per hour, while enabling a swift response to any incident.

The two lines are expected to have an annual ridership of 17.1 million passengers, which is set to exceed 20 million by 2018 after the network is completed.

The project was proposed as part of the Intermodal Transport Plan for Malaga, a six-line light metro network, in 1999. The Government of Andalusia started planning for the development of two lines of the proposed network in 2002 and signed a collaboration agreement with the Malaga City Council in the following year. The two lines awarded were the first phase of a total of 6 lines to be in operation in the entire metropolitan city. These six future metro lines will also be a central part of the Railway Corridor project on the Costa del Sol (intercity plan) that will be launched between Estepona (West) and Nerja (east). It will be a cross route linking the two ends of the Malaga coastline and will mitigate the severe circulatory problems experienced in the N-340, the A-7 and AP-7 (see Figure 2).

[[Image:Malaga1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Future line development of Metro de Malaga, Spain''

There is some level of exclusivity in the project. The project may compete with other transportation modes, mainly buses and taxis. However, this new way of transportation would be more efficient in terms of time and cost. There is also an alternative sustainable transport mode based on a cycling route running along the sea front.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Malaga Metro is a light railway network promoted by the regional government of the autonomous community, Junta de Andalucia, as part of an Infrastructure Regional Plan to be developed under a Public Private Partnership strategy.

In Spain, the central government keeps main competencies in railways, ground transport, airports, ports and other main infrastructures of general interest or those across several Autonomous Communities and national territory. While the autonomous governments may get transferred into its Statute, all related competences only affect its own autonomous territory. The regional governments have been very active in providing public infrastructures. Likewise, the main autonomous communities have utilized diverse PPP models based on mixed payment mechanisms, to provide other public facilities and services in the transport sector. At regional level, although each autonomous community may have a different organization, it most usually follows a similar state pattern, with a Public Works and Housing Department (Consejeria), which often has an Infrastructure office and Public Agencies to implement the Regional Governments policies.

In the autonomous community of Andalucia, the regional government, through the Consejería de ObrasPúblicas y Transportes, has developed a master Infrastructure Regional Plan. To accomplish this plan, the Consejería created in 1996 the public institution Gestion de Infraestructuras de Andalucía. S.A. (GIASA), responsible for road, hydraulic and transport infrastructure. Later in 2011, this institution merged with another public institution the Ferrocarriles de la Junta de Andalucía, creating the sole Agencia de ObraPública de la Junta de Andalucía, which is currently the contracting agency responsible for most public infrastructure. This agency carries out the planning, tendering, contracting and financing/funding tasks, and often participates in the project company. This is the case of Metro de Malaga, in which the regional government acts as concession grantor and shareholder of the concession with a share of approximately 24%.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The project sponsors and other interested parties are the following:

* Junta de Andalucia,
* European Investment Bank (EIB)
* Metro de Malaga, S.A
* Private partners
* Malaga Town council
* Central Government

Original shareholders of the SPV were, Junta de Andalucia (25.00%), FCC (26.73%), Azvi (12.62%), Sando (12.62%) Comsa (11.14%), Vera (11.14%), and Cajamar (0.75%) (regional commercial bank).

However, currently Metro de Malaga is owned by the regional government Junta de Andalucía (23.69%) and a number of private investors with the following shares: Globalvía (15.35%), FCC (10.01%), Cajamar (18.86%), Azvi, through Cointer (11.96%), Comsa-Emte (10.56%), Sando (8.57%) and Vera (1.03%). Currently, equity sums € 136.5 million.

The key subcontractors (builders) are the following:

* FCC (large national /international builder)
* Azvi (large regional/ medium national builder)
* Comsa (medium national builder)
* Sando (small national / biggest local builder)
* Vera (small national / second biggest local builder)

Recently, a process to change ownership started and some shareholding changes might take place.

Globalvia is the concessioner holding integrated by FCC and Bankia groups, who are currently (2015) in negotiations to sale Gobalvia to a Malaysian Fund.

Some shareholders, representing a total of 39.4% of shares (Sando -8.57%-, Azvi, through Cointer,-11.96%-, and Cajamar-18.86%-), have a selling position. This group recently failed to complete its stake sale to Blackstone Fund (USA), but is still looking for other alternatives.

Other main contractors involved are as follows:

* Agencia de Obra Publica, as grantor and partner, co-lead the project.
* Metro Bilbao provides technical assistance for the implementation of the project.
* CAF was awarded a 41 M EUR contract to deliver 14 Urbos 3 tram units for the Malaga Metro. CAF Transport Engineering is responsible for technical assistance coordination for the commissioning of the metro.
* A joint venture between Vimac and two other companies was awarded a contract for electrification and electromechanical installations that include the installation of six traction substations and corresponding distribution and interconnection centres (CDI's), 18,500 m.
* Alstom delivered this signalling system for the two lines of the metro under a contract awarded in 2006.

Figure 3 illustrates main parties and roles in the project.

[[Image:Malaga2.png]] 
''Figure 3: Participants in Metro de Malaga project''

==Sources of Financing==

The total investment for the light metro network planned in the first phase is estimated to be 765-795 M EUR. In addition to the shareholder’s equity contributions, the European Investment Bank granted in 2006 a 20-year loan of 325 M EUR for the project, while the remaining financing comes from the government of Andalusia and the Malaga city council.

EIB loan has two tranches, the first one signed on February 3, 1996 for 50 M EUR and the second one signed on March 26, 2010 for 275M EUR. The loan is covered with a guarantee line granted by the regional government of Junta de Andalucia, which also covers other projects such as the Metro de Sevilla.

In summary, the financing structure is the following:

* Shareholder capital: 136.5 M EUR.
* Public contributions: 212 M EUR (may be incremented at completion) (33% of total investment)
* EIB loans: 325 M EUR. (Max. 50% of total investment)

==Users==

The main users are individual passengers, with current lines mainly serving commuters from several neighbourhoods to downtown and industrial parks, as well as university students.

The main stakeholders include the Regional government, Town council, Local districts council, and the Metropolitan consortium.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The main reason for selecting the delivery method/financing scheme is the identification of this project as part of the Regional Infrastructure Plan to procure urban mobility that includes the public private partnership as selected strategy for its implementation.

In the selection of this project, the reasons considered in choosing Private (co)financing, have been:

* Large scale project
* Long term project approach
* Public funding restrictions and institutional financing availability
* Adopting technology innovation

The business model may be considered as a rather finance-based approach and consists of a mix of public funding with operating subventions and usage payments in accordance with performance indicators, as well as private funding from user charges.

==Project Timing==

Metro de Malaga required more than a decade of project discussions and nearly eight years of works, and has significantly changed mobility in the area of Cadiz road and the new Teatinos neighbourhoods. Since the last tram operated in Malaga streets in 1961, several project ideas have been raised from different public authorities. But it was in 1995, when the Junta de Andalucia included a light metro for the Malaga Intermodal Transport Plan for the first time.

When the project was approved in 2006, the regional and national economy was booming after more than a decade of economic growth. The economic downturn impacted the local economy and regional GDP, while also the per capita income was lower than expectations at operations commencement in 2014. The unemployment level was higher than forecasted and mobility levels decreased. However, after the summer of 2014, the economy is clearly growing again, mainly pushed by the tourist sector which is showing historical records of activity.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

For the time, Metro de Malaga is exclusively an urban project, which covers the west part of the city along the coast and the new developments for residential and industrial areas. The north and east part of the city, as well as the centre area are still out of the scope of the project and most likely will require a long time to be considered.

Areas covered by lines 1 and 2 needed to improve mobility out of the existing traffic congestion. The area covered by line 1, along the Cadiz road, is, by far, the highest population density area of the region and new developments along the coast makes the density level even higher, therefore, basic traffic assumptions were meaningful and correct. Similarly, line 2 runs by a growing area, which hosts new university buildings, a dynamic technological and industrialized zone, new commercial and business parks and new residential developments, which, in spite of the economic downturn, show considerable economic activity, even higher than planned a decade earlier.

Nevertheless, there is clear need for extending existing lines and building new, in order for the project to become a global city transportation mode and achieve outstanding use. In fact, the two lines awarded were the first phase of a total of 6 lines to be in operation in the entire metropolitan city.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

Open call is the usual procurement method in Spain, though it is also common to include a negotiation process in the final stage to deal with changes in the project and open issues not included in the tendering process. Considering all arising issues in the Metro de Malaga project, after the open call and selection process, long negotiations (not part of the tender) were required.

Four Bidders were considered in the 1st Stage. The winner consortium was Metromar, led by the main building company FCC, and jointed with Comsa, Azvi and local Sando and Vera building companies, as well as the local financial institution Cajamar. The other three competing consortiums were led by national builders, SACYR, Ferrovial-Necxo, and Dragados-CAF, respectively.

===Contract Structure===

The light metro project follows a Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain (DBFOM) contract. The concession comprises of two lines, depot and maintenance facilities, a fleet of vehicles and intermodal facilities. However, since the project faced design and construction changes, public provision also consisted of Design, Built and Finance, mainly for the amended part of the project.

In addition, financial guarantees were provided by the grantor. Moreover, financial guarantees were granted to the European Investment bank from Junta de Andalucia.

The contract also includes public contributions in operations to cover the operating costs (technical tariff).

The contract does not include renegotiation clauses in line with the usual Spanish procurement standards. There are clauses and penalties for timely and quality completion of Works. Also, some penalties are included in the contract for contract breach or non-compliance of general duties set in the contract. Early contract termination is included.

Performance guarantees were required to the winner consortium both for project construction and operation.

''Repayment mechanism''

The type of expected remuneration during the operating phase included:

* User charges
* Usage payment
* Subventions

The concession grantor makes payments as operating subvention (fix) and user payments (variable) which are the main source of income/revenues. As a result, user charges become secondary revenues/income.
User charges (fares) are proposed by the concessioner, but need approval by the public authorities (grantor).

===Risk Allocation===

The risk allocation scheme is presented in Figure 4.

[[Image:Malaga3.png]] 
''Figure 4: Risk allocation''

In principle, design and construction risks are totally transferred to the private sector. However in practice, lack of proper detail and inadequate planning in project preparation by the grantor (which is the reference for the final project design), alter at a big extend, the risk transfer scheme originally included in the contract. Exploitation and commercial risks are at some extent mitigated by the operating public contribution scheme. Financing risk is also mainly mitigated by the financial guarantee provided by the grantor. In conclusion, overall, much of the risk level is kept by the public sector.

===Performance===

Operation started recently in 2014 and more time is required for an appropriate assessment.

There are some performance indicators which may incur penalties related to:

* Network availability: service and rolling material fleet
* Network reliability: rolling material fleet and fixed installations
* Timekeeping service: Delays
* Commercial reputation: cleaning, lighting, ticketing operations

The cost/budgeted of investments ratio is: 150%, and may be increased to 200% after the whole project finishes. The reasons behind this overrun were the modifications carried out during the main works, especially in terms of underground conversion and extensions, as well as improvements in stations. There are also significant innovations impacting investment and operation costs.

The concessioner and authorities claim that traffic and revenues are in line with forecast in the initial operation phase, and are expected to considerably increase once the project is completed (mainly when downtown stations from Gualdamedina to Atarazanas open), most likely to take place after 2017.

According to a press release issued by the concessioner at 2014 year closing, Metro de Malaga has achieved 2.05 million passengers in only five months of operation. This is much in the range of the forecast, just 1% above the 2.03 expected number of users. In 2014’s last quarter, the transport service achieved 436,000 users/month equivalent to over 17,000 passenger/day. For the first annual period of 2015, it is expected to reach 4.9 million users.

''Re-negotiations''

There have been several rounds of renegotiations after the project award (3 or more) sometime for a long period (more than a year). The main reason(s) of re-negotiation are:

* Contract design (misallocation of risks including revenue guarantees, Investment requirements / Exclusive private financing)
* Political and social environment (mainly institutional conflicts and disagreements)

The final outcome of the renegotiations was mainly an increase in the public contribution to offset the cost overrun and an extension of the concession period to similar time to the delays at works commencement.

The resulting delays were 2 years for the beginning of works and 4 years for the completion of works/opening of operation.

==Project Outcomes==

At present, the general level of the project's perceived success is low because of the cost of the works and delays in opening.

The Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that can be considered are the number of users and the additional lines and stations that provide transportation services throughout the city.

The Critical Failure Factors (CFFs) are the following:

* Poor or lack of ex-ante evaluation
* Inadequate works planning
* Additional works requirements.

With regard to acceptability, apart from the initial opposition to large and long works from the affected commercial business, users are in general satisfied.

The main objectives were to provide sustainable urban mobility and reduce congestion. In effect, the expected benefits of the project are time gains for users, cost savings for car users shifted to the metro, cost savings from reduced bus service operations that could be invested in complementary lines and decongestion effects in the city centre.

Economic impact

* Cost savings for daily commuters and private car users derived from less traffic congestion,
* Improved access to downtown to many commuters

Social impact

* Positive effect in reducing private car traffic running on the surface, in terms of pollution, noise and global warming.

Environmental impact

* Contribution to reducing pollution.

==References==

* AccountsChamber of Andalucia. (2013).Public Private activities analysis of Public Works Agency of Junta de Andalucia.
* Andalusian Advisory Council.(2014): Changes in Metro de Malaga Public Work contract.
* Concession de Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos. Los casos de Metro de Sevilla y Metro de Málaga
* General presentationof Public Works Agency of Junta de Andalucia(2012)
* http://www.latoga.es/detallearticulo.asp?id=1060683210&nro=156&nom=Noviembre/Diciembre%202005 Metro de Malaga concession agreements and tendering conditions document (Pliego de CláusulasAdministrativasParticulares)
* Metro de Malaga web page: http://metromalaga.es/
* Nores, J.L. y Fernandez, F.J. (2005) Contrato de Concesion e Obra Publica – Andalucia. Nº 156 | Noviembre/Diciembre 2005
* Press articles (mainly local press, Diario Sur and Malaga Hoy)
* www.aopandalucia.es/.../05_Concesion_Metro_Sevilla_y_Malaga.pdf

Case Studies: Metro de Malaga, Spain

2016-10-12T17:27:31Z

Nimda: Created page with "{{Infobox |header1 = Metro de Malaga, Spain |header2 = |label2 = Project Type: |data2 = Greenfield |header3 = |label3 = Type of Project Financing: |data3 = PPP |header4 ..."

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|header1 = Metro de Malaga, Spain
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = PPP
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 35 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 762-795M EUR
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Malaga.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Current lines of Metro de Malaga, Spain ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 1995: Conception
| data1 =
| label2= 31 October 2003:
| data2 = Call for tender
| label3= 13 October 2004:
| data3 = Contract Award
| label4= 2 December 2004:
| data4 = Contract signed
| label5= 2006:
| data5 = Initial Works plan approval (modified)
| label6= 3 February 2006:
| data6 = Finance Close
| label7= 2008:
| data7 = Start of works
| label8= 2010:
| data8 = Concession agreement revision
| label9= 2012:
| data9 = Works plan revision
| label10= 27 September 2013:
| data10 = Institutional agreement to start operations
| label11= 18 July 2014:
| data11 = New concession and financing agreement
| label12= 30 July 2014:
| data12 = Start of Operations (1st phase)
| label13= 2017:
| data13 = Expected completion of works

}}
}}

==Introduction==

“Metro de Malaga” is a light rail network serving the city of Malaga, Andalusia, Spain. The project concerns the construction of the first two lines of a new underground railway system in Malaga, one of Spain’s largest cities, with a population of some 550,000 inhabitants, with the metropolitan area having a population of more than one million. The light rail network is operated by Metro de Malaga, a concessioner formed by the Public Works Agency of the Andalusia regional government, several builders and operators, as well as the financial institution Cajamar (a regional commercial bank).

The first two lines (Line 1 and Line 2) of the light metro system, covering the areas to the west and south-west of the city and spanning 11.3km in total length, entered commercial service at the end of July 2014. The Line 1 runs for 6.7km from Andalucía Tech to El Perchel, in the Central district of Malaga, located on the right bank of Guadalmedina. The 4.5km-long underground section of the line comprises of 11 stations, including the El Perchel station that is shared with Line 2. The section provides easy access to the University campus, the City of Justice and Carlos Haya Hospital. The Line 2 runs 4.6km along the coastal belt from Palacio de los Deportes to El Perchel and is completely underground. It has seven stations, including the one shared with the Line 1 and provides easy access to districts of Carretera de Cádiz and the Martin Carpena Arena. The two lines cross at the El Perchel station, which offers access to Renfe's AVE high-speed commuter rail service, as well as the intercity bus hub.

Construction for the project was agreed to start in 2006 and the first two lines of the metro were completed by June 2014. However, the two lines comprise only 81% of the planned network under the first development phase of the broader metro network. The remaining 19% of the network includes: 1) the under-construction El Perchel-Guadalmedina section, scheduled for completion in 2017; 2) a 295m-long underground section from the Guadalmedina station to the Atarazanas station in the city centre and 3) a 1.8km over-ground track extension of Line 2, from Guadalmedina station towards the Hospital Civil station situated north of the city centre.

This previous solution was adopted after long institutional negotiations and contract revision. In effect, there were project improvements concerning design, intermodal transfer and safety, as well as a political controversy mainly due to a new proposal about the central section from underground to surface. Consequently, there were significant delays and cost overruns of the original project. As a result of the new agreement, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing of the Government of Andalusia launched at its cost a tender for the infrastructure works required for the Guadalmedina-Atarazanas section in July 2014. The remaining sections of the planned network are scheduled for completion by the end of 2017 (see Figure 1).

The original budget was 403 M EUR (including 41 M EUR for rolling stock). However, due to significant changes in the final design and as a consequence, delays in works completion, investment at commencement of operations in 2014 exceeded 600 M EUR, of which 570 M EUR concerned construction costs. According to the last institutional agreement, at project completion due at the end of 2017, the total investment after covering remaining sections, is expected to be between of 765 and 795 M EUR.

The rolling stock is mainly composed of 14 CAF Urbos 3 tram units, each capable of accommodating 221 passengers. The vehicles with a maximum speed of 70km/h are equipped with triple braking system, which includes an electric brake on the engine, as well as mechanical and electromagnetic brake axles on the rail track.

The signalling system used in the first two lines of the metro is based on Alstom's Urbalis 400 communications-based train control (CBTC) solution. The system uses wireless communication technology and automatic train protection (ATP) system to enhance operational efficiency by increasing the number of trains per hour, while enabling a swift response to any incident.

The two lines are expected to have an annual ridership of 17.1 million passengers, which is set to exceed 20 million by 2018 after the network is completed.

The project was proposed as part of the Intermodal Transport Plan for Malaga, a six-line light metro network, in 1999. The Government of Andalusia started planning for the development of two lines of the proposed network in 2002 and signed a collaboration agreement with the Malaga City Council in the following year. The two lines awarded were the first phase of a total of 6 lines to be in operation in the entire metropolitan city. These six future metro lines will also be a central part of the Railway Corridor project on the Costa del Sol (intercity plan) that will be launched between Estepona (West) and Nerja (east). It will be a cross route linking the two ends of the Malaga coastline and will mitigate the severe circulatory problems experienced in the N-340, the A-7 and AP-7 (see Figure 2).

[[Image:Malaga1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Future line development of Metro de Malaga, Spain''

There is some level of exclusivity in the project. The project may compete with other transportation modes, mainly buses and taxis. However, this new way of transportation would be more efficient in terms of time and cost. There is also an alternative sustainable transport mode based on a cycling route running along the sea front.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Malaga Metro is a light railway network promoted by the regional government of the autonomous community, Junta de Andalucia, as part of an Infrastructure Regional Plan to be developed under a Public Private Partnership strategy.

In Spain, the central government keeps main competencies in railways, ground transport, airports, ports and other main infrastructures of general interest or those across several Autonomous Communities and national territory. While the autonomous governments may get transferred into its Statute, all related competences only affect its own autonomous territory. The regional governments have been very active in providing public infrastructures. Likewise, the main autonomous communities have utilized diverse PPP models based on mixed payment mechanisms, to provide other public facilities and services in the transport sector. At regional level, although each autonomous community may have a different organization, it most usually follows a similar state pattern, with a Public Works and Housing Department (Consejeria), which often has an Infrastructure office and Public Agencies to implement the Regional Governments policies.

In the autonomous community of Andalucia, the regional government, through the Consejería de ObrasPúblicas y Transportes, has developed a master Infrastructure Regional Plan. To accomplish this plan, the Consejería created in 1996 the public institution Gestion de Infraestructuras de Andalucía. S.A. (GIASA), responsible for road, hydraulic and transport infrastructure. Later in 2011, this institution merged with another public institution the Ferrocarriles de la Junta de Andalucía, creating the sole Agencia de ObraPública de la Junta de Andalucía, which is currently the contracting agency responsible for most public infrastructure. This agency carries out the planning, tendering, contracting and financing/funding tasks, and often participates in the project company. This is the case of Metro de Malaga, in which the regional government acts as concession grantor and shareholder of the concession with a share of approximately 24%.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The project sponsors and other interested parties are the following:

* Junta de Andalucia,
* European Investment Bank (EIB)
* Metro de Malaga, S.A
* Private partners
* Malaga Town council
* Central Government

Original shareholders of the SPV were, Junta de Andalucia (25.00%), FCC (26.73%), Azvi (12.62%), Sando (12.62%) Comsa (11.14%), Vera (11.14%), and Cajamar (0.75%) (regional commercial bank).

However, currently Metro de Malaga is owned by the regional government Junta de Andalucía (23.69%) and a number of private investors with the following shares: Globalvía (15.35%), FCC (10.01%), Cajamar (18.86%), Azvi, through Cointer (11.96%), Comsa-Emte (10.56%), Sando (8.57%) and Vera (1.03%). Currently, equity sums € 136.5 million.

The key subcontractors (builders) are the following:

* FCC (large national /international builder)
* Azvi (large regional/ medium national builder)
* Comsa (medium national builder)
* Sando (small national / biggest local builder)
* Vera (small national / second biggest local builder)

Recently, a process to change ownership started and some shareholding changes might take place.

Globalvia is the concessioner holding integrated by FCC and Bankia groups, who are currently (2015) in negotiations to sale Gobalvia to a Malaysian Fund.

Some shareholders, representing a total of 39.4% of shares (Sando -8.57%-, Azvi, through Cointer,-11.96%-, and Cajamar-18.86%-), have a selling position. This group recently failed to complete its stake sale to Blackstone Fund (USA), but is still looking for other alternatives.

Other main contractors involved are as follows:

* Agencia de Obra Publica, as grantor and partner, co-lead the project.
* Metro Bilbao provides technical assistance for the implementation of the project.
* CAF was awarded a 41 M EUR contract to deliver 14 Urbos 3 tram units for the Malaga Metro. CAF Transport Engineering is responsible for technical assistance coordination for the commissioning of the metro.
* A joint venture between Vimac and two other companies was awarded a contract for electrification and electromechanical installations that include the installation of six traction substations and corresponding distribution and interconnection centres (CDI's), 18,500 m.
* Alstom delivered this signalling system for the two lines of the metro under a contract awarded in 2006.

Figure 3 illustrates main parties and roles in the project.

[[Image:Malaga2.png]] 
''Figure 3: Participants in Metro de Malaga project''

==Sources of Financing==

The total investment for the light metro network planned in the first phase is estimated to be 765-795 M EUR. In addition to the shareholder’s equity contributions, the European Investment Bank granted in 2006 a 20-year loan of 325 M EUR for the project, while the remaining financing comes from the government of Andalusia and the Malaga city council.

EIB loan has two tranches, the first one signed on February 3, 1996 for 50 M EUR and the second one signed on March 26, 2010 for 275M EUR. The loan is covered with a guarantee line granted by the regional government of Junta de Andalucia, which also covers other projects such as the Metro de Sevilla.

In summary, the financing structure is the following:

* Shareholder capital: 136.5 M EUR.
* Public contributions: 212 M EUR (may be incremented at completion) (33% of total investment)
* EIB loans: 325 M EUR. (Max. 50% of total investment)

==Users==

The main users are individual passengers, with current lines mainly serving commuters from several neighbourhoods to downtown and industrial parks, as well as university students.

The main stakeholders include the Regional government, Town council, Local districts council, and the Metropolitan consortium.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The main reason for selecting the delivery method/financing scheme is the identification of this project as part of the Regional Infrastructure Plan to procure urban mobility that includes the public private partnership as selected strategy for its implementation.

In the selection of this project, the reasons considered in choosing Private (co)financing, have been:

* Large scale project
* Long term project approach
* Public funding restrictions and institutional financing availability
* Adopting technology innovation

The business model may be considered as a rather finance-based approach and consists of a mix of public funding with operating subventions and usage payments in accordance with performance indicators, as well as private funding from user charges.

==Project Timing==

Metro de Malaga required more than a decade of project discussions and nearly eight years of works, and has significantly changed mobility in the area of Cadiz road and the new Teatinos neighbourhoods. Since the last tram operated in Malaga streets in 1961, several project ideas have been raised from different public authorities. But it was in 1995, when the Junta de Andalucia included a light metro for the Malaga Intermodal Transport Plan for the first time.

When the project was approved in 2006, the regional and national economy was booming after more than a decade of economic growth. The economic downturn impacted the local economy and regional GDP, while also the per capita income was lower than expectations at operations commencement in 2014. The unemployment level was higher than forecasted and mobility levels decreased. However, after the summer of 2014, the economy is clearly growing again, mainly pushed by the tourist sector which is showing historical records of activity.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

For the time, Metro de Malaga is exclusively an urban project, which covers the west part of the city along the coast and the new developments for residential and industrial areas. The north and east part of the city, as well as the centre area are still out of the scope of the project and most likely will require a long time to be considered.

Areas covered by lines 1 and 2 needed to improve mobility out of the existing traffic congestion. The area covered by line 1, along the Cadiz road, is, by far, the highest population density area of the region and new developments along the coast makes the density level even higher, therefore, basic traffic assumptions were meaningful and correct. Similarly, line 2 runs by a growing area, which hosts new university buildings, a dynamic technological and industrialized zone, new commercial and business parks and new residential developments, which, in spite of the economic downturn, show considerable economic activity, even higher than planned a decade earlier.

Nevertheless, there is clear need for extending existing lines and building new, in order for the project to become a global city transportation mode and achieve outstanding use. In fact, the two lines awarded were the first phase of a total of 6 lines to be in operation in the entire metropolitan city.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

Open call is the usual procurement method in Spain, though it is also common to include a negotiation process in the final stage to deal with changes in the project and open issues not included in the tendering process. Considering all arising issues in the Metro de Malaga project, after the open call and selection process, long negotiations (not part of the tender) were required.

Four Bidders were considered in the 1st Stage. The winner consortium was Metromar, led by the main building company FCC, and jointed with Comsa, Azvi and local Sando and Vera building companies, as well as the local financial institution Cajamar. The other three competing consortiums were led by national builders, SACYR, Ferrovial-Necxo, and Dragados-CAF, respectively.

===Contract Structure===

The light metro project follows a Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain (DBFOM) contract. The concession comprises of two lines, depot and maintenance facilities, a fleet of vehicles and intermodal facilities. However, since the project faced design and construction changes, public provision also consisted of Design, Built and Finance, mainly for the amended part of the project.

In addition, financial guarantees were provided by the grantor. Moreover, financial guarantees were granted to the European Investment bank from Junta de Andalucia.

The contract also includes public contributions in operations to cover the operating costs (technical tariff).

The contract does not include renegotiation clauses in line with the usual Spanish procurement standards. There are clauses and penalties for timely and quality completion of Works. Also, some penalties are included in the contract for contract breach or non-compliance of general duties set in the contract. Early contract termination is included.

Performance guarantees were required to the winner consortium both for project construction and operation.

''Repayment mechanism''

The type of expected remuneration during the operating phase included:

* User charges
* Usage payment
* Subventions

The concession grantor makes payments as operating subvention (fix) and user payments (variable) which are the main source of income/revenues. As a result, user charges become secondary revenues/income.
User charges (fares) are proposed by the concessioner, but need approval by the public authorities (grantor).

===Risk Allocation===

The risk allocation scheme is presented in Figure 4.

[[Image:Malaga3.png]] 
''Figure 4: Risk allocation''

In principle, design and construction risks are totally transferred to the private sector. However in practice, lack of proper detail and inadequate planning in project preparation by the grantor (which is the reference for the final project design), alter at a big extend, the risk transfer scheme originally included in the contract. Exploitation and commercial risks are at some extent mitigated by the operating public contribution scheme. Financing risk is also mainly mitigated by the financial guarantee provided by the grantor. In conclusion, overall, much of the risk level is kept by the public sector.

===Performance===

Operation started recently in 2014 and more time is required for an appropriate assessment.

There are some performance indicators which may incur penalties related to:

* Network availability: service and rolling material fleet
* Network reliability: rolling material fleet and fixed installations
* Timekeeping service: Delays
* Commercial reputation: cleaning, lighting, ticketing operations

The cost/budgeted of investments ratio is: 150%, and may be increased to 200% after the whole project finishes. The reasons behind this overrun were the modifications carried out during the main works, especially in terms of underground conversion and extensions, as well as improvements in stations. There are also significant innovations impacting investment and operation costs.

The concessioner and authorities claim that traffic and revenues are in line with forecast in the initial operation phase, and are expected to considerably increase once the project is completed (mainly when downtown stations from Gualdamedina to Atarazanas open), most likely to take place after 2017.

According to a press release issued by the concessioner at 2014 year closing, Metro de Malaga has achieved 2.05 million passengers in only five months of operation. This is much in the range of the forecast, just 1% above the 2.03 expected number of users. In 2014’s last quarter, the transport service achieved 436,000 users/month equivalent to over 17,000 passenger/day. For the first annual period of 2015, it is expected to reach 4.9 million users.

''Re-negotiations''

There have been several rounds of renegotiations after the project award (3 or more) sometime for a long period (more than a year). The main reason(s) of re-negotiation are:

* Contract design (misallocation of risks including revenue guarantees, Investment requirements / Exclusive private financing)
* Political and social environment (mainly institutional conflicts and disagreements)

The final outcome of the renegotiations was mainly an increase in the public contribution to offset the cost overrun and an extension of the concession period to similar time to the delays at works commencement.

The resulting delays were 2 years for the beginning of works and 4 years for the completion of works/opening of operation.

==Project Outcomes==

At present, the general level of the project's perceived success is low because of the cost of the works and delays in opening.

The Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that can be considered are the number of users and the additional lines and stations that provide transportation services throughout the city.

The Critical Failure Factors (CFFs) are the following:

* Poor or lack of ex-ante evaluation
* Inadequate works planning
* Additional works requirements.

With regard to acceptability, apart from the initial opposition to large and long works from the affected commercial business, users are in general satisfied.

The main objectives were to provide sustainable urban mobility and reduce congestion. In effect, the expected benefits of the project are time gains for users, cost savings for car users shifted to the metro, cost savings from reduced bus service operations that could be invested in complementary lines and decongestion effects in the city centre.

Economic impact

* Cost savings for daily commuters and private car users derived from less traffic congestion,
* Improved access to downtown to many commuters

Social impact

* Positive effect in reducing private car traffic running on the surface, in terms of pollution, noise and global warming.

Environmental impact

* Contribution to reducing pollution.

==References==

* AccountsChamber of Andalucia. (2013).Public Private activities analysis of Public Works Agency of Junta de Andalucia.
* Andalusian Advisory Council.(2014): Changes in Metro de Malaga Public Work contract.
* Concession de Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos. Los casos de Metro de Sevilla y Metro de Málaga
* General presentationof Public Works Agency of Junta de Andalucia(2012)
* http://www.latoga.es/detallearticulo.asp?id=1060683210&nro=156&nom=Noviembre/Diciembre%202005 Metro de Malaga concession agreements and tendering conditions document (Pliego de CláusulasAdministrativasParticulares)
* Metro de Malaga web page: http://metromalaga.es/
* Nores, J.L. y Fernandez, F.J. (2005) Contrato de Concesion e Obra Publica – Andalucia. Nº 156 | Noviembre/Diciembre 2005
* Press articles (mainly local press, Diario Sur and Malaga Hoy)
* www.aopandalucia.es/.../05_Concesion_Metro_Sevilla_y_Malaga.pdf

Case Studies

2016-10-12T17:11:31Z

Nimda: /* Urban Transport */

== Roads and Motorways ==

[[Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO|A19 Dishforth DBFO]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road |Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession|Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Ionia Odos Motorway|Ionia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: M6 Toll (BNRR)|M6 Toll (BNRR)]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: M80 Haggs to Stepps|M80 Haggs to Stepps]], UK

[[Case Studies: Olympia Odos Motorway|Olympia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Via-Invest Zaventem|Via-Invest Zaventem]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: E-39 Klett - Baardshaug|E-39 Klett-Baardshaug]], Norway

[[Case Studies: Istrian Y Toll Motorway|Istrian Y Toll Motorway]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Moreas Motorway, Greece|Moreas Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Central Greece Motorway (E65), Greece|Central Greece Motorway (E65)]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road, Italy|Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road]], Italy

[[Case Studies: E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand, Norway|E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand]], Norway

[[Case Studies: A2 Motorway, Poland|A2 Motorway]], Poland

[[Case Studies: A22 Algarve, Portugal|A22 Algarve]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: A23 Beira Interior, Portugal|A23 Beira Interior]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway, Spain|C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway, Spain|Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: M-45 Toll Motorway, Spain|M-45 Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain|Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci, Serbia |Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: H5 Koper-Izola Motorway, Slovenia| H5 Koper-Izola Motorway]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway , Slovenia| A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway ]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca , Serbia|Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase, Serbia|Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: E18 Muurla-Lohja, Finland|E18 Muurla-Lohja ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75, Finland | Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75 ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation | Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD)]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation | “Slavyanka” Roads ]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: M-25 London Orbital, U.K. | M-25 London Orbital ]], U.K.

== Bridges/Tunnels ==

[[Case Studies: Rio-Antirio Bridge, Greece |Rio-Antirio Bridge]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Lusoponte Bridge, Portugal | Lusoponte Bridge ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Blanka Tunnel Complex, Czech Republic| The Blanka Tunnel Complex]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: “Herrentunnel”Lübeck, Germany |“Herrentunnel”Lübeck]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Coen Tunnel|Coen Tunnel]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation| Orlovski Tunnel ]], Russian Federation

== Rail ==



[[Case Studies: FERTAGUS Train|FERTAGUS Train]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link|Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Combiplan Nijverdal, The Netherlands | Combiplan Nijverdal]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Gardermobanen, Norway | Gardermobanen ]], Norway

== Ports ==

[[Case Studies: Piraeus Container Terminal|Piraeus Container Terminal]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Sines Container Terminal|Sines Container Terminal]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Valencia Cruise Terminal|Valencia Cruise Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock|Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock]], Belgium


[[Case Studies: Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal, Rijeka, Croatia |Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development, Cyprus | Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona, Spain | Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal, Spain | Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Durrës Port East Terminal, Albania | Durrës Port East Terminal]], Albania

[[Case Studies: OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende, Belgium | OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende ]], Belgium

== Urban Transport ==

[[Case Studies: Brabo 1, Flanders|Brabo 1, Flanders]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: The Caen' TVR|The Caen' TVR]], France

[[Case Studies: Metro Sul do Tejo|Metro Sul do Tejo]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Reims' Tramway|The Reims' Tramway]], France

[[Case Studies: SEVICI|SEVICI]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester, United Kingdom | Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester]], United Kingdom

[[Case Studies: Athens Tramway, Greece | Athens Tramway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part, Poland | Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part]], Poland

[[Case Studies: Vélo’v, France| Vélo’v ]], France

[[Case Studies: The Lyon's Tramway T4, France| The Lyon's Tramway T4 ]], France

[[Case Studies: Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe, Germany | Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Metro do Porto S.A., Portugal | Metro do Porto S.A. ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Metro de Malaga, Spain | Metro de Malaga ]], Spain

== Airports ==

[[Case Studies: Larnaca and Paphos International Airports|Larnaca and Paphos International Airports]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Tirana International Airport|International Airport of Tirana]], Albania

[[Case Studies: Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”| Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, Germany | Berlin-Brandenburg Airport ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion, Portugal | Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion ]], Portugal

== Terminals and Depots ==



[[Case Studies: Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen|Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: The Hague New Train Central Station |The Hague New Train Central Station]], The Netherlands

== Service Infrastructure ==

[[Case Studies: Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive), Albania | Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive)]], Albania

File:Malaga3.png

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Nimda:

File:Malaga2.png

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Nimda:

File:Malaga1.png

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Nimda:

Case Studies: M-25 London Orbital, U.K.

2016-10-12T15:51:41Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = M-25 London orbital, United Kingdom
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Private co-financing
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 30 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 900 Mil GBP (Construction cost)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:London.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: M-25 London orbital, U.K. '' 
Source-. Briggs, A. and Drewett, D. (2007)
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 2006:
| data1 = Date Project conceived
| label2= 2008:
| data2 = Call for tender
| label3= Feb. 2009:
| data3 = Contract signed
| label4= 20 May2009:
| data4 = Financial Close
| label5= May 2012:
| data5 = Original project completion time
| label6= January 2013:
| data6 = Project extension
| label7= December 2014:
| data7 = Expected full completion

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The M25 motorway or London Orbital motorway forms a 125-mile orbital route some 20 miles from the centre of London that almost encircles Greater London, England, in the United Kingdom. The Dartford Crossing, two tunnels and a bridge crossing the river Thames at Dartford, complete the loop.

A narrower concept was first mooted early in the 20th century as part of the plan to build four ring roads around London. A few sections, based on the abandoned London Ring ways plan, were constructed in the early 1970s and completed in 1986.

The M25 is the major route around London, carrying international traffic between entry points and the rest of Great Britain. It also forms the hub of the English motorway system, and serves as a commuter route for local traffic. It is one of the busiest links of the British motorway network: 196,000 vehicles were recorded on a busy day near London Heathrow Airport in 2003 and the western half experienced an average daily flow of 147,000 vehicles in 2007.

In May 2009, the Agency signed a 30-year private finance contract with “Connect Plus”. The contract requires “Connect Plus” to widen two sections of the M25 (approximately 40 miles), and to refurbish the Hatfield Tunnel. “Connect Plus” must also operate and maintain the M25, including the Dartford Crossing, plus 125 miles of connecting roads at junctions. It is also required to design a solution for congestion for two further sections of the M25 (approximately 25 miles). The contract has a present value cost (2009) of £3.4 billion. Of this total, the widening of the initial sections has a present value construction cost of £900 million and delivers £2.3 billion present value benefits. However, the nominal contract value over the 30-year contract period is £6.2 billion.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Contracting Authority is the Regulatory authority Highways Agency. The project is included in the PFI Programme.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

Connect Plus, a consortium of Skanska, Balfour Beatty, Atkins and Egis Projects, was formed to deliver the contract services on behalf of the Highways Agency. Within the PFI contract, Balfour Beatty and Skanska share 50% each for the Construction Joint Venture; whereas for the O&M Joint Venture, Balfour Beatty holds 52.5% of the contract, whilst Atkins and Egis share 32.5% and 15%, respectively.

[[Image:London1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Organisations involved in the contract''

==Sources of Financing==

The financing structure of the project consisted of commercial bank debt provided by a 16-bank club deal for £700 million, EIB credits for £400 million and shareholder equity for £200 million. Part of the EIB participation was backed by an additional commercial bank facility for £215 million provided as EIB guarantees, whilst the remaining £185 million consisted of EIB structured finance facility.

In total, there were £1.1 billion senior debt loan facilities, which represented about 85% of the total financing.

==Users==

The project users are private and commercial user/vehicles. The primary aims of the project, in the view of users, were to (Highways Agency, 2012):

* Allow traffic to flow more smoothly, resulting in fewer accidents.
* See a noticeable reduction in road noise in most places immediately after completion and noticeable change in traffic noise levels over the long term due to the new lower-noise road surface.
* Provide improved drainage, resulting in better water quality and safer roads.
* Provide new modern "cut-off" lighting, which meets the level needed for a four-lane motorway while minimising the effect on adjacent properties.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

From the Contacting Authority’s point of view, the main purposes for the use of PFI contract were to:

* Relieve congestion and improve reliability through securing a private sector partner to widen the M25.
* Get value for money from private participation and best outcomes in terms of use of public funds.
* Obtain financing at market rates during the difficult financing conditions in early 2009.

The Agency considered that a single private finance contract would be advantageous for the construction and the operation of the M25, because, during:

* Construction – contractors could achieve efficiency by using the same arrangements, such as appointing subcontractors for all sections and learn lessons for later sections. A single private finance contract could also reduce the risk of delays on earlier contracts causing delays on later contracts (reduction of interface risk).
* Operation – a single company responsible for the M25 would have easier interactions with third parties such as the emergency services, and the opportunity to make operating efficiencies.

==Project Timing==

According to the House of Commons (2011), the UK Government commissioned consultants to produce a long-term sustainable strategy for tackling congestion on the M25 in 2000. The Government announced its intention to proceed with widening in July 2003 and the Highway Agency’s initial 2004 timetable anticipated construction starting in May 2007. This was subsequently revised to May 2008, following consultation with industry and a decision to widen the motorway using private finance. In May 2009, nine years after the start of the project, the Highways Agency signed a 30-year private finance contract with “Connect Plus” for widening two sections of the M25 motorway, and maintaining the entire 125 mile length of the motorway, including the Dartford Crossing, and 125 miles of connecting roads and motorways. The timescales of construction of the project are listed in Table 1:

''Table 1: Construction timescales'' 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Activity'''
! '''Date'''
|-
| Publish Environmental Statement
| Autumn 2010
|-
| Site clearance
| From September 2012
|-
| Installation of new concrete barrier in central reservation
| Late 2012
|-
| Start of Works
| May 2013
|-
| Completion of work to upgrade the Central Reservation Barrier
| Mid-July 2013
|-
| Completion of Traffic Management Switch
| Early August 2013
|-
| Installation of first new Gantry
| Mid-September 2013
|-
| Completion
| 30 April 2014
|}
''Source: Highways England (2010)''

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The M25 project forms a boundary with the Greater London Authority. The M25 is a vital route for freight, commuter and tourist traffic. Linking with the M2 and M20, it provides a gateway to and from the continent via Eurotunnel and Dover.

The London Orbital Multi Model Study (ORBIT), published in 2002, was tasked with addressing the problems of the M25 motorway and the orbital transport corridor around London. The study concluded that if current trends were to continue, traffic levels would increase and all users, including those essential to the economy, would suffer increasing congestion and unreliable journey times. The ORBIT report recommended that most of the dual 3 lane sections of the M25 should generally be widened to dual 4 lanes (Highways England, 2010).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The Agency ran a generally effective and competitive procurement for the widening tender advertised in 2005. There was, however, some slippage in the time schedule (National Audit Office 2010). The tendering was carried out in a two stage procedure, with 5 bidders submitting tenders in the first stage, shortlisted to 3 bidders during the negotiation phase.

The Agency prequalified five potential bidders, and then reduced these to the following three consortia in October 2006:

* ALF – Amey, Laing O’Rourke and FerrovialAgroman;
* Connect Plus – Balfour Beatty, Skanska, Atkins, and Egis; and
* FLOW – Vinci, Laing Roads, Carillion, and Costain.

The Agency selected Connect Plus as Provisional Preferred Bidder (announced in May 2008). The duration of the project assignment procedure was 42 months (from contract advertisement in November 2005 to award in May 2009).

===Contract Structure===

The contract structure was based on the availability model, with active management. The Private Provision of the contract consisted of:

* Design
* Build/ construct
* Operate/ Manage
* Maintain

The Public Authority Provision (activities not transferred) of the contract consisted of, Design and Finance. The contract included renegotiation clauses but no guarantees. There is a contract review clause, as an alternative to termination, allowing the Agency to renegotiate the contract if it radically changes its requirements.

===Risk Allocation===

The risk allocation scheme is depicted in Figure 3.

[[Image:London2.png]] 
''Figure 3: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

Performance indicators were explicitly mentioned in the contract and are related to (Highways Agency 2012; Nick Harding 2007):

* Lane Availability
* Route Performance
* Condition Criteria
* Safety Performance
* Proactive Management

With regard to achieving project goals:

* Reliability was improved fully in line with expectations or even more.
* Availability was fully in line with expectations or even more.
* Maintenance costs are fully in line with expectations.
* Safety was improved fully in line with expectations or even more.
* Security incidents are within expected range.
* User Satisfaction: More than 50% of end users are satisfied.

The project was completed on time and within budget. However, there are some criticisms about the initial delays from project inception (in 2000) to contract signing (in 2009). According to the House of Commons (2011), the initial project delays exposed the project to the 2008 credit crisis, resulting in further delays and higher financing costs. These costs were attributed to changes of design standards generating impact on investment costs. Finally, actual traffic and revenues are in line with forecast, while network usage has increased after the project implementation.

==Project Outcomes==

The general level of the project's perceived success is high, particularly with regard to reduction in congestion and improvements in safety standards. In addition, travel cost and reliability improvements are fully in line with or have exceeded expectations. Finally, the project has also resulted in less pollution and other environmental impacts (e.g. reduction in noise levels).

==References==

* Briggs, A. and Drewett, D. (2007). Contribution of PPP to enhance transport infrastructure – the UK experience. Highways Agency
* Highways Agency (2012). DBFO Background contract information
* Highways England, (2011), M-25, Available via: http://www.highways.gov.uk/our-road-network/our-network/key-roads/m25/
* House of Commons (2011). M25 Private Finance Contract. Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2010–11. The Stationary Office Limited, London. Available via: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/651/651.pdf
* National Audit Office (2010). Procurement of the M25private finance contract. Highways Agency
* Nick Harding (2007): Performance Measures in PPP Contracts. Presentation at TRB Third International Conference on Performance Measurement
* Press articles.
* www.connectplusm25.co.uk/

Case Studies: M-25 London Orbital, U.K.

2016-10-12T15:51:11Z

Nimda: Created page with "{{Infobox |header1 = M-25 London orbital, United Kingdom |header2 = |label2 = Project Type: |data2 = Greenfield |header3 = |label3 = Type of Project Financing: |data3 = ..."

{{Infobox
|header1 = M-25 London orbital, United Kingdom
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Private co-financing
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 30 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 900 Mil GBP (Construction cost)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:London.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: M-25 London orbital, U.K. '' 
Source-. Briggs, A. and Drewett, D. (2007)
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 2006:
| data1 = Date Project conceived
| label2= 2008:
| data2 = Call for tender
| label3= Feb. 2009:
| data3 = Contract signed
| label4= 20 May2009:
| data4 = Financial Close
| label5= May 2012:
| data5 = Original project completion time
| label6= January 2013:
| data6 = Project extension
| label7= December 2014:
| data7 = Expected full completion

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The M25 motorway or London Orbital motorway forms a 125-mile orbital route some 20 miles from the centre of London that almost encircles Greater London, England, in the United Kingdom. The Dartford Crossing, two tunnels and a bridge crossing the river Thames at Dartford, complete the loop.

A narrower concept was first mooted early in the 20th century as part of the plan to build four ring roads around London. A few sections, based on the abandoned London Ring ways plan, were constructed in the early 1970s and completed in 1986.

The M25 is the major route around London, carrying international traffic between entry points and the rest of Great Britain. It also forms the hub of the English motorway system, and serves as a commuter route for local traffic. It is one of the busiest links of the British motorway network: 196,000 vehicles were recorded on a busy day near London Heathrow Airport in 2003 and the western half experienced an average daily flow of 147,000 vehicles in 2007.

In May 2009, the Agency signed a 30-year private finance contract with “Connect Plus”. The contract requires “Connect Plus” to widen two sections of the M25 (approximately 40 miles), and to refurbish the Hatfield Tunnel. “Connect Plus” must also operate and maintain the M25, including the Dartford Crossing, plus 125 miles of connecting roads at junctions. It is also required to design a solution for congestion for two further sections of the M25 (approximately 25 miles). The contract has a present value cost (2009) of £3.4 billion. Of this total, the widening of the initial sections has a present value construction cost of £900 million and delivers £2.3 billion present value benefits. However, the nominal contract value over the 30-year contract period is £6.2 billion.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Contracting Authority is the Regulatory authority Highways Agency. The project is included in the PFI Programme.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

Connect Plus, a consortium of Skanska, Balfour Beatty, Atkins and Egis Projects, was formed to deliver the contract services on behalf of the Highways Agency. Within the PFI contract, Balfour Beatty and Skanska share 50% each for the Construction Joint Venture; whereas for the O&M Joint Venture, Balfour Beatty holds 52.5% of the contract, whilst Atkins and Egis share 32.5% and 15%, respectively.

[[Image:London1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Organisations involved in the contract''

==Sources of Financing==

The financing structure of the project consisted of commercial bank debt provided by a 16-bank club deal for £700 million, EIB credits for £400 million and shareholder equity for £200 million. Part of the EIB participation was backed by an additional commercial bank facility for £215 million provided as EIB guarantees, whilst the remaining £185 million consisted of EIB structured finance facility.

In total, there were £1.1 billion senior debt loan facilities, which represented about 85% of the total financing.

==Users==

The project users are private and commercial user/vehicles. The primary aims of the project, in the view of users, were to (Highways Agency, 2012):

* Allow traffic to flow more smoothly, resulting in fewer accidents.
* See a noticeable reduction in road noise in most places immediately after completion and noticeable change in traffic noise levels over the long term due to the new lower-noise road surface.
* Provide improved drainage, resulting in better water quality and safer roads.
* Provide new modern "cut-off" lighting, which meets the level needed for a four-lane motorway while minimising the effect on adjacent properties.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

From the Contacting Authority’s point of view, the main purposes for the use of PFI contract were to:

* Relieve congestion and improve reliability through securing a private sector partner to widen the M25.
* Get value for money from private participation and best outcomes in terms of use of public funds.
* Obtain financing at market rates during the difficult financing conditions in early 2009.

The Agency considered that a single private finance contract would be advantageous for the construction and the operation of the M25, because, during:

* Construction – contractors could achieve efficiency by using the same arrangements, such as appointing subcontractors for all sections and learn lessons for later sections. A single private finance contract could also reduce the risk of delays on earlier contracts causing delays on later contracts (reduction of interface risk).
* Operation – a single company responsible for the M25 would have easier interactions with third parties such as the emergency services, and the opportunity to make operating efficiencies.

==Project Timing==

According to the House of Commons (2011), the UK Government commissioned consultants to produce a long-term sustainable strategy for tackling congestion on the M25 in 2000. The Government announced its intention to proceed with widening in July 2003 and the Highway Agency’s initial 2004 timetable anticipated construction starting in May 2007. This was subsequently revised to May 2008, following consultation with industry and a decision to widen the motorway using private finance. In May 2009, nine years after the start of the project, the Highways Agency signed a 30-year private finance contract with “Connect Plus” for widening two sections of the M25 motorway, and maintaining the entire 125 mile length of the motorway, including the Dartford Crossing, and 125 miles of connecting roads and motorways. The timescales of construction of the project are listed in Table 1:

''Table 1: Construction timescales'' 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Activity'''
! '''Date'''
|-
| Publish Environmental Statement
| Autumn 2010
|-
| Site clearance
| From September 2012
|-
| Installation of new concrete barrier in central reservation
| Late 2012
|-
| Start of Works
| May 2013
|-
| Completion of work to upgrade the Central Reservation Barrier
| Mid-July 2013
|-
| Completion of Traffic Management Switch
| Early August 2013
|-
| Installation of first new Gantry
| Mid-September 2013
|-
| Completion
| 30 April 2014
|}
''Source: Highways England (2010)''

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The M25 project forms a boundary with the Greater London Authority. The M25 is a vital route for freight, commuter and tourist traffic. Linking with the M2 and M20, it provides a gateway to and from the continent via Eurotunnel and Dover.

The London Orbital Multi Model Study (ORBIT), published in 2002, was tasked with addressing the problems of the M25 motorway and the orbital transport corridor around London. The study concluded that if current trends were to continue, traffic levels would increase and all users, including those essential to the economy, would suffer increasing congestion and unreliable journey times. The ORBIT report recommended that most of the dual 3 lane sections of the M25 should generally be widened to dual 4 lanes (Highways England, 2010).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The Agency ran a generally effective and competitive procurement for the widening tender advertised in 2005. There was, however, some slippage in the time schedule (National Audit Office 2010). The tendering was carried out in a two stage procedure, with 5 bidders submitting tenders in the first stage, shortlisted to 3 bidders during the negotiation phase.

The Agency prequalified five potential bidders, and then reduced these to the following three consortia in October 2006:

* ALF – Amey, Laing O’Rourke and FerrovialAgroman;
* Connect Plus – Balfour Beatty, Skanska, Atkins, and Egis; and
* FLOW – Vinci, Laing Roads, Carillion, and Costain.

The Agency selected Connect Plus as Provisional Preferred Bidder (announced in May 2008). The duration of the project assignment procedure was 42 months (from contract advertisement in November 2005 to award in May 2009).

===Contract Structure===

The contract structure was based on the availability model, with active management. The Private Provision of the contract consisted of:

* Design
* Build/ construct
* Operate/ Manage
* Maintain

The Public Authority Provision (activities not transferred) of the contract consisted of, Design and Finance. The contract included renegotiation clauses but no guarantees. There is a contract review clause, as an alternative to termination, allowing the Agency to renegotiate the contract if it radically changes its requirements.

===Risk Allocation===

The risk allocation scheme is depicted in Figure 3.
[[Image:London2.png]] 
''Figure 3: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

Performance indicators were explicitly mentioned in the contract and are related to (Highways Agency 2012; Nick Harding 2007):

* Lane Availability
* Route Performance
* Condition Criteria
* Safety Performance
* Proactive Management

With regard to achieving project goals:

* Reliability was improved fully in line with expectations or even more.
* Availability was fully in line with expectations or even more.
* Maintenance costs are fully in line with expectations.
* Safety was improved fully in line with expectations or even more.
* Security incidents are within expected range.
* User Satisfaction: More than 50% of end users are satisfied.

The project was completed on time and within budget. However, there are some criticisms about the initial delays from project inception (in 2000) to contract signing (in 2009). According to the House of Commons (2011), the initial project delays exposed the project to the 2008 credit crisis, resulting in further delays and higher financing costs. These costs were attributed to changes of design standards generating impact on investment costs. Finally, actual traffic and revenues are in line with forecast, while network usage has increased after the project implementation.

==Project Outcomes==

The general level of the project's perceived success is high, particularly with regard to reduction in congestion and improvements in safety standards. In addition, travel cost and reliability improvements are fully in line with or have exceeded expectations. Finally, the project has also resulted in less pollution and other environmental impacts (e.g. reduction in noise levels).

==References==

* Briggs, A. and Drewett, D. (2007). Contribution of PPP to enhance transport infrastructure – the UK experience. Highways Agency
* Highways Agency (2012). DBFO Background contract information
* Highways England, (2011), M-25, Available via: http://www.highways.gov.uk/our-road-network/our-network/key-roads/m25/
* House of Commons (2011). M25 Private Finance Contract. Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2010–11. The Stationary Office Limited, London. Available via: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/651/651.pdf
* National Audit Office (2010). Procurement of the M25private finance contract. Highways Agency
* Nick Harding (2007): Performance Measures in PPP Contracts. Presentation at TRB Third International Conference on Performance Measurement
* Press articles.
* www.connectplusm25.co.uk/

Case Studies

2016-10-12T15:34:19Z

Nimda: /* Roads and Motorways */

== Roads and Motorways ==

[[Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO|A19 Dishforth DBFO]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road |Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession|Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Ionia Odos Motorway|Ionia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: M6 Toll (BNRR)|M6 Toll (BNRR)]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: M80 Haggs to Stepps|M80 Haggs to Stepps]], UK

[[Case Studies: Olympia Odos Motorway|Olympia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Via-Invest Zaventem|Via-Invest Zaventem]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: E-39 Klett - Baardshaug|E-39 Klett-Baardshaug]], Norway

[[Case Studies: Istrian Y Toll Motorway|Istrian Y Toll Motorway]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Moreas Motorway, Greece|Moreas Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Central Greece Motorway (E65), Greece|Central Greece Motorway (E65)]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road, Italy|Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road]], Italy

[[Case Studies: E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand, Norway|E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand]], Norway

[[Case Studies: A2 Motorway, Poland|A2 Motorway]], Poland

[[Case Studies: A22 Algarve, Portugal|A22 Algarve]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: A23 Beira Interior, Portugal|A23 Beira Interior]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway, Spain|C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway, Spain|Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: M-45 Toll Motorway, Spain|M-45 Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain|Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci, Serbia |Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: H5 Koper-Izola Motorway, Slovenia| H5 Koper-Izola Motorway]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway , Slovenia| A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway ]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca , Serbia|Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase, Serbia|Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: E18 Muurla-Lohja, Finland|E18 Muurla-Lohja ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75, Finland | Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75 ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation | Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD)]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation | “Slavyanka” Roads ]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: M-25 London Orbital, U.K. | M-25 London Orbital ]], U.K.

== Bridges/Tunnels ==

[[Case Studies: Rio-Antirio Bridge, Greece |Rio-Antirio Bridge]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Lusoponte Bridge, Portugal | Lusoponte Bridge ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Blanka Tunnel Complex, Czech Republic| The Blanka Tunnel Complex]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: “Herrentunnel”Lübeck, Germany |“Herrentunnel”Lübeck]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Coen Tunnel|Coen Tunnel]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation| Orlovski Tunnel ]], Russian Federation

== Rail ==



[[Case Studies: FERTAGUS Train|FERTAGUS Train]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link|Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Combiplan Nijverdal, The Netherlands | Combiplan Nijverdal]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Gardermobanen, Norway | Gardermobanen ]], Norway

== Ports ==

[[Case Studies: Piraeus Container Terminal|Piraeus Container Terminal]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Sines Container Terminal|Sines Container Terminal]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Valencia Cruise Terminal|Valencia Cruise Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock|Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock]], Belgium


[[Case Studies: Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal, Rijeka, Croatia |Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development, Cyprus | Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona, Spain | Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal, Spain | Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Durrës Port East Terminal, Albania | Durrës Port East Terminal]], Albania

[[Case Studies: OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende, Belgium | OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende ]], Belgium

== Urban Transport ==

[[Case Studies: Brabo 1, Flanders|Brabo 1, Flanders]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: The Caen' TVR|The Caen' TVR]], France

[[Case Studies: Metro Sul do Tejo|Metro Sul do Tejo]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Reims' Tramway|The Reims' Tramway]], France

[[Case Studies: SEVICI|SEVICI]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester, United Kingdom | Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester]], United Kingdom

[[Case Studies: Athens Tramway, Greece | Athens Tramway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part, Poland | Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part]], Poland

[[Case Studies: Vélo’v, France| Vélo’v ]], France

[[Case Studies: The Lyon's Tramway T4, France| The Lyon's Tramway T4 ]], France

[[Case Studies: Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe, Germany | Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Metro do Porto S.A., Portugal | Metro do Porto S.A. ]], Portugal

== Airports ==

[[Case Studies: Larnaca and Paphos International Airports|Larnaca and Paphos International Airports]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Tirana International Airport|International Airport of Tirana]], Albania

[[Case Studies: Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”| Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, Germany | Berlin-Brandenburg Airport ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion, Portugal | Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion ]], Portugal

== Terminals and Depots ==



[[Case Studies: Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen|Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: The Hague New Train Central Station |The Hague New Train Central Station]], The Netherlands

== Service Infrastructure ==

[[Case Studies: Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive), Albania | Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive)]], Albania

File:London2.png

2016-10-12T15:33:18Z

Nimda:

File:London1.png

2016-10-12T15:33:10Z

Nimda:

File:London.png

2016-10-12T15:33:00Z

Nimda:

Case Studies: Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion, Portugal

2016-10-11T12:03:51Z

Nimda: Created page with "{{Infobox |header1 = Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion, Portugal |header2 = |label2 = Project Type: |data2 = Brownfield |header3 = |label3 = Type of Project Financing: |data3..."

{{Infobox
|header1 = Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion, Portugal
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Brownfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = Originally foreseen 3 years for the respective bundle of contracts
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = EUR 308M
|title = Project Overview
|image =
|caption =
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 1999:
| data1 = project conceived
| label2= 2000:
| data2 = contract for detailed design and technical assistance to construction
| label3= 1999:
| data3 = construction begins
| label4= 2002:
| data4 = baggage terminal completed
| label5= 2002:
| data5 = access roadworks completed
| label6= 2002:
| data6 = fire station completed
| label7= 2004:
| data7 = capacity expansion for the 2004 UEFA European Championship
| label8= 2006:
| data8 = platform renewal completed

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The SáCarneiro airport is located in Porto, the second metropolitan area of Portugal. It was built in 1945, became international in the mid-1950s, and underwent several expansions. In 1999, a three-stage masterplan was put forward as a strategic development roadmap. The 1999 expansion corresponds to the first stage of that masterplan. The stage aims to support an increase in capacity up to 6 MPA (million passengers per year), double the operational area capacity, and thoroughly renew the terminal.

With respect to the airside, the 1999 project included a new layout for the platform, the renewal of the runway and the taxiways, the introduction of 35 new aircraft parking positions, and a new fuel supply network. On the landside, the project included separate curbsides for departures and arrivals; new connections to the sewage network; the remodeling of the existing parking area; the construction of a new underground parking; improvement of road access, and a connection to the metro network. The terminal renewal included new departures and arrivals halls, new check-in desks, a major remodelling of the boarding and disembarking flows into two levels, as well as the installation of a pier along the front of the terminal, serving nine parking slots and served by nine jet bridges.

This project was conceived and procured by ANA, the (then) public company that holds the responsibility for all Portuguese airports, as a series of 65 public works and goods and services purchase contracts awarded directly and through competitions. The project suffered long delays and cost overruns, having been awarded in 2000, and delivered in 2007, 4 years later than planned. The airport was operational throughout construction.

The new terminal building won the 2007 European Steel Design Award for Portugal, and the airport has been voted by passengers as the best European airport in 2007 for the ACI International Award, while it has been between the top three between 2006 and 2011.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

ANA is the airport infrastructure manager in Portugal, operating the national airports. It was a public company when the Sá Carneiro airport expansion project was procured and built, but recently, in 2013, it was concessioned to Vinci for a 50 year period.

As manager of the Portuguese airports, ANA was responsible for the establishment, management and development of airport infrastructure in Portugal. Implementing the strategic development plan of the Sá Carneiro Airport was their responsibility.

Because it was a public company with exclusively public capital, ANA was subject to public procurement laws.

The new design was subject to national and international standards and regulations. Supervision and enforcement of national regulations is the responsibility of INAC, the civil aviation regulator.

The design was mostly carried out by the contracting authority ANA. Some detailed design was contracted out (structural, water/drainage, gas, electrical, mechanical, and security) to the following companies: AF – Armando Fialho, TalProjecto, ENGIDRO, EACE, Eng. Rodrigues Gomes e Associados.

Construction, services and equipment were contracted to the following companies: A. Cavaco, ABB, ACF, Adrianos, Alves Ribeiro, Bento Pedroso, Abrantina, CDL, Comelmada, Edifer, EDP, Efacec, Engil, Fernando Gaspar, Geopesquisa, Letratec, Mota-Engil, Movex,OFM, Siemens, SIMI, Sinal Impar, Sistavac, Soares da Costa, Soletop, Somague, Sotécnica, Teixeira Duarte, ThyssenElevatec, ThyssenKrupp, Zagope.

Other companies and institutions were involved as consultants (Schipol and NACO), managers and supervisors (GAPOBRA, GPA, PLANEGE, SOGECINCO, AFAPLAN), inspectors (CONUGAL/FASE), auditors (IOAT, European Court of Auditors, General Finance Auditor and Ernest&Young), and evaluators (National Laboratory of Civil Engineering, CONSULPAV, Bureau Veritas – RINAVE).

==Sources of Financing==

The financing was based on ANA’s own funds (42,8%), EU ERDF funds (6,1%), EIB loan (41,3%) and other loans (9,8%). The airport expansion was part of TEN-T’s Priority Project 8 - Multimodal axis Portugal/Spain-rest of Europe. The III Community Support Framework report for Portugal included the Sá Carneiro Airport expansion as a funded project (24,9 million euros from the European Regional Development Fund).

==Users==

Airlines and business developers looking to establish themselves at the airport (including commerce and cargo operators) are the users of the airport. Air transport passengers are also users, although they are not charged directly for the use of the airport. The main stakeholders identified for this project are ANA, the airport operator, the airlines flying to the airport, the businesses established at the airport, local public transport companies, local taxi associations, the local government / municipality, population residing near the airport (subject to noise), the local environmental associations, and airport handling companies.

==Key Purpose for Public Financing Model Selection==

For this project, ANA did not choose private co-finance. As airport operators, they contracted out construction, as that is not their vocation. They were able to finance the project partially with own funds, partially with loans, and with some ERDF contribution. More recently, ANA was the object of a PPP awarded to Vinci for 50 years, for the operation of all Portuguese airports.

==Project Timing==

The airport was built in 1945, under a different name – Pedras Rubras. In the mid-1950s, it became international following a runway extension to 2400m. During the 1970s, the runway was extended again to 3480m. In 1990, there were major remodelling works, with a new terminal building, new access roads, new parking in the platform, a freight terminal and additional technical buildings for air traffic control. With 1990 renewals, the airport was renamed Sá Carneiro. However, by the end of the decade, at 3 MPA, there were already severe capacity constraints affecting airport performance and its ability to grow. There were too few check-in desks and boarding gates, the baggage handling system did not have enough capacity, there was a shortage of parking, the platform layout was not optimized, the terminal layout was too limited and could not accommodate commercial area demands, and the single curbside access was congested. Facing these challenges, the airport operator brought in a consultant – Schiphol Project Consult – to devise a strategic development plan. In 1999, that plan, which covered marketing, business, land-use and infrastructure, and environment, was put forward as a three-stage masterplan for the airport. The 1999 expansion of the Sá Carneiro airport is the first stage of that masterplan for the airport. Further stages of the masterplan support future traffic growth for the airport.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

As mentioned before, Porto is the second metropolitan area of Portugal, with a population of 3,7 million inhabitants, and an increasing population density of about 1580 inhabitants per square km. It has recently become a popular tourist destination listed in many top rankings for city break destinations in Europe. Tourism is one of the forces driving air traffic growth.

Although it is the only airport in the city of Porto, the Sá Carneiro airport is in direct competition with other airports in the region. There is competition for air routes with the Lisbon airport, and the Galician airports in Spain (Vigo, Santiago de Compostela, Coruña).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

65 contracts were involved, most related to construction, design, and construction coordination. There were also several contracts for systems and equipment.

===Tendering===

More than half of the contracts were directly awarded (54%), however these only represent 11% of the total value contracted. 87% of the total value of the construction was awarded using a public tender. Very few contracts were awarded using limited or negotiated procedures (a total of 7 representing 11% of construction value).

The main reason for using direct award procedures was the urgency due to the traffic peak generated by the UEFA championship EURO 2004. Additionally, 5 public tenders were cancelled with the exclusion of all bidders due to irregular and incomplete proposals, or because all bids were considerably higher than requested. Most of the direct awards were carried out after approaching only one company.

The most important award criteria for public tenders were price and deadline, which contrasts with what actually happened in terms of delays and cost overruns.

Open calls used as award criteria price (from 30 to 60%), deadline (from 13 to 35%), quality and quality control (5 to 40%), and technical support to equipment (30 to 40%).

Restricted calls used lowest price by NPV calculation as the sole award criterion.

Negotiated procedures used price (55%), quality (5%) and equipment (40%) as award criteria.

Direct award procedures used lowest price by NPV calculation as the award criterion, and, in three cases, a 15% to 20% weight on quality.

===Contract Structure===

The contracts followed three main pricing models – lump sum, fixed price and rental – but no official standards were used. The Court of Auditors concluded that lump sum contracts were not adequate for the project, and that unit cost should have been adopted. The Court mentions a particular contract that was tendered without detailed measurements and still used a lump sum model.

===Risk Allocation===

As designer and operator, financer and borrower of bank money, and contracting authority of the construction, equipment and rental contracts, ANA took the bulk of the risks associated with the expansion project, as depicted in Figure 1.

[[Image:Carneiro.png]] 
''Figure 1: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

Works inspection for the contracting authority was very satisfactory: 53% of contracts were considered to have performed at an excellent quality level, 29% were considered reasonable, and for 12% there were some issues.

With respect to cost, the project did not perform well: initial budget was EUR 308,2M; final cost was EUR406,9M; the cost overrun was of EUR98,8M, representing 32% of the original budget. This can be attributed to several reasons. Award value was 5% higher than budgeted. The contracting authority had to compensate several contractors for construction suspensions, construction delay, situations that hindered the works and constraints due to the terminal building construction. Claims for additional works were made, and after independent inspection, the contracting authority paid for them. Project changes, namely to deal with the Euro 2004 traffic peak, generated additional costs and required additional contracts. Pricing reviews also caused substantial cost overruns.

The UEFA Euro 2004 championship was awarded to Portugal after the project was underway. To be able to process the peak in demand, some changes were made to the project. These changes were to be in effect temporarily, throughout 2004, and then the project would return to the original design. The Euro 2004 capacity expansion required stopping some of the construction works for the duration of the championship. The latter also generated claims from other contractors involved in the project.

With respect to deadlines, the project did not perform well. There was a 10 month delay in the beginning of works because the environmental impact study was found non-compliant. Contracts were already being awarded at that time, and awards had to be stopped until a new study was submitted and an environmental impact declaration was issued. The final delivery of construction was 4 years later than planned. Even though the project was operating throughout construction, this delay had significant impacts. This delay can be attributed to several reasons. The imposition of level 3 alert after 9/11 made the areas around the pipeline off-limits to construction crews. Construction in those areas was thus delayed. The large number of bids for the terminal building contract, the tender suspension due to delays in obtaining the environmental impact declaration, and bidders’ claims to European courts, caused a delay of about 18 months. The temporary changes and constraints to the project due to the UEFA Euro 2004 championship required stopping some of the construction works for the duration of the championship. Finally, there were operational difficulties in providing construction site space for the contractors in the operating airport, especially since other entities were operating using airport space (customs, handling companies, restaurants and others).

Project coordination problems were also considered a critical factor in this project. There were difficulties in project management and supervision, which could have been accounted for in such a complex project. These were eventually solved after the project governance was changed from a task force model to a central management and coordination body within the contracting authority. Nevertheless, this solution came only 3 years after construction began.

With respect to traffic and revenues, the project has been performing well. In 2007, the traffic goal was 5MPA by 2010. Actual traffic in 2010 was 5,3MPA (6% higher than expected). Traffic is still growing since then – in 2014 it was 6,4 MPA.

==Project Outcomes==

The main purpose for the contracting authority was to increase capacity to be able to attract further demand – this goal seems to have been successfully achieved.

The Court of Auditors considers the project had a positive impact: the project made the Sá Carneiro airport a reference airport in the northwest of the Iberian Peninsula, allowed for a higher passenger satisfaction, generated international recognition for service quality, improved the region’s economy, positioned the metropolitan area of Porto as a European/World city, and promoted direct and indirect activities, such as the creation of jobs.

Despite the positive impact, the project’s delays and cost overruns make it less successful from a project management perspective.

==References==

* INAC (2010). Evolução do Transporte Aéreo no Aeroporto Francisco Sá Carneiro 1990-2009. Civil aviationinstitutereport, August 2010. ISBN 978.989.95680-9-9
* Tribunal de Contas (2009). Ampliação do Aeroporto Francisco Sá Carneiro. Auditoria temática às derrapagens em obras públicas. Quarto Relatório Vertical. Court of Auditor’s report nr. 06/2009 AUDIT. http://www.tcontas.pt/pt/actos/rel_auditoria/2009/audit-dgtc-rel006-2009-2s.pdf

Case Studies

2016-10-11T11:54:33Z

Nimda: /* Airports */

== Roads and Motorways ==

[[Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO|A19 Dishforth DBFO]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road |Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession|Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Ionia Odos Motorway|Ionia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: M6 Toll (BNRR)|M6 Toll (BNRR)]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: M80 Haggs to Stepps|M80 Haggs to Stepps]], UK

[[Case Studies: Olympia Odos Motorway|Olympia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Via-Invest Zaventem|Via-Invest Zaventem]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: E-39 Klett - Baardshaug|E-39 Klett-Baardshaug]], Norway

[[Case Studies: Istrian Y Toll Motorway|Istrian Y Toll Motorway]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Moreas Motorway, Greece|Moreas Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Central Greece Motorway (E65), Greece|Central Greece Motorway (E65)]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road, Italy|Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road]], Italy

[[Case Studies: E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand, Norway|E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand]], Norway

[[Case Studies: A2 Motorway, Poland|A2 Motorway]], Poland

[[Case Studies: A22 Algarve, Portugal|A22 Algarve]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: A23 Beira Interior, Portugal|A23 Beira Interior]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway, Spain|C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway, Spain|Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: M-45 Toll Motorway, Spain|M-45 Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain|Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci, Serbia |Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: H5 Koper-Izola Motorway, Slovenia| H5 Koper-Izola Motorway]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway , Slovenia| A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway ]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca , Serbia|Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase, Serbia|Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: E18 Muurla-Lohja, Finland|E18 Muurla-Lohja ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75, Finland | Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75 ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation | Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD)]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation | “Slavyanka” Roads ]], Russian Federation

== Bridges/Tunnels ==

[[Case Studies: Rio-Antirio Bridge, Greece |Rio-Antirio Bridge]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Lusoponte Bridge, Portugal | Lusoponte Bridge ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Blanka Tunnel Complex, Czech Republic| The Blanka Tunnel Complex]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: “Herrentunnel”Lübeck, Germany |“Herrentunnel”Lübeck]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Coen Tunnel|Coen Tunnel]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation| Orlovski Tunnel ]], Russian Federation

== Rail ==



[[Case Studies: FERTAGUS Train|FERTAGUS Train]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link|Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Combiplan Nijverdal, The Netherlands | Combiplan Nijverdal]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Gardermobanen, Norway | Gardermobanen ]], Norway

== Ports ==

[[Case Studies: Piraeus Container Terminal|Piraeus Container Terminal]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Sines Container Terminal|Sines Container Terminal]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Valencia Cruise Terminal|Valencia Cruise Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock|Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock]], Belgium


[[Case Studies: Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal, Rijeka, Croatia |Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development, Cyprus | Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona, Spain | Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal, Spain | Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Durrës Port East Terminal, Albania | Durrës Port East Terminal]], Albania

[[Case Studies: OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende, Belgium | OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende ]], Belgium

== Urban Transport ==

[[Case Studies: Brabo 1, Flanders|Brabo 1, Flanders]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: The Caen' TVR|The Caen' TVR]], France

[[Case Studies: Metro Sul do Tejo|Metro Sul do Tejo]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Reims' Tramway|The Reims' Tramway]], France

[[Case Studies: SEVICI|SEVICI]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester, United Kingdom | Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester]], United Kingdom

[[Case Studies: Athens Tramway, Greece | Athens Tramway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part, Poland | Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part]], Poland

[[Case Studies: Vélo’v, France| Vélo’v ]], France

[[Case Studies: The Lyon's Tramway T4, France| The Lyon's Tramway T4 ]], France

[[Case Studies: Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe, Germany | Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Metro do Porto S.A., Portugal | Metro do Porto S.A. ]], Portugal

== Airports ==

[[Case Studies: Larnaca and Paphos International Airports|Larnaca and Paphos International Airports]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Tirana International Airport|International Airport of Tirana]], Albania

[[Case Studies: Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”| Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, Germany | Berlin-Brandenburg Airport ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion, Portugal | Sá Carneiro Airport Expansion ]], Portugal

== Terminals and Depots ==



[[Case Studies: Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen|Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: The Hague New Train Central Station |The Hague New Train Central Station]], The Netherlands

== Service Infrastructure ==

[[Case Studies: Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive), Albania | Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive)]], Albania

File:Carneiro.png

2016-10-11T11:53:33Z

Nimda:

Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation

2016-10-11T11:50:52Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Roads in the residential area “Slavyanka” (Pushkin District of St. Petersburg), Russian Federation
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 12 years (including construction period – 2years)
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 1.6 billion rubles
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Slav.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Slavyanka Roads ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= June 9, 2012:
| data1 = Publication of tender notice
| label2= August 17, 2012:
| data2 = Prequalification bids
| label3= August 20, 2012:
| data3 = Prequalification results
| label4= October 10, 2012:
| data4 = Award of the PPP agreement on construction and maintenance of roads in the residential area “Slavyanka”.
| label5= January 24, 2014:
| data5 = Start of operation.

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The project comprises the construction and operation of roads with a total length of 7.7 km in the residential area “Slavyanka”, in the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg.

The aim of the PPP project is to ensure the transport accessibility of the new residential district “Slavyanka” of the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg by the construction of free public roads and organization of their maintenance in accordance with a Public-Private Partnership agreement in accordance with the Law № 627-100 “On Participation of St. Petersburg in Public-Private Partnerships”.

Under the PPP agreement, the private partner is obliged to design and build the roads using equity and debt and to maintain the roads during a 10 year period, transferring the object of the agreement to the public partner under the contract of sale, including instalment payments for St. Petersburg.

The road consists of 12 road sections each of which is a standard public road with a different length as depicted in Table 1.

Table 1: Key characteristics of roads under contract 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Road facility
! Name
! Length
! Number of traffic lanes
|-
| Road facility 1
| Severskaya St.
| 817 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 2
| Turovskaya St.
| 297 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 3
| Izborskaya St.
| 297 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 4
| Polotskaya St.(from Kolpinsky Highway to Ring)
| 404 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 5
| Polotskaya St.(from Ring to Passage 2)
| 601 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 6
| Rostovskaya St.(from Severskaya St. to Ring)
| 471 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 7
| Rostovskaya St.(from Small Ring to Big Ring)
| 422 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 8
| Rostovskaya St.(from Ring to Galitskaya St.)
| 498 m
| Minimum 2
|-
| Road facility 9
| Galitskaya St.
| 682 m
| Minimum 2
|-
| Road facility 10
| Big Ring
| 1190 m
| Minimum 3
|-
| Road facility 11
| Small Ring
| 507 m
| Minimum 3
|-
| Road facility 12
| Passage 2
| 1553 m
| Minimum 2
|}

Other related road infrastructure should also be provided, such as public transport stations, regulated and not regulated pedestrian crossings and junctions, sidewalks and lawns, and a system of modern and energy-efficient street lighting.

The project feature is that it is not a unique or complicated project, but it can serve as an example of the creation of regional and municipal free public roads. Currently, the roads in the residential area “Slavyanka” have been built and are in operation.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The authority authorised to sign and fulfil the conditions of the PPP agreement on behalf of the city of St. Petersburg is the Government of St. Petersburg.

The organizer of the tender for the conclusion of the PPP agreement is also the Government of St. Petersburg. Interactions between the competition organizer and the participants of the tender and other stakeholders, including exchange of documents, are carried out through the Investment Committee of Saint-Petersburg acting on behalf of the Government of St. Petersburg. Control for fulfilment of the conditions of the agreement before commissioning of the roads is the responsibility of the Construction Committee, and after commissioning, that of the Administration of the Pushkin District. The Committee on City Property Management signs a lease agreement with the private partner.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The private partner is the company “SlavDorService” Ltd. – a subsidiary company of the “Baltros” company group, which is one of the biggest developers and construction companies of the Northwest region of the Russian Federation and also the developer of the residential area “Slavyanka”. The main activity of the company is integrated development for housing construction.

“SlavDorService” Ltd. is 99% owned by “DSK Slavyansky” Ltd. and 1% - by “Zanevsky” Ltd. “SlavDorService” Ltd., as well as “DSK Slavyansky” Ltd. are included in the company group “Baltros”.

The company “SlavDorService” Ltd. was created especially for the purpose of roads construction in “Slavyanka” of the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg.

==Users==

The users –are the general public, legal entities and individuals having the right to use public roads in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on the roads and roads activities.

The main aim of the use of roads is ensuring the accessibility of the residential area “Slavyanka”.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

Value for money was the main driver for adoption of the PPP solution.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The roads with the total length of 7.7 km are located in the territory of the residential area “Slavyanka” of the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg.

The residential area “Slavyanka” situated in the south of St. Petersburg in the municipal district Shushary is one of the biggest projects of the integrated development of territory in the Russian Federation. It includes 135 apartment buildings constructed in a land of 220 ha, while the planned population of the area is 40-50 thousand inhabitants. Thereby, the roads built are very important primarily at the local level, since they provide convenient and high-quality access for the inhabitants of the municipal district Shushary.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The bids of participants during the tender procedure for the PPP agreement on construction and maintenance of the roads in the residential area “Slavyanka” were evaluated based on the following criteria:

* The size of principal payment for the entire object of the agreement (maximum – 1,76 billion rubles). Weight– 0,80.
* Construction period of the object of the agreement (maximum – 730 days). Weight – 0,10.
* The size of compensation of the maintenance costs by a participant as a percentage of regulatory costs for maintenance (maximum – 100%). Weight – 0,10.
* The size of rental fee for the land (minimum – 156000 rubles per quarter).
* The extent of implementation by a participant of conditions on the use of land.

Three companies, “SlavDorServise” Ltd., “NSK-Monolit” Ltd. and “General Construction Corporation” JST applied for participation in the competition. But only two companies, “SlavDorServise” Ltd., and “NSK-Monolit” Ltd. continued to participate in the tender, since the third company “General Construction Corporation” JST did not pass the pre-selection having not met the requirements of the tender documentation.

The contract was awarded to "SlavDorServis" Ltd., which presented the best bid with the highest rent amount (160 thousand rubles per quarter).

===Contract Structure===

The terms of the agreement of the 12-years PPP contract included:

* Construction period – 14 months;
* Operation period – 10 years;
* Term of signing of sale contract – not later than 3 months after the start of operation of the roads or after the date of state registration of the ownership of the private partner;

Legal framework of the agreement:

* St. Petersburg Law No. 627-100 “On St. Petersburg’s Participation in Public-Private Partnerships”, 25.12.2006
* St. Petersburg City Government Decision No. 346 “On Measures for the Development of Public-Private Partnerships in St. Petersburg”, 31.03.2009
* St. Petersburg City Government Decision No. 347 “On Measures to Realize Law No. 627-100”, 31.03.2009
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 673 “On the Conclusion of PPP Agreement on the Construction and Maintenance of the Roads in the Residential Area “Slavyanka” of Pushkin District of St. Petersburg and the Lease Contract of Land for Construction”, 02.07.2013
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 672 “On the Form of Participation of St. Petersburg in Public-Private Partnerships", 02.07.2013

The contract is a Design Build Finance Maintain (DBFM) type. St. Petersburg provides the private partner the land for construction and operation of roads, the property right of which belongs to the private partner during the period determined in the agreement, after which the partner transfers the roads to the ownership of St. Petersburg and maintains them during the entire period of the agreement.

The city will pay the private partner the principal payment in equal instalments during the period of maintenance, including interest rate on instalments, and also compensate the maintenance costs of the private partner (availability fee).

The private partner bears all the costs and expenses related to the fulfilment of obligations regarding the construction and maintenance of the roads. The public partner has the obligation to pay the principal payment and compensate the maintenance costs of the private partner, which are provided in the agreement. In the case of non-fulfilment or improper implementation of the obligation by the private partner, the sum of compensation of the maintenance costs is reduced.

The total amount of financing from the part of the private partner in the project is 1.1 billion rubles, in addition:

* The interest rate for instalment payment is 12%;
* The Redemption price of roads is 1,18 billion rubles:
* Road facility 1 – 174,9 million rubles
* Road facility 2 – 58,6 million rubles
* Road facility 3 – 65,5 million rubles
* Road facility 4 – 83 million rubles
* Road facility 5 – 90,5 million rubles
* Road facility 6 – 107,6 million rubles
* Road facility 7 – 95 million rubles
* Road facility 8 – 63,3 million rubles
* Road facility 9 – 76,9million rubles
* Road facility 10 – 194,4million rubles
* Road facility 11 – 84,5million rubles
* Road facility 12 – 95,2million rubles

The size of government expenditure on the maintenance of the roads is 98% of the regulatory costs for maintenance.

===Risk Allocation===

Risks taken by the Government:

* underfunding of the government obligations;
* changes of the project on the initiative of the Government,
* town-planning constraints,
* failure to provide land plots,
* archaeological finds.

Shared risks:

* inflation,
* problems with permits,
* detection of communications, impeding the implementation of the project,
* delay of operation due to the illegal actions of the authorities of St. Petersburg,
* environmental risks,
* changes in legislation,
* invalidity of contracts for the project,
* force majeure

The risk allocation is depicted in Figure 2.

[[Image:Slav1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The project reached its goals and ensured the accessibility of the new residential district “Slavyanka” of the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg.

The PPP agreement did not contain specific operational performance requirements. These requirements were included in a bidding documentation. Penalties against the compensation of maintenance costs were included for insufficient performance.

With respect to Construction Management performance, the project was delivered on time, to budget and with minimum disturbance to the local environment.

==References==

* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 361 “On Granting of Subsidies in 2015 for Maintenance and Repair of Road Facilities in Accordance with the PPP Agreement on the Construction and Maintenance of the Roads in the Residential Area “Slavyanka” of Pushkin District of St. Petersburg”, 22.04.2015.
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 672 “On the Form of Participation of St. Petersburg in Public-Private Partnerships", 02.07.2013Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 673 “On the Conclusion of PPP Agreement on the Construction and Maintenance of the Roads in the Residential Area “Slavyanka” of Pushkin District of St. Petersburg and the Lease Contract of Land for Construction”, 02.07.2013
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 908 “On Approval of the Additional Agreement No. 2 to the PPP Agreement of the Construction and Maintenance of the Roads in the Residential Area “Slavyanka” of Pushkin district of St. Petersburg”, 25.09.2014
* PPP: the experience of St. Petersburg. Monthly informational and analytical magazine "Highways".http://archive.izdatelstvo-dorogi.ru/2012-11-01/platdorogi/gchp.html
* Roads and schools in the "Slavyanka" on the base of PPP will be built by "SlavDorServis" http://www.dormost.spb.ru/enews/view/2028

Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation

2016-10-11T11:49:07Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Roads in the residential area “Slavyanka” (Pushkin District of St. Petersburg), Russian Federation
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 12 years (including construction period – 2years)
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 1.6 billion rubles
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Slav.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Slavyanka Roads ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= June 9, 2012:
| data1 = Publication of tender notice
| label2= August 17, 2012:
| data2 = Prequalification bids
| label3= August 20, 2012:
| data3 = Prequalification results
| label4= October 10, 2012:
| data4 = Award of the PPP agreement on construction and maintenance of roads in the residential area “Slavyanka”.
| label5= January 24, 2014:
| data5 = Start of operation.

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The project comprises the construction and operation of roads with a total length of 7.7 km in the residential area “Slavyanka”, in the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg.

The aim of the PPP project is to ensure the transport accessibility of the new residential district “Slavyanka” of the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg by the construction of free public roads and organization of their maintenance in accordance with a Public-Private Partnership agreement in accordance with the Law № 627-100 “On Participation of St. Petersburg in Public-Private Partnerships”.

Under the PPP agreement, the private partner is obliged to design and build the roads using equity and debt and to maintain the roads during a 10 year period, transferring the object of the agreement to the public partner under the contract of sale, including instalment payments for St. Petersburg.

The road consists of 12 road sections each of which is a standard public road with a different length as depicted in Table 1.

Table 1: Key characteristics of roads under contract 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Road facility
! Name
! Length
! Number of traffic lanes
|-
| Road facility 1
| Severskaya St.
| 817 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 2
| Turovskaya St.
| 297 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 3
| Izborskaya St.
| 297 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 4
| Polotskaya St.(from Kolpinsky Highwayto Ring)
| 404 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 5
| Polotskaya St.(from Ring toPassage 2)
| 601 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 6
| Rostovskaya St.(from Severskaya St.to Ring)
| 471 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 7
| Rostovskaya St.(from Small Ring to Big Ring)
| 422 m
| Minimum 4
|-
| Road facility 8
| Rostovskaya St.(from Ring to Galitskaya St.)
| 498 m
| Minimum 2
|-
| Road facility 9
| Galitskaya St.
| 682 m
| Minimum 2
|-
| Road facility 10
| Big Ring
| 1190 m
| Minimum 3
|-
| Road facility 11
| Small Ring
| 507 m
| Minimum 3
|-
| Road facility 12
| Passage 2
| 1553 m
| Minimum 2
|}

Other related road infrastructure should also be provided, such as public transport stations, regulated and not regulated pedestrian crossings and junctions, sidewalks and lawns, and a system of modern and energy-efficient street lighting.

The project feature is that it is not a unique or complicated project, but it can serve as an example of the creation of regional and municipal free public roads. Currently, the roads in the residential area “Slavyanka” have been built and are in operation.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The authority authorised to sign and fulfil the conditions of the PPP agreement on behalf of the city of St. Petersburg is the Government of St. Petersburg.

The organizer of the tender for the conclusion of the PPP agreement is also the Government of St. Petersburg. Interactions between the competition organizer and the participants of the tender and other stakeholders, including exchange of documents, are carried out through the Investment Committee of Saint-Petersburg acting on behalf of the Government of St. Petersburg. Control for fulfilment of the conditions of the agreement before commissioning of the roads is the responsibility of the Construction Committee, and after commissioning, that of the Administration of the Pushkin District. The Committee on City Property Management signs a lease agreement with the private partner.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The private partner is the company “SlavDorService” Ltd. – a subsidiary company of the “Baltros” company group, which is one of the biggest developers and construction companies of the Northwest region of the Russian Federation and also the developer of the residential area “Slavyanka”. The main activity of the company is integrated development for housing construction.

“SlavDorService” Ltd. is 99% owned by “DSK Slavyansky” Ltd. and 1% - by “Zanevsky” Ltd. “SlavDorService” Ltd., as well as “DSK Slavyansky” Ltd. are included in the company group “Baltros”.

The company “SlavDorService” Ltd. was created especially for the purpose of roads construction in “Slavyanka” of the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg.

==Users==

The users –are the general public, legal entities and individuals having the right to use public roads in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on the roads and roads activities.

The main aim of the use of roads is ensuring the accessibility of the residential area “Slavyanka”.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

Value for money was the main driver for adoption of the PPP solution.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The roads with the total length of 7.7 km are located in the territory of the residential area “Slavyanka” of the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg.

The residential area “Slavyanka” situated in the south of St. Petersburg in the municipal district Shushary is one of the biggest projects of the integrated development of territory in the Russian Federation. It includes 135 apartment buildings constructed in a land of 220 ha, while the planned population of the area is 40-50 thousand inhabitants. Thereby, the roads built are very important primarily at the local level, since they provide convenient and high-quality access for the inhabitants of the municipal district Shushary.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The bids of participants during the tender procedure for the PPP agreement on construction and maintenance of the roads in the residential area “Slavyanka” were evaluated based on the following criteria:

* The size of principal payment for the entire object of the agreement (maximum – 1,76 billion rubles). Weight– 0,80.
* Construction period of the object of the agreement (maximum – 730 days). Weight – 0,10.
* The size of compensation of the maintenance costs by a participant as a percentage of regulatory costs for maintenance (maximum – 100%). Weight – 0,10.
* The size of rental fee for the land (minimum – 156000 rubles per quarter).
* The extent of implementation by a participant of conditions on the use of land.

Three companies, “SlavDorServise” Ltd., “NSK-Monolit” Ltd. and “General Construction Corporation” JST applied for participation in the competition. But only two companies, “SlavDorServise” Ltd., and “NSK-Monolit” Ltd. continued to participate in the tender, since the third company “General Construction Corporation” JST did not pass the pre-selection having not met the requirements of the tender documentation.

The contract was awarded to "SlavDorServis" Ltd., which presented the best bid with the highest rent amount (160 thousand rubles per quarter).

===Contract Structure===

The terms of the agreement of the 12-years PPP contract included:

* Construction period – 14 months;
* Operation period – 10 years;
* Term of signing of sale contract – not later than 3 months after the start of operation of the roads or after the date of state registration of the ownership of the private partner;

Legal framework of the agreement:

* St. Petersburg Law No. 627-100 “On St. Petersburg’s Participation in Public-Private Partnerships”, 25.12.2006
* St. Petersburg City Government Decision No. 346 “On Measures for the Development of Public-Private Partnerships in St. Petersburg”, 31.03.2009
* St. Petersburg City Government Decision No. 347 “On Measures to Realize Law No. 627-100”, 31.03.2009
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 673 “On the Conclusion of PPP Agreement on the Construction and Maintenance of the Roads in the Residential Area “Slavyanka” of Pushkin District of St. Petersburg and the Lease Contract of Land for Construction”, 02.07.2013
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 672 “On the Form of Participation of St. Petersburg in Public-Private Partnerships", 02.07.2013

The contract is a Design Build Finance Maintain (DBFM) type. St. Petersburg provides the private partner the land for construction and operation of roads, the property right of which belongs to the private partner during the period determined in the agreement, after which the partner transfers the roads to the ownership of St. Petersburg and maintains them during the entire period of the agreement.

The city will pay the private partner the principal payment in equal instalments during the period of maintenance, including interest rate on instalments, and also compensate the maintenance costs of the private partner (availability fee).

The private partner bears all the costs and expenses related to the fulfilment of obligations regarding the construction and maintenance of the roads. The public partner has the obligation to pay the principal payment and compensate the maintenance costs of the private partner, which are provided in the agreement. In the case of non-fulfilment or improper implementation of the obligation by the private partner, the sum of compensation of the maintenance costs is reduced.

The total amount of financing from the part of the private partner in the project is 1.1 billion rubles, in addition:

* The interest rate for instalment payment is 12%;
* The Redemption price of roads is 1,18 billion rubles:
* Road facility 1 – 174,9 million rubles
* Road facility 2 – 58,6 million rubles
* Road facility 3 – 65,5 million rubles
* Road facility 4 – 83 million rubles
* Road facility 5 – 90,5 million rubles
* Road facility 6 – 107,6 million rubles
* Road facility 7 – 95 million rubles
* Road facility 8 – 63,3 million rubles
* Road facility 9 – 76,9million rubles
* Road facility 10 – 194,4million rubles
* Road facility 11 – 84,5million rubles
* Road facility 12 – 95,2million rubles

The size of government expenditure on the maintenance of the roads is 98% of the regulatory costs for maintenance.

===Risk Allocation===

Risks taken by the Government:

* underfunding of the government obligations;
* changes of the project on the initiative of the Government,
* town-planning constraints,
* failure to provide land plots,
* archaeological finds.

Shared risks:

* inflation,
* problems with permits,
* detection of communications, impeding the implementation of the project,
* delay of operation due to the illegal actions of the authorities of St. Petersburg,
* environmental risks,
* changes in legislation,
* invalidity of contracts for the project,
* force majeure

The risk allocation is depicted in Figure 2.

[[Image:Slav1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The project reached its goals and ensured the accessibility of the new residential district “Slavyanka” of the Pushkin District of St. Petersburg.

The PPP agreement did not contain specific operational performance requirements. These requirements were included in a bidding documentation. Penalties against the compensation of maintenance costs were included for insufficient performance.

With respect to Construction Management performance, the project was delivered on time, to budget and with minimum disturbance to the local environment.

==References==

* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 361 “On Granting of Subsidies in 2015 for Maintenance and Repair of Road Facilities in Accordance with the PPP Agreement on the Construction and Maintenance of the Roads in the Residential Area “Slavyanka” of Pushkin District of St. Petersburg”, 22.04.2015.
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 672 “On the Form of Participation of St. Petersburg in Public-Private Partnerships", 02.07.2013Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 673 “On the Conclusion of PPP Agreement on the Construction and Maintenance of the Roads in the Residential Area “Slavyanka” of Pushkin District of St. Petersburg and the Lease Contract of Land for Construction”, 02.07.2013
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 908 “On Approval of the Additional Agreement No. 2 to the PPP Agreement of the Construction and Maintenance of the Roads in the Residential Area “Slavyanka” of Pushkin district of St. Petersburg”, 25.09.2014
* PPP: the experience of St. Petersburg. Monthly informational and analytical magazine "Highways".http://archive.izdatelstvo-dorogi.ru/2012-11-01/platdorogi/gchp.html
* Roads and schools in the "Slavyanka" on the base of PPP will be built by "SlavDorServis" http://www.dormost.spb.ru/enews/view/2028

Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation

2016-10-11T11:07:00Z

Nimda: Created page with "{{Infobox |header1 = Roads in the residential area “Slavyanka” (Pushkin District of St. Petersburg), Russian Federation |header2 = |label2 = Project Type: |data2 = Greenf..."

Case Studies

2016-10-11T11:04:09Z

Nimda: /* Roads and Motorways */

== Roads and Motorways ==

[[Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO|A19 Dishforth DBFO]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road |Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession|Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Ionia Odos Motorway|Ionia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: M6 Toll (BNRR)|M6 Toll (BNRR)]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: M80 Haggs to Stepps|M80 Haggs to Stepps]], UK

[[Case Studies: Olympia Odos Motorway|Olympia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Via-Invest Zaventem|Via-Invest Zaventem]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: E-39 Klett - Baardshaug|E-39 Klett-Baardshaug]], Norway

[[Case Studies: Istrian Y Toll Motorway|Istrian Y Toll Motorway]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Moreas Motorway, Greece|Moreas Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Central Greece Motorway (E65), Greece|Central Greece Motorway (E65)]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road, Italy|Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road]], Italy

[[Case Studies: E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand, Norway|E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand]], Norway

[[Case Studies: A2 Motorway, Poland|A2 Motorway]], Poland

[[Case Studies: A22 Algarve, Portugal|A22 Algarve]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: A23 Beira Interior, Portugal|A23 Beira Interior]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway, Spain|C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway, Spain|Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: M-45 Toll Motorway, Spain|M-45 Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain|Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci, Serbia |Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: H5 Koper-Izola Motorway, Slovenia| H5 Koper-Izola Motorway]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway , Slovenia| A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway ]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca , Serbia|Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase, Serbia|Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: E18 Muurla-Lohja, Finland|E18 Muurla-Lohja ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75, Finland | Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75 ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation | Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD)]], Russian Federation

[[Case Studies: “Slavyanka” Roads, Russian Federation | “Slavyanka” Roads ]], Russian Federation

== Bridges/Tunnels ==

[[Case Studies: Rio-Antirio Bridge, Greece |Rio-Antirio Bridge]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Lusoponte Bridge, Portugal | Lusoponte Bridge ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Blanka Tunnel Complex, Czech Republic| The Blanka Tunnel Complex]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: “Herrentunnel”Lübeck, Germany |“Herrentunnel”Lübeck]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Coen Tunnel|Coen Tunnel]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation| Orlovski Tunnel ]], Russian Federation

== Rail ==



[[Case Studies: FERTAGUS Train|FERTAGUS Train]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link|Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Combiplan Nijverdal, The Netherlands | Combiplan Nijverdal]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Gardermobanen, Norway | Gardermobanen ]], Norway

== Ports ==

[[Case Studies: Piraeus Container Terminal|Piraeus Container Terminal]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Sines Container Terminal|Sines Container Terminal]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Valencia Cruise Terminal|Valencia Cruise Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock|Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock]], Belgium


[[Case Studies: Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal, Rijeka, Croatia |Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development, Cyprus | Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona, Spain | Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal, Spain | Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Durrës Port East Terminal, Albania | Durrës Port East Terminal]], Albania

[[Case Studies: OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende, Belgium | OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende ]], Belgium

== Urban Transport ==

[[Case Studies: Brabo 1, Flanders|Brabo 1, Flanders]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: The Caen' TVR|The Caen' TVR]], France

[[Case Studies: Metro Sul do Tejo|Metro Sul do Tejo]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Reims' Tramway|The Reims' Tramway]], France

[[Case Studies: SEVICI|SEVICI]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester, United Kingdom | Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester]], United Kingdom

[[Case Studies: Athens Tramway, Greece | Athens Tramway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part, Poland | Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part]], Poland

[[Case Studies: Vélo’v, France| Vélo’v ]], France

[[Case Studies: The Lyon's Tramway T4, France| The Lyon's Tramway T4 ]], France

[[Case Studies: Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe, Germany | Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Metro do Porto S.A., Portugal | Metro do Porto S.A. ]], Portugal

== Airports ==

[[Case Studies: Larnaca and Paphos International Airports|Larnaca and Paphos International Airports]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Tirana International Airport|International Airport of Tirana]], Albania

[[Case Studies: Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”| Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, Germany | Berlin-Brandenburg Airport ]], Germany

== Terminals and Depots ==



[[Case Studies: Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen|Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: The Hague New Train Central Station |The Hague New Train Central Station]], The Netherlands

== Service Infrastructure ==

[[Case Studies: Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive), Albania | Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive)]], Albania

File:Slav1.png

2016-10-11T10:59:17Z

Nimda:

File:Slav.png

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Nimda:

Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation

2016-10-11T10:55:16Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public-Private Partnership (PPP) BOOT
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 30 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 120 bln. Rubles
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Western.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Figure 1: Western High-Speed Diameter toll road ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 7 February 2011:
| data1 = Call for tender
| label2= 9 August 2011:
| data2 = Procurement process concluded
| label3= 23 December 2011:
| data3 = LLC “Northern Capital Highway”, OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter” and the Government of St. Petersburg sighed the PPP agreement
| label4= 20 December 2012:
| data4 = Financial close and renewed PPP agreement were signed in Mosco
| label5= March 2013:
| data5 = Start of construction
| label6= 2016:
| data6 = Expected start of operation

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), the first urban high-speed toll road in the Russian Federation, is a modern high-speed urban highway being built in St. Petersburg. The investment project of international significance is aimed at:

* providing the transport connection between the north-western, the central and southern parts of the city;
* solving the problem of transport isolation of the Vasilievsky Island from other parts of St. Petersburg, including the period when the existing road bridges are open;
* relieving the transport road network of St. Petersburg, including the central part of the city being under UNESCO protection;
* improving the environmental conditions in St. Petersburg by relieving the city roads;
* partially solving seasonable road congestion problems at the exit from the city to recreational areas;
* transferring the transit traffic flows to the new highway, that will significantly increase the capacity of the road network of the city, relieve transport congestion in the historic centre of St. Petersburg and improve the environmental conditions;
* increase of turnover of the Seaport of St. Petersburg.

The project realization determines:

* the dynamics of socio-economic development of the city;
* competitiveness;
* the investment attractiveness of Saint-Petersburg;

The Contract was signed between the City of St. Petersburg, OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter” and “Northern Capital Highway” on the 23th of December, 2011, in accordance with St. Petersburg Regional Law № 627-100 “On Participation of St. Petersburg in Public-Private Partnerships”.

The object of the PPP project is the toll road “Western High-Speed Diameter” (hereinafter – Toll Road), which includes three parts:

* North part;
* Central part;
* South part.

The Toll Road Technical Parameters are:

* Length : 46,6 km
* On land : 19,3 km
* In an open cut : 2,7 km
* On engineering structures :24,6 km
* Number of transport interchanges :15
* Number of lanes : 4-8
* Maximum permissible speed :110 km/hour

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

St. Petersburg and OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter” appear as a public partner in the project. The former is the initiator of the project and the owner of the object after the completion of the PPP agreement.

Under the PPP Agreement, the city Government is obliged to provide the land to the private partner, fulfil preconstruction works, such as rerouting or removal of the existing engineering networks, territory cleaning and carrying out measures for protection of the environment, provide capital grant for private partner, lease out the object of agreement for a long-term and provide minimal guaranteed income and compensation in case of cancellation of the agreement.

OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter” is responsible for organization of the tender and acts on behalf of the city.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The Limited liability company “Northern Capital Highway” (NCH) is a SPV company created on March, 14th 2011 on the purpose of realization of the PPP project initiated by the city government. The consortium consists of VTB Capital, Gazprom Bank, Astaldi (Italy), IçtaşInşaat (Turkey) (construction contractors) and Mega YapiInşsaatve Ticaret (Turkey) as a technical consultant.

NCH is obliged to finance, build the Central part of the highway and operate the highway for 30 years.

Debt funding equals 49% of the total funding and is provided by the group of different financial organizations such as commercial (investment) banks (VTB Capital, Gazprombank – 28%), international financial organizations (EBRR, Eurasian Development Bank – 30%) and development institutions (Vnesheconombank – 42%). Equity financing is 7%.

==Users==

WHSD is a toll road aimed at relieving the city road network by increasing its traffic capacity by up to 120 000 vehicles per day and provide the transport connection between the north-western, the central and southern regions of the city.

The major users of the highway are citizens and visitors of the city who drive motor cars, bus drivers and truck transport. The vehicles are divided into four categories according to their size. Toll charges differ between categories and depend on traffic and time of day. Also, there is a discount system for frequent users (10%, 15% or 20%).

There are three payment options:

1. Transponder

The most convenient way to pay a fee as drivers are charged automatically with the help of the electronic gadget placed on the wind screen. The use of transponder allows the user to get the discount of 25% or 15% depending on the chosen tariff.

2. Contactless smart card

The smart-card can be either personalized or not, topped up online.

3. Cash or credit card

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The contract was signed between the Government of St. Petersburg, ZSD and the SPV NCH in accordance with St. Petersburg Regional Law on PPP. ZSD Company takes part as it was already responsible for constructing the North and South parts of the highway. It represents the city interests in the scheme. The purpose of the Agreement is, firstly, to raise money that are not public, secondly, to construct the object and, thirdly, operate it. These functions that were addressed to private partner defined the model of BOOT.

==Project Timing==

The key city`s reasons for project initiation are the lack of transport provision of the city and the need of relieving the transport road network. From the city government’s perspective, this will boost socio-economic development of the city, increase competitiveness and investment attractiveness.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The total length of the highway is 46.6 km. The Central part, which is being constructed under the PPP Agreement, is of 11 km length. The road goes from the river Ekateringofka bank to the right bank of the river Big Nevka.

From the city economic prospective, the highway allows the increase of cargo turn-over by improving the access to the port, improves transport accessibility to seaport passengers, boosts traffic capacity up to 120 000 vehicles per day, ultimately enhancing the city development as a touristic centre, providing workplaces and improving economic activity of the population.

On the federal level, the highway becomes a part of the transport corridor “North-South” by increasing traffic capacity, improving the level of federal indicator of physical distribution system effectiveness and providing conditions for increasing population mobility.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The tender organizer:

* OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter”

The participants of the tender:

a) Ltd. “Baltic Concession Company “Magistral”

The Parties of the Consortium are:

⇒ CJSC “Terra Nova” (Russia) 
⇒ CJSC “Baltic Dredging” (Russia) 
⇒ AllgemeineBaugesellschaft A. PORR AG (Austria) 
⇒ Renaissance Construction Ltd. (Russia) 
⇒ Vinci Concessions SAS (France) 
⇒ JSC “Bridge Construction N19” (Russia) 
⇒ Jan de NulNV (Belgium) 
⇒ LTD “Sberbank Investments”(Russia) 

b) Limited Liability Company “Northern Capital Highway” (NCH)

The Parties of the Consortium are:

⇒ VTB Capital (Russia) 
⇒ Gazprombank (Russia) 
⇒ Astaldi (Italy) 
⇒ IçtaşInşaat (Turkey) 
⇒ Mega Yapi Inşsaat ve Ticaret (Turkey) 

c) Samsung C&T Corporation(South Korea)

Planned schedule of PPP tender:

07.02.2011 – publication of the notice about the tender
29.03.2011 - filing of applications for prequalification
12.04.2011 – prequalification stage
28.06.2011 – submission of tender proposals
29.07.2011 – assessment of tender proposals and determination of the winner of the tender
30.09.2011 - conduct of negotiations
20.12.2011 – signing of the PPP agreement

The requirements of prequalification:

I. Experience in construction of a toll road, the operation of which is started not earlier than 2000;

II. Experience in construction of a toll road in the framework of a project, which meets the following requirements:

* The project cost – not less than 10 billion rubles
* The length of the span of the bridge - not less than 160 m., the length of the vertical clearance - not less than 25 m.

III. Experience in attraction of funding not secured by state guarantees in the last 10 years for the project, the cost of which is not less than 10 billion rubles. The amount of attracted funding – not less than 7 billion rubles.

IV. Experience in participation in PPP projects, the total cost of which is not less than 10 billion rubles.

The proposals of the participants during the tender procedure were evaluated on the following criteria:

* Financial criteria. weight – 80%
* Legal criteria – weight 20%

===Contract Structure===

The three-party contract was signed between the city of Saint Petersburg, ZSD and CHN. The property rights on the road belong to ZSD. CHN possesses all the profits it gains from the operation of the road.

The St. Petersburg responsibilities are:

* To lease the land necessary for the construction to ZSD;
* To ensure the compliance of preconstruction works done in accordance with project documentation such as rerouting of utilities and facilities and of territory preparation including vacation of the land, compensatory payments and natural environment protection;
* Provide budget money according to the legislation in the manner and on the terms defined in the Agreement and in compliance with the project indicators including the amount of profits obtained from user charging;
* To pay an indemnity in amounts, manner and terms defined in the Agreement;
* To support the Agreement parties within its powers and according to the Agreement.

The ZSD responsibilities are:

* To build the North and South part of the highway;
* To operate the object of the Agreement on terms defined in the Agreement;
* To provide the NCH with an opportunity to operate in accordance with the Agreement on the land for building the Central part of the highway;
* To provide the right of use of project documentation to NCH;
* To finance a part of NCH spending on building of the object in amounts, manner and on terms defined in the Agreement;
* To make payments to NCH on operation stage in amounts and manner defined in the Agreement according to the tender proposal in order to provide service of money raised by the NCH
* To control the performance of NCH and make decisions on current project issues where necessary;
* To support the Agreement parties within its powers and according to the Agreement.

The NCH responsibilities are:

* To build the Central part of the highway;
* To raise money in amounts enough to meet commitment;
* To operate the road together with ZSD according to the terms of the Agreement.

The Private Partner is responsible for operating the highway and tolling. The fee is defined by the Private Partner within the limits set by the Public Partner. The agreement used by two parties is the scheme of minimal guaranteed income so that the city government represented as OAO “ZSD” is obliged to make fixed payments to the Private Partner as a guarantee of minimal income. In case of short delivery due to decrease in traffic level compared to forecasted, the city compensates the losses. In case of excess profits, the sum is divided between the Public and Private Partners in proportion of 90%/10%, correspondingly, according to the Agreement.

===Risk Allocation===

Saint Petersburg assumes:

* Risk of not obtaining the licenses in case of illegal delay of releasing licenses and illegal cancellation of the authorization;
* Risk of negative changes of legislation on cases defined in the Agreement.

ZSD assumes:

* Risk of drawbacks of the project documentation;
* Risk of delay of commissioning the Central part of the highway

NCH assumes:

* Financing risks;
* Common risk of getting licenses;
* Common construction risks including risks of construction organization, price and delays of construction;
* Operation risk including the risk of partial and total inaccessibility of the object of Agreement for users is distributed between ZSD and NCH.

Risk allocation is depicted in Figure 2.

[[Image:Western1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The project is still under the construction stage and will be delivered by 2016. There are no delays so far.

==References==

* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 106 “On the conclusion of PPP agreement on the construction and operation of the road “Western High Speed Diameter”, 11.02.2011
* http://fs.moex.com/f/1322/vtb-kapital.pdf
* http://www.nch-spb.com/
* http://www.pppinrussia.ru/userfiles/upload/files/ZSD_moya_pdf.pdf
* http://www.whsd.ru/pdf/info_mem_03-05.pdf

Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation

2016-10-11T10:54:32Z

Nimda: Created page with "{{Infobox |header1 = Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation |header2 = |label2 = Project Type: |data2 = Greenfield |header3 = |label3 = Type of Project Fin..."

{{Infobox
|header1 = Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = Public-Private Partnership (PPP) BOOT
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 30 years
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 120 bln. Rubles
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Western.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Figure 1: Western High-Speed Diameter toll road ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= 7 February 2011:
| data1 = Call for tender
| label2= 9 August 2011:
| data2 = Procurement process concluded
| label3= 23 December 2011:
| data3 = LLC “Northern Capital Highway”, OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter” and the Government of St. Petersburg sighed the PPP agreement
| label4= 20 December 2012:
| data4 = Financial close and renewed PPP agreement were signed in Mosco
| label5= March 2013:
| data5 = Start of construction
| label6= 2016:
| data6 = Expected start of operation

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), the first urban high-speed toll road in the Russian Federation, is a modern high-speed urban highway being built in St. Petersburg. The investment project of international significance is aimed at:

* providing the transport connection between the north-western, the central and southern parts of the city;
* solving the problem of transport isolation of the Vasilievsky Island from other parts of St. Petersburg, including the period when the existing road bridges are open;
* relieving the transport road network of St. Petersburg, including the central part of the city being under UNESCO protection;
* improving the environmental conditions in St. Petersburg by relieving the city roads;
* partially solving seasonable road congestion problems at the exit from the city to recreational areas;
* transferring the transit traffic flows to the new highway, that will significantly increase the capacity of the road network of the city, relieve transport congestion in the historic centre of St. Petersburg and improve the environmental conditions;
* increase of turnover of the Seaport of St. Petersburg.

The project realization determines:

* the dynamics of socio-economic development of the city;
* competitiveness;
* the investment attractiveness of Saint-Petersburg;

The Contract was signed between the City of St. Petersburg, OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter” and “Northern Capital Highway” on the 23th of December, 2011, in accordance with St. Petersburg Regional Law № 627-100 “On Participation of St. Petersburg in Public-Private Partnerships”.

The object of the PPP project is the toll road “Western High-Speed Diameter” (hereinafter – Toll Road), which includes three parts:

* North part;
* Central part;
* South part.

The Toll Road Technical Parameters are:

* Length : 46,6 km
* On land : 19,3 km
* In an open cut : 2,7 km
* On engineering structures :24,6 km
* Number of transport interchanges :15
* Number of lanes : 4-8
* Maximum permissible speed :110 km/hour

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

St. Petersburg and OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter” appear as a public partner in the project. The former is the initiator of the project and the owner of the object after the completion of the PPP agreement.

Under the PPP Agreement, the city Government is obliged to provide the land to the private partner, fulfil preconstruction works, such as rerouting or removal of the existing engineering networks, territory cleaning and carrying out measures for protection of the environment, provide capital grant for private partner, lease out the object of agreement for a long-term and provide minimal guaranteed income and compensation in case of cancellation of the agreement.

OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter” is responsible for organization of the tender and acts on behalf of the city.

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The Limited liability company “Northern Capital Highway” (NCH) is a SPV company created on March, 14th 2011 on the purpose of realization of the PPP project initiated by the city government. The consortium consists of VTB Capital, Gazprom Bank, Astaldi (Italy), IçtaşInşaat (Turkey) (construction contractors) and Mega YapiInşsaatve Ticaret (Turkey) as a technical consultant.

NCH is obliged to finance, build the Central part of the highway and operate the highway for 30 years.

Debt funding equals 49% of the total funding and is provided by the group of different financial organizations such as commercial (investment) banks (VTB Capital, Gazprombank – 28%), international financial organizations (EBRR, Eurasian Development Bank – 30%) and development institutions (Vnesheconombank – 42%). Equity financing is 7%.

==Users==

WHSD is a toll road aimed at relieving the city road network by increasing its traffic capacity by up to 120 000 vehicles per day and provide the transport connection between the north-western, the central and southern regions of the city.

The major users of the highway are citizens and visitors of the city who drive motor cars, bus drivers and truck transport. The vehicles are divided into four categories according to their size. Toll charges differ between categories and depend on traffic and time of day. Also, there is a discount system for frequent users (10%, 15% or 20%).

There are three payment options:

1. Transponder

The most convenient way to pay a fee as drivers are charged automatically with the help of the electronic gadget placed on the wind screen. The use of transponder allows the user to get the discount of 25% or 15% depending on the chosen tariff.

2. Contactless smart card

The smart-card can be either personalized or not, topped up online.

3. Cash or credit card

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The contract was signed between the Government of St. Petersburg, ZSD and the SPV NCH in accordance with St. Petersburg Regional Law on PPP. ZSD Company takes part as it was already responsible for constructing the North and South parts of the highway. It represents the city interests in the scheme. The purpose of the Agreement is, firstly, to raise money that are not public, secondly, to construct the object and, thirdly, operate it. These functions that were addressed to private partner defined the model of BOOT.

==Project Timing==

The key city`s reasons for project initiation are the lack of transport provision of the city and the need of relieving the transport road network. From the city government’s perspective, this will boost socio-economic development of the city, increase competitiveness and investment attractiveness.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

The total length of the highway is 46.6 km. The Central part, which is being constructed under the PPP Agreement, is of 11 km length. The road goes from the river Ekateringofka bank to the right bank of the river Big Nevka.

From the city economic prospective, the highway allows the increase of cargo turn-over by improving the access to the port, improves transport accessibility to seaport passengers, boosts traffic capacity up to 120 000 vehicles per day, ultimately enhancing the city development as a touristic centre, providing workplaces and improving economic activity of the population.

On the federal level, the highway becomes a part of the transport corridor “North-South” by increasing traffic capacity, improving the level of federal indicator of physical distribution system effectiveness and providing conditions for increasing population mobility.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The tender organizer:

* OJSC “Western High-Speed Diameter”

The participants of the tender:

a) Ltd. “Baltic Concession Company “Magistral”

The Parties of the Consortium are:

⇒ CJSC “Terra Nova” (Russia) 
⇒ CJSC “Baltic Dredging” (Russia) 
⇒ AllgemeineBaugesellschaft A. PORR AG (Austria) 
⇒ Renaissance Construction Ltd. (Russia) 
⇒ Vinci Concessions SAS (France) 
⇒ JSC “Bridge Construction N19” (Russia) 
⇒ Jan de NulNV (Belgium) 
⇒ LTD “Sberbank Investments”(Russia) 

b) Limited Liability Company “Northern Capital Highway” (NCH)

The Parties of the Consortium are:

⇒ VTB Capital (Russia) 
⇒ Gazprombank (Russia) 
⇒ Astaldi (Italy) 
⇒ IçtaşInşaat (Turkey) 
⇒ Mega Yapi Inşsaat ve Ticaret (Turkey) 

c) Samsung C&T Corporation(South Korea)

Planned schedule of PPP tender:

07.02.2011 – publication of the notice about the tender
29.03.2011 - filing of applications for prequalification
12.04.2011 – prequalification stage
28.06.2011 – submission of tender proposals
29.07.2011 – assessment of tender proposals and determination of the winner of the tender
30.09.2011 - conduct of negotiations
20.12.2011 – signing of the PPP agreement

The requirements of prequalification:

I. Experience in construction of a toll road, the operation of which is started not earlier than 2000;

II. Experience in construction of a toll road in the framework of a project, which meets the following requirements:

* The project cost – not less than 10 billion rubles
* The length of the span of the bridge - not less than 160 m., the length of the vertical clearance - not less than 25 m.

III. Experience in attraction of funding not secured by state guarantees in the last 10 years for the project, the cost of which is not less than 10 billion rubles. The amount of attracted funding – not less than 7 billion rubles.

IV. Experience in participation in PPP projects, the total cost of which is not less than 10 billion rubles.

The proposals of the participants during the tender procedure were evaluated on the following criteria:

* Financial criteria. weight – 80%
* Legal criteria – weight 20%

===Contract Structure===

The three-party contract was signed between the city of Saint Petersburg, ZSD and CHN. The property rights on the road belong to ZSD. CHN possesses all the profits it gains from the operation of the road.

The St. Petersburg responsibilities are:

* To lease the land necessary for the construction to ZSD;
* To ensure the compliance of preconstruction works done in accordance with project documentation such as rerouting of utilities and facilities and of territory preparation including vacation of the land, compensatory payments and natural environment protection;
* Provide budget money according to the legislation in the manner and on the terms defined in the Agreement and in compliance with the project indicators including the amount of profits obtained from user charging;
* To pay an indemnity in amounts, manner and terms defined in the Agreement;
* To support the Agreement parties within its powers and according to the Agreement.

The ZSD responsibilities are:

* To build the North and South part of the highway;
* To operate the object of the Agreement on terms defined in the Agreement;
* To provide the NCH with an opportunity to operate in accordance with the Agreement on the land for building the Central part of the highway;
* To provide the right of use of project documentation to NCH;
* To finance a part of NCH spending on building of the object in amounts, manner and on terms defined in the Agreement;
* To make payments to NCH on operation stage in amounts and manner defined in the Agreement according to the tender proposal in order to provide service of money raised by the NCH
* To control the performance of NCH and make decisions on current project issues where necessary;
* To support the Agreement parties within its powers and according to the Agreement.

The NCH responsibilities are:

* To build the Central part of the highway;
* To raise money in amounts enough to meet commitment;
* To operate the road together with ZSD according to the terms of the Agreement.

The Private Partner is responsible for operating the highway and tolling. The fee is defined by the Private Partner within the limits set by the Public Partner. The agreement used by two parties is the scheme of minimal guaranteed income so that the city government represented as OAO “ZSD” is obliged to make fixed payments to the Private Partner as a guarantee of minimal income. In case of short delivery due to decrease in traffic level compared to forecasted, the city compensates the losses. In case of excess profits, the sum is divided between the Public and Private Partners in proportion of 90%/10%, correspondingly, according to the Agreement.

===Risk Allocation===

Saint Petersburg assumes:

* Risk of not obtaining the licenses in case of illegal delay of releasing licenses and illegal cancellation of the authorization;
* Risk of negative changes of legislation on cases defined in the Agreement.

ZSD assumes:

* Risk of drawbacks of the project documentation;
* Risk of delay of commissioning the Central part of the highway

NCH assumes:

* Financing risks;
* Common risk of getting licenses;
* Common construction risks including risks of construction organization, price and delays of construction;
* Operation risk including the risk of partial and total inaccessibility of the object of Agreement for users is distributed between ZSD and NCH.

Risk allocation is depicted in Figure 2.
[[Image:Western1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The project is still under the construction stage and will be delivered by 2016. There are no delays so far.

==References==

* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 106 “On the conclusion of PPP agreement on the construction and operation of the road “Western High Speed Diameter”, 11.02.2011
* http://fs.moex.com/f/1322/vtb-kapital.pdf
* http://www.nch-spb.com/
* http://www.pppinrussia.ru/userfiles/upload/files/ZSD_moya_pdf.pdf
* http://www.whsd.ru/pdf/info_mem_03-05.pdf

Case Studies

2016-10-11T10:34:20Z

Nimda: /* Roads and Motorways */

== Roads and Motorways ==

[[Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO|A19 Dishforth DBFO]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road |Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession|Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Ionia Odos Motorway|Ionia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: M6 Toll (BNRR)|M6 Toll (BNRR)]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: M80 Haggs to Stepps|M80 Haggs to Stepps]], UK

[[Case Studies: Olympia Odos Motorway|Olympia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Via-Invest Zaventem|Via-Invest Zaventem]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: E-39 Klett - Baardshaug|E-39 Klett-Baardshaug]], Norway

[[Case Studies: Istrian Y Toll Motorway|Istrian Y Toll Motorway]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Moreas Motorway, Greece|Moreas Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Central Greece Motorway (E65), Greece|Central Greece Motorway (E65)]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road, Italy|Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road]], Italy

[[Case Studies: E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand, Norway|E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand]], Norway

[[Case Studies: A2 Motorway, Poland|A2 Motorway]], Poland

[[Case Studies: A22 Algarve, Portugal|A22 Algarve]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: A23 Beira Interior, Portugal|A23 Beira Interior]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway, Spain|C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway, Spain|Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: M-45 Toll Motorway, Spain|M-45 Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain|Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci, Serbia |Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: H5 Koper-Izola Motorway, Slovenia| H5 Koper-Izola Motorway]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway , Slovenia| A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway ]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca , Serbia|Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase, Serbia|Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: E18 Muurla-Lohja, Finland|E18 Muurla-Lohja ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75, Finland | Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75 ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD), Russian Federation | Western High-Speed Diameter (WHSD)]], Russian Federation

== Bridges/Tunnels ==

[[Case Studies: Rio-Antirio Bridge, Greece |Rio-Antirio Bridge]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Lusoponte Bridge, Portugal | Lusoponte Bridge ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Blanka Tunnel Complex, Czech Republic| The Blanka Tunnel Complex]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: “Herrentunnel”Lübeck, Germany |“Herrentunnel”Lübeck]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Coen Tunnel|Coen Tunnel]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation| Orlovski Tunnel ]], Russian Federation

== Rail ==



[[Case Studies: FERTAGUS Train|FERTAGUS Train]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link|Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Combiplan Nijverdal, The Netherlands | Combiplan Nijverdal]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Gardermobanen, Norway | Gardermobanen ]], Norway

== Ports ==

[[Case Studies: Piraeus Container Terminal|Piraeus Container Terminal]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Sines Container Terminal|Sines Container Terminal]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Valencia Cruise Terminal|Valencia Cruise Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock|Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock]], Belgium


[[Case Studies: Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal, Rijeka, Croatia |Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development, Cyprus | Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona, Spain | Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal, Spain | Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Durrës Port East Terminal, Albania | Durrës Port East Terminal]], Albania

[[Case Studies: OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende, Belgium | OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende ]], Belgium

== Urban Transport ==

[[Case Studies: Brabo 1, Flanders|Brabo 1, Flanders]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: The Caen' TVR|The Caen' TVR]], France

[[Case Studies: Metro Sul do Tejo|Metro Sul do Tejo]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Reims' Tramway|The Reims' Tramway]], France

[[Case Studies: SEVICI|SEVICI]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester, United Kingdom | Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester]], United Kingdom

[[Case Studies: Athens Tramway, Greece | Athens Tramway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part, Poland | Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part]], Poland

[[Case Studies: Vélo’v, France| Vélo’v ]], France

[[Case Studies: The Lyon's Tramway T4, France| The Lyon's Tramway T4 ]], France

[[Case Studies: Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe, Germany | Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Metro do Porto S.A., Portugal | Metro do Porto S.A. ]], Portugal

== Airports ==

[[Case Studies: Larnaca and Paphos International Airports|Larnaca and Paphos International Airports]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Tirana International Airport|International Airport of Tirana]], Albania

[[Case Studies: Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”| Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, Germany | Berlin-Brandenburg Airport ]], Germany

== Terminals and Depots ==



[[Case Studies: Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen|Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: The Hague New Train Central Station |The Hague New Train Central Station]], The Netherlands

== Service Infrastructure ==

[[Case Studies: Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive), Albania | Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive)]], Albania

File:Western1.png

2016-10-11T10:33:12Z

Nimda:

File:Western.png

2016-10-11T10:33:00Z

Nimda:

Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation

2016-10-11T10:26:08Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = ORLOVSKI TUNNEL (under the River Neva in St, Petersburg), Russian Federation
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = PPP
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 30 years (including 4 years of design and construction)
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 54 600 million rubles
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Orlovski.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Orlovski Tunnel ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= September 14, 2007:
| data1 = Call for Tender
| label2= September 8-10, 2007:
| data2 = Road-show of the project in Frankfurt, at the office of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
| label3= December 6, 2007:
| data3 = Prequalification
| label4= February 18, 2010:
| data4 = Award
| label5= June, 2010:
| data5 = The concession agreement is signed between the Government of St. Petersburg and “Nevskaya Concession Company”
| label6= August, 2011:
| data6 = Start of construction
| label7= October 4, 2011:
| data7 = The authorities of St. Petersburg refused to participate in the project because of the significant increase of project costs (the cause is difficult terrain in the proposed site of construction)
| label8= November, 2012:
| data8 = Resolution of the Government of St. Petersburg on the cancellation of the agreement with the "Nevskaya Concession Company". The contract is cancelled.
| label9= December 11, 2012:
| data9 = The Government of St. Petersburg officially notified the "Nevskaya Concession Company" about the termination of the concession agreement for the design, construction and operation of the Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River. The grounds for termination of the agreement is that the concessioner has not provided evidence to achieve financial closure, has not fulfilled the conditions of the start of construction and the cost of the project exceeded 55 billion rubles.
| label10= June, 2015:
| data10= Paris Arbitration ordered the Government of St. Petersburg to pay “Nevskaya Concession Company” compensation amounting to EUR 15 million for breach of the concession agreement.

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The Orlovski Tunnel was designed as a road tunnel of about one kilometre length under the Neva River, linking Piskarevsky Avenue and Smolnaya Embankment in St. Petersburg (Figure 2). The tunnel was to be tolled. Its key features included the following:

* 2 carriageways
* 3 lanes per carriageway
* Overall length 2350 m
* Portal to portal length: 1100 m
* River bank to bank length: 550 m
* Depth of river: 15 m
* Bored tunnel depth: 40 m

[[Image:Orlovski1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Project Location, St Petersburg''

The overall two-way capacity of the Orlovski Tunnel was to be 60 000 vehicles per day.
The construction of the Orlovski Tunnel was considered as the solution to the traffic problems of St. Petersburg. Its implementation would have contributed to the development of the city as a major international transport hub.

The decision to develop the Orlovski Tunnel project was driven by the following factors:

* congestion of the transport network in the city centre and the gravity zone of the Orlovski Tunnel,
* absence of a permanent transport connection between the right- and left-bank districts of St. Petersburg in the city centre,
* exhausted capacity of the existing Neva bridges,
* expected traffic increase throughout the city.

Moreover, the construction of the Orlovski Tunnel would have helped to address an issue of federal significance – to increase the capacity of the Volgo-Baltic Waterway (VBW). The tunnel would allow the draw bridges over the Neva River to be open for one hour longer, thus increasing the total ship traffic.

In accordance with the Decree of the Russian Government, the Orlovski Tunnel project had to be implemented using a Private-Public Partnership model .The construction and operation of the Orlovski Tunnel could become one of the first Russian transport infrastructure concessions, implemented in accordance with the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Concession Agreements” d.d. July 21st, 2005 No. 115-FZ (hereinafter – Concession Law). The duration of the agreement was foreseen for 30 years from its signing.

The bidding procedure for the concession agreement for the design, construction, financing and operation of the Orlovski Tunnel in St. Petersburg (hereinafter – Tender procedure) was conducted in accordance with the Concession Law.

In November 2006, the Decree of the Government of the RF No. 1709-r was adopted which put the project on the list of schemes supported by the Investment Fund and approved the project.

On April 10th, 2007, the Government of St. Petersburg adopted the Decree No. 384 “On Implementation and Operation of a Toll Tunnel under the Neva River in Alignment of Piskarevski Pr. – Orlovskaya Ul.”

On May 31st, 2007, the Government of the Russian Federation passed the Decree No. 695-r “On Signing of Concession Agreement in relation to Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in St. Petersburg”.

The Tender Documentation was approved by Order of the Federal Highways Agency (No. 61 of September 4th, 2007) and Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg (No. 1090 of April 3rd, 2007).

The duration of the agreement was 30 years from the signing, including 4 years of design and construction (2008-2012). The Tunnel construction was scheduled to begin in 2011 and its inauguration in early 2016.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Public Partners under the Orlovski Tunnel project was the Russian Federation and the city of St. Petersburg via their respective dedicated authorities:

* on behalf of the Russian Federation , the Federal Road Agency (Rosavtodor)
* on behalf of the federal city of St. Petersburg , the Government of St. Petersburg

The Government was the project developer – Managing Company of the Orlovski Tunnel project.

Later, the Russian Federation withdrew from the structure of Grantors.

Advisory support was provided by:

* The World Bank – financial and strategic advisor
* Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer – legal advisor
* Mott Macdonald – technical advisor
* Research and Design Institute of Regional Development and Transportation – technical and transport advisor

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The concessioner in this project was the consortium Ltd "Nevskaya concession company”, which represents the French group Vinci.

==Users==

The Orlovski Tunnel was constructed to be the major link between the right and left bank districts of St. Petersburg in the city centre and open to passenger traffic, public transport, emergency services and freight transport with a permissible maximum weight of up to 3.5 tons.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The PPP model was selected due to the following:

* Project inscribed in master plans of the city since 1986
* Feasibility studies and site evaluation were concluded
* Government believes there is significant value in innovative design solutions and long term maintenance risk being transferred to the private sector: strong rationale for PPP
* Project designed on the basis of a 30-year concession, design build finance operate & maintain scheme

==Project Timing==

The construction of the Orlovski Tunnel was considered as the solution for the traffic problems of St. Petersburg.

7. Project Locality and Market Geography
St. Petersburg plays a major role in the transport system of the Russian Federation. The largest Baltic Port of Russia, located in St. Petersburg leading all Russian ports, and the Volgo-Baltic Waterway, make St. Petersburg a major transport hub in the Russian Federation. Owing to its unique geographic location – on the coast of the Baltic Sea and in immediate proximity to the EU and major European ports- St. Petersburg has become the gateway to the Russian Federation for a considerable share of the export/import freight volumes of the country. Sections of two Euro-Asian transport corridors – the North-South and the Transsiberian, as well as the Pan-European Transport Corridor IX pass through St. Petersburg.

The principal transport artery through St. Petersburg is the Neva River, whose 23 km length is included in the Single Deep-Water System of European Russia. The Neva River is one of the major links of the Volgo-Baltic Waterway (VBW) connecting the Volga River to the Baltic Sea, via the White Sea - Baltic Canal, to the White Sea. The Volgo-Baltic Waterway plays a major role in the Pan-European Transport Corridor IX and the North-West transport Corridor. The significance of the VBW increased substantially due to the construction of new ports in the Gulf of Finland and the extension of the Pan-European Transport Corridor IX to the Black and Caspian seas.

[[Image:Orlovski2.png]] 
''Figure 3: Volgo-Baltic Basin''

At present, the traffic via the Volgo-Baltic route is constrained due to limited periods when bridges are raised. Ship owners incur considerable losses because of delays of ships waiting to pass through the Neva.

The implementation of the Orlovski Tunnel would enable the Neva bridges to open for one hour longer every day. Based on estimates, this would increase the capacity of the St. Petersburg section of the Volgo-Baltic Waterway by 1.3 times its current capacity, and provide an essential impetus to the increase in international transportation.

Moreover, the accommodation of the growing traffic flows would be impossible without new crossings between the left- and right bank sections of the city. At present, north-eastern districts of the city are linked to the centre and south-western districts mostly over four bridges: the Troitski Bridge, Liteiny Bridge, Petra Velikogo (Bolsheokhtinski) and Alexander Nevski Bridge. The central street and road network rely on bridges already operated at capacity. For instance, during peak hours, the above bridges are at more than 100% capacity.

The implementation of the Orlovski Tunnel would enable the realignment of traffic on the approaches to the centre, and therefore, a significant relief of congestion on existing bridges linking the right- and left bank districts of St. Petersburg.

The Orlovski Tunnel forms an integral part of the construction and reconstruction transport works currently undertaken by St. Petersburg as part of its Master Plan.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The Bids received were evaluated on two criteria:

1) Technical criteria: weight – 0,2
2) Financial criteria: weigh– 0,8:
a) The total discounted amount of public financing of the construction (capital grant). Maximum 22,15 billion rubles.
b) The total discounted amount of compensation paid by the Grantor to the Concessioner during the stage of exploitation of the Tunnel (availability payment).

At the prequalification stage, applications for participation in the Tender procedure were received from four companies:

* Ltd “Nevskaya concession company” (the French group Vinci)
* Ltd "Neva Tunnel" (Austrian Strabag AG, the Cyprus Suri Holdings Limited, a German Zueblin AG and the French Egis Projects SA)
* JSC "Buigproekt Operating" (the French group Bouygues)
* Neva Traverse GmbH (German Hochtief Construction AG and Hochtief PPP Solution and the Dutch Royal Boskalis Westminster NV)

Only one of the four consortia, which had previously been screened for participation in the Tender procedure, continued to participate in the tender – "Nevskaya concession company" Ltd-, because no other company submitted proposals to this stage of the competition. In June 2010, the Government of St Petersburg and “Nevskaya Concession Company” Ltd signed the concession agreement.

===Contract Structure===

The obligations of the Concessioner included the following:

* to design the Orlovski Tunnel and obtain all the relevant permits and approvals;
* to build the Orlovski Tunnel using equity and debt funds, and finance provided by the Grantor;
* to start the operation of the Orlovski Tunnel before the deadline specified in the bid;
* to use (operate) the Orlovski Tunnel as a public road tunnel, in particular – to levy tolls from users of the Orlovski Tunnel once its construction is completed and the tunnel is put in operation, and not to terminate (not to interrupt) this activity without the Grantor’s consent, and collect tolls from the tunnel users. Toll rates will be set by the Grantor;
* to provide public utility services with access to the land plots used in construction and operation of the Tunnel;
* to provide maintenance and major repairs of the Orlovski Tunnel at its own expense;
* to meet requirements for insurance against risks specified in the Concession Agreement; in particular, at its own expense, insure the risk of loss (destruction) or damage of the Tunnel, and the risk of third party liability for the damage caused during the construction and operation of the Tunnel;
* on termination of the Concession Agreement (including expiry), to transfer the Tunnel to the Grantor;
* the Concessioner may not build any property (other than the Orlovski Tunnel) on the land plots provided to it.

The obligations of the Grantor were as follows:

* after the signature of the Concession Agreement within the time set by law, sign with the Concessioner a Land Lease Agreement in respect of land plots, where the Tunnel will be located and which are necessary for construction and operation of the Orlovski Tunnel by the Concessioner;
* to provide necessary support to the Concessioner in obtaining subsoil and water use licenses;
* hand over the design and construction input data available to the Concessioner;
* provide a contribution toward the Orlovski Tunnel construction costs from the budget of the Russian Federation and the budget of St. Petersburg in the amount determined based on Bids;
* make availability payments for the Tunnel;
* to provide the Concessioner with reasonable support in its interaction with public authorities and other organizations controlled by the Grantor, and in getting access to the necessary communications and resources of the existing urban infrastructure;
* on termination of the Concession Agreement (including expiry), accept the Tunnel from the Concessioner under the procedure specified in the Concession Agreement;
* fulfil other obligations, arising from the Concession Agreement, other contracts between the parties, and provisions of Russian laws.

The estimated project cost was 54 600 million rubles.

The project was financed by equal shares – (33.3%) of the investor, the city budget and the investment fund of the Russian Federation.

The Concessioner was expected to mobilize finance in an amount sufficient to cover project design, construction, and operation costs.

The disbursement of government funding included government support to be provided both by the Russian Federation and government of St. Petersburg and a grant from the RF.

The Russian Federation had to contribute a part of capital costs of the project. The Orlovski Tunnel was one of the first toll road projects approved for the financing from the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation (grant + availability payment from St. Petersburg government).

St. Petersburg had to support the project with city budget funds. Pursuant to the investment project profile (approved by Decree of the Government of the RF No. 1708-r of 30.11.2006), the maximum amount of public support at the construction stage had to be 17,572 million rubles. In order to keep the public financing to a minimum, Bidders were requested to indicate the amount of the Grantor financing they need. This was one of the key bid evaluation criteria. Moreover, the concession agreement provided for availability payments (based on Lane availability and System performance) by the city of St. Petersburg, i.e. the concessioner did not bear traffic risk. Bidders indicated the amount of availability payment required, which was also an important part of the bid evaluation criteria.

Finally, there was direct contractual obligation of each government to mobilize funding and funding mechanisms to be transparent and reliable (funding mechanism to be based on clearly identified and measurable milestones).

[[Image:Orlovski3.png]] 
''Figure 4: Orlovski Tunnel PPP Structure''

===Risk Allocation===

Risks related to land preparation, utility relocation, development of the urban road network, and traffic risks are to be borne by the Grantor.

Risks related to design, construction, operation of the Tunnel were to be borne by the Concessioner.

The Grantor assumed the traffic risk and had more freedom related to the policy of toll collection.

The risk of certain changes in the law and the risks of public sector are borne by the Grantor, but the risks related to necessary approvals/permits belonged to the Concessioner.

Risks related to changes in macro-economic situation, construction financing, as well as subsurface and force majeure risk will be shared by both parties.

The above risk allocation is presented in Figure 5.

[[Image:Orlovski4.png]] 
''Figure 5: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The tunnel was to provide for:

* two-way traffic of up to 60,000 vehicles per day;
* two-way traffic on ramps: Piskarevski Pr. ramp – up to 35,000 vehicles per day, Sverdlovskaya Embankment ramp – up to 15,000 vehicles per day;
* a link to Shosse Revolutsii, Polustrovski Pr., and Sredneokhtinski Pr. with overall two-way traffic of up to 20,000 vehicles per day;

Traffic estimates for the tolled tunnel are presented in Table 1:

''Table 1: Tunnel Traffic forecast'' 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Parameter
! 2011
! 2015
! 20251
! 2035
|-
| '''Daily traffic for cars (‘000 vehicles)'''
| 52.5
| 63.2
| 60.3
| 66.3
|-
| '''Daily traffic of trucks (trucks up to 3.5 tons, in ‘000vehicles)'''
| 5.5
| 4.2
| 5.8
| 6.4
|-
| '''Total traffic'''
| 58.0
| 67.4
| 66.1
| 72.1
|}

1: the traffic reduction in 2025 will be caused by the development of the urban road network within the gravity zone of the tunnel

The tunnel was to be equipped with a physical toll collection facility. The key requirement for toll stations is toll collection without queues in front of toll plazas exceeding a 2 minutes wait time or 12 vehicles.

==Outcomes==

The construction of the Orlovski Tunnel did not begin since the Government of St. Petersburg terminated the concession agreement with the "Nevskaya Concession Company" on the grounds that the concessionaire has not provided evidence to achieve financial closure, had not fulfilled the conditions of the start of construction and the cost of the project exceeded 55 billion rubles.

==References==

* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 1215 of November 23, 2012 “On the Cancellation of the Concession Agreement for the Design, Construction and Operation of the Orlovski Tunnel under Neva River in St. Petersburg”
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 309 of March 24, 2010 “On Results of Open Competition for the Concession Agreement for the Design, Construction and Operation of the Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in Saint Petersburg”
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 310 of March 24, 2010 “On Measures for the Conclusion of the Concession Agreement with the Participant of Open Competition for the Concession Agreement for the Design, Construction and Operation of the Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in Saint Petersburg”
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 1090 of September 3, 2007 “On conclusion of the Concession Agreement in Relation to Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in Saint Petersburg”
* Decree of the Government of the Russian federation No. 695-r of 31.05.2007 “On Signing of Concession Agreement in relation to Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in St. Petersburg”
* JSC "WHSD".(2015) Orlovski Tunnel. URL:http://www.orlovtunnel.ru/index.php?lng=en&page=1
* Project Brief. Construction of the Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in St. Petersburg./ “ORLOVSKI TUNNEL” JSC. – September, 2007.

Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation

2016-10-11T10:25:32Z

Nimda:

{{Infobox
|header1 = ORLOVSKI TUNNEL (under the River Neva in St, Petersburg), Russian Federation
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Type of Project Financing:
|data3 = PPP
|header4 =
|label4 = Contract duration:
|data4 = 30 years (including 4 years of design and construction)
|header5 =
|label5 = Budget:
|data5 = 54 600 million rubles
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Orlovski.png|300px]]
|caption = ''Figure 1: Orlovski Tunnel ''
| header6 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= September 14, 2007:
| data1 = Call for Tender
| label2= September 8-10, 2007:
| data2 = Road-show of the project in Frankfurt, at the office of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
| label3= December 6, 2007:
| data3 = Prequalification
| label4= February 18, 2010:
| data4 = Award
| label5= June, 2010:
| data5 = The concession agreement is signed between the Government of St. Petersburg and “Nevskaya Concession Company”
| label6= August, 2011:
| data6 = Start of construction
| label7= October 4, 2011:
| data7 = The authorities of St. Petersburg refused to participate in the project because of the significant increase of project costs (the cause is difficult terrain in the proposed site of construction)
| label8= November, 2012:
| data8 = Resolution of the Government of St. Petersburg on the cancellation of the agreement with the "Nevskaya Concession Company". The contract is cancelled.
| label9= December 11, 2012:
| data9 = The Government of St. Petersburg officially notified the "Nevskaya Concession Company" about the termination of the concession agreement for the design, construction and operation of the Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River. The grounds for termination of the agreement is that the concessioner has not provided evidence to achieve financial closure, has not fulfilled the conditions of the start of construction and the cost of the project exceeded 55 billion rubles.
| label10= June, 2015:
| data10= Paris Arbitration ordered the Government of St. Petersburg to pay “Nevskaya Concession Company” compensation amounting to EUR 15 million for breach of the concession agreement.

}}
}}

==Introduction==

The Orlovski Tunnel was designed as a road tunnel of about one kilometre length under the Neva River, linking Piskarevsky Avenue and Smolnaya Embankment in St. Petersburg (Figure 2). The tunnel was to be tolled. Its key features included the following:

* 2 carriageways
* 3 lanes per carriageway
* Overall length 2350 m
* Portal to portal length: 1100 m
* River bank to bank length: 550 m
* Depth of river: 15 m
* Bored tunnel depth: 40 m

[[Image:Orlovski1.png]] 
''Figure 2: Project Location, St Petersburg''

The overall two-way capacity of the Orlovski Tunnel was to be 60 000 vehicles per day.
The construction of the Orlovski Tunnel was considered as the solution to the traffic problems of St. Petersburg. Its implementation would have contributed to the development of the city as a major international transport hub.

The decision to develop the Orlovski Tunnel project was driven by the following factors:

* congestion of the transport network in the city centre and the gravity zone of the Orlovski Tunnel,
* absence of a permanent transport connection between the right- and left-bank districts of St. Petersburg in the city centre,
* exhausted capacity of the existing Neva bridges,
* expected traffic increase throughout the city.

Moreover, the construction of the Orlovski Tunnel would have helped to address an issue of federal significance – to increase the capacity of the Volgo-Baltic Waterway (VBW). The tunnel would allow the draw bridges over the Neva River to be open for one hour longer, thus increasing the total ship traffic.

In accordance with the Decree of the Russian Government, the Orlovski Tunnel project had to be implemented using a Private-Public Partnership model .The construction and operation of the Orlovski Tunnel could become one of the first Russian transport infrastructure concessions, implemented in accordance with the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Concession Agreements” d.d. July 21st, 2005 No. 115-FZ (hereinafter – Concession Law). The duration of the agreement was foreseen for 30 years from its signing.

The bidding procedure for the concession agreement for the design, construction, financing and operation of the Orlovski Tunnel in St. Petersburg (hereinafter – Tender procedure) was conducted in accordance with the Concession Law.

In November 2006, the Decree of the Government of the RF No. 1709-r was adopted which put the project on the list of schemes supported by the Investment Fund and approved the project.

On April 10th, 2007, the Government of St. Petersburg adopted the Decree No. 384 “On Implementation and Operation of a Toll Tunnel under the Neva River in Alignment of Piskarevski Pr. – Orlovskaya Ul.”

On May 31st, 2007, the Government of the Russian Federation passed the Decree No. 695-r “On Signing of Concession Agreement in relation to Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in St. Petersburg”.

The Tender Documentation was approved by Order of the Federal Highways Agency (No. 61 of September 4th, 2007) and Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg (No. 1090 of April 3rd, 2007).

The duration of the agreement was 30 years from the signing, including 4 years of design and construction (2008-2012). The Tunnel construction was scheduled to begin in 2011 and its inauguration in early 2016.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The Public Partners under the Orlovski Tunnel project was the Russian Federation and the city of St. Petersburg via their respective dedicated authorities:

* on behalf of the Russian Federation , the Federal Road Agency (Rosavtodor)
* on behalf of the federal city of St. Petersburg , the Government of St. Petersburg

The Government was the project developer – Managing Company of the Orlovski Tunnel project.

Later, the Russian Federation withdrew from the structure of Grantors.

Advisory support was provided by:

* The World Bank – financial and strategic advisor
* Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer – legal advisor
* Mott Macdonald – technical advisor
* Research and Design Institute of Regional Development and Transportation – technical and transport advisor

==The Concessioner (Private Party)==

The concessioner in this project was the consortium Ltd "Nevskaya concession company”, which represents the French group Vinci.

==Users==

The Orlovski Tunnel was constructed to be the major link between the right and left bank districts of St. Petersburg in the city centre and open to passenger traffic, public transport, emergency services and freight transport with a permissible maximum weight of up to 3.5 tons.

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

The PPP model was selected due to the following:

* Project inscribed in master plans of the city since 1986
* Feasibility studies and site evaluation were concluded
* Government believes there is significant value in innovative design solutions and long term maintenance risk being transferred to the private sector: strong rationale for PPP
* Project designed on the basis of a 30-year concession, design build finance operate & maintain scheme

==Project Timing==

The construction of the Orlovski Tunnel was considered as the solution for the traffic problems of St. Petersburg.

7. Project Locality and Market Geography
St. Petersburg plays a major role in the transport system of the Russian Federation. The largest Baltic Port of Russia, located in St. Petersburg leading all Russian ports, and the Volgo-Baltic Waterway, make St. Petersburg a major transport hub in the Russian Federation. Owing to its unique geographic location – on the coast of the Baltic Sea and in immediate proximity to the EU and major European ports- St. Petersburg has become the gateway to the Russian Federation for a considerable share of the export/import freight volumes of the country. Sections of two Euro-Asian transport corridors – the North-South and the Transsiberian, as well as the Pan-European Transport Corridor IX pass through St. Petersburg.

The principal transport artery through St. Petersburg is the Neva River, whose 23 km length is included in the Single Deep-Water System of European Russia. The Neva River is one of the major links of the Volgo-Baltic Waterway (VBW) connecting the Volga River to the Baltic Sea, via the White Sea - Baltic Canal, to the White Sea. The Volgo-Baltic Waterway plays a major role in the Pan-European Transport Corridor IX and the North-West transport Corridor. The significance of the VBW increased substantially due to the construction of new ports in the Gulf of Finland and the extension of the Pan-European Transport Corridor IX to the Black and Caspian seas.

[[Image:Orlovski2.png]] 
''Figure 3: Volgo-Baltic Basin''

At present, the traffic via the Volgo-Baltic route is constrained due to limited periods when bridges are raised. Ship owners incur considerable losses because of delays of ships waiting to pass through the Neva.

The implementation of the Orlovski Tunnel would enable the Neva bridges to open for one hour longer every day. Based on estimates, this would increase the capacity of the St. Petersburg section of the Volgo-Baltic Waterway by 1.3 times its current capacity, and provide an essential impetus to the increase in international transportation.

Moreover, the accommodation of the growing traffic flows would be impossible without new crossings between the left- and right bank sections of the city. At present, north-eastern districts of the city are linked to the centre and south-western districts mostly over four bridges: the Troitski Bridge, Liteiny Bridge, Petra Velikogo (Bolsheokhtinski) and Alexander Nevski Bridge. The central street and road network rely on bridges already operated at capacity. For instance, during peak hours, the above bridges are at more than 100% capacity.

The implementation of the Orlovski Tunnel would enable the realignment of traffic on the approaches to the centre, and therefore, a significant relief of congestion on existing bridges linking the right- and left bank districts of St. Petersburg.

The Orlovski Tunnel forms an integral part of the construction and reconstruction transport works currently undertaken by St. Petersburg as part of its Master Plan.

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The Bids received were evaluated on two criteria:

1) Technical criteria: weight – 0,2
2) Financial criteria: weigh– 0,8:
a) The total discounted amount of public financing of the construction (capital grant). Maximum 22,15 billion rubles.
b) The total discounted amount of compensation paid by the Grantor to the Concessioner during the stage of exploitation of the Tunnel (availability payment).

At the prequalification stage, applications for participation in the Tender procedure were received from four companies:

* Ltd “Nevskaya concession company” (the French group Vinci)
* Ltd "Neva Tunnel" (Austrian Strabag AG, the Cyprus Suri Holdings Limited, a German Zueblin AG and the French Egis Projects SA)
* JSC "Buigproekt Operating" (the French group Bouygues)
* Neva Traverse GmbH (German Hochtief Construction AG and Hochtief PPP Solution and the Dutch Royal Boskalis Westminster NV)

Only one of the four consortia, which had previously been screened for participation in the Tender procedure, continued to participate in the tender – "Nevskaya concession company" Ltd-, because no other company submitted proposals to this stage of the competition. In June 2010, the Government of St Petersburg and “Nevskaya Concession Company” Ltd signed the concession agreement.

===Contract Structure===

The obligations of the Concessioner included the following:

* to design the Orlovski Tunnel and obtain all the relevant permits and approvals;
* to build the Orlovski Tunnel using equity and debt funds, and finance provided by the Grantor;
* to start the operation of the Orlovski Tunnel before the deadline specified in the bid;
* to use (operate) the Orlovski Tunnel as a public road tunnel, in particular – to levy tolls from users of the Orlovski Tunnel once its construction is completed and the tunnel is put in operation, and not to terminate (not to interrupt) this activity without the Grantor’s consent, and collect tolls from the tunnel users. Toll rates will be set by the Grantor;
* to provide public utility services with access to the land plots used in construction and operation of the Tunnel;
* to provide maintenance and major repairs of the Orlovski Tunnel at its own expense;
* to meet requirements for insurance against risks specified in the Concession Agreement; in particular, at its own expense, insure the risk of loss (destruction) or damage of the Tunnel, and the risk of third party liability for the damage caused during the construction and operation of the Tunnel;
* on termination of the Concession Agreement (including expiry), to transfer the Tunnel to the Grantor;
* the Concessioner may not build any property (other than the Orlovski Tunnel) on the land plots provided to it.

The obligations of the Grantor were as follows:

* after the signature of the Concession Agreement within the time set by law, sign with the Concessioner a Land Lease Agreement in respect of land plots, where the Tunnel will be located and which are necessary for construction and operation of the Orlovski Tunnel by the Concessioner;
* to provide necessary support to the Concessioner in obtaining subsoil and water use licenses;
* hand over the design and construction input data available to the Concessioner;
* provide a contribution toward the Orlovski Tunnel construction costs from the budget of the Russian Federation and the budget of St. Petersburg in the amount determined based on Bids;
* make availability payments for the Tunnel;
* to provide the Concessioner with reasonable support in its interaction with public authorities and other organizations controlled by the Grantor, and in getting access to the necessary communications and resources of the existing urban infrastructure;
* on termination of the Concession Agreement (including expiry), accept the Tunnel from the Concessioner under the procedure specified in the Concession Agreement;
* fulfil other obligations, arising from the Concession Agreement, other contracts between the parties, and provisions of Russian laws.

The estimated project cost was 54 600 million rubles.

The project was financed by equal shares – (33.3%) of the investor, the city budget and the investment fund of the Russian Federation.

The Concessioner was expected to mobilize finance in an amount sufficient to cover project design, construction, and operation costs.

The disbursement of government funding included government support to be provided both by the Russian Federation and government of St. Petersburg and a grant from the RF.

The Russian Federation had to contribute a part of capital costs of the project. The Orlovski Tunnel was one of the first toll road projects approved for the financing from the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation (grant + availability payment from St. Petersburg government).

St. Petersburg had to support the project with city budget funds. Pursuant to the investment project profile (approved by Decree of the Government of the RF No. 1708-r of 30.11.2006), the maximum amount of public support at the construction stage had to be 17,572 million rubles. In order to keep the public financing to a minimum, Bidders were requested to indicate the amount of the Grantor financing they need. This was one of the key bid evaluation criteria. Moreover, the concession agreement provided for availability payments (based on Lane availability and System performance) by the city of St. Petersburg, i.e. the concessioner did not bear traffic risk. Bidders indicated the amount of availability payment required, which was also an important part of the bid evaluation criteria.

Finally, there was direct contractual obligation of each government to mobilize funding and funding mechanisms to be transparent and reliable (funding mechanism to be based on clearly identified and measurable milestones).

[[Image:Orlovski3.png]] 
''Figure 4: Orlovski Tunnel PPP Structure''

===Risk Allocation===

Risks related to land preparation, utility relocation, development of the urban road network, and traffic risks are to be borne by the Grantor.

Risks related to design, construction, operation of the Tunnel were to be borne by the Concessioner.

The Grantor assumed the traffic risk and had more freedom related to the policy of toll collection.

The risk of certain changes in the law and the risks of public sector are borne by the Grantor, but the risks related to necessary approvals/permits belonged to the Concessioner.

Risks related to changes in macro-economic situation, construction financing, as well as subsurface and force majeure risk will be shared by both parties.

The above risk allocation is presented in Figure 5.

[[Image:Orlovski4.png]] 
''Figure 5: Risk allocation''

===Performance===

The tunnel was to provide for:

* two-way traffic of up to 60,000 vehicles per day;
* two-way traffic on ramps: Piskarevski Pr. ramp – up to 35,000 vehicles per day, Sverdlovskaya Embankment ramp – up to 15,000 vehicles per day;
* a link to Shosse Revolutsii, Polustrovski Pr., and Sredneokhtinski Pr. with overall two-way traffic of up to 20,000 vehicles per day;

Traffic estimates for the tolled tunnel are presented in Table 1:

Table 1: Tunnel Traffic forecast

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Parameter
! 2011
! 2015
! 20251
! 2035
|-
| '''Daily traffic for cars (‘000 vehicles)'''
| 52.5
| 63.2
| 60.3
| 66.3
|-
| '''Daily traffic of trucks (trucks up to 3.5 tons, in ‘000vehicles)'''
| 5.5
| 4.2
| 5.8
| 6.4
|-
| '''Total traffic'''
| 58.0
| 67.4
| 66.1
| 72.1
|}

1: the traffic reduction in 2025 will be caused by the development of the urban road network within the gravity zone of the tunnel

The tunnel was to be equipped with a physical toll collection facility. The key requirement for toll stations is toll collection without queues in front of toll plazas exceeding a 2 minutes wait time or 12 vehicles.

==Outcomes==

The construction of the Orlovski Tunnel did not begin since the Government of St. Petersburg terminated the concession agreement with the "Nevskaya Concession Company" on the grounds that the concessionaire has not provided evidence to achieve financial closure, had not fulfilled the conditions of the start of construction and the cost of the project exceeded 55 billion rubles.

==References==

* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 1215 of November 23, 2012 “On the Cancellation of the Concession Agreement for the Design, Construction and Operation of the Orlovski Tunnel under Neva River in St. Petersburg”
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 309 of March 24, 2010 “On Results of Open Competition for the Concession Agreement for the Design, Construction and Operation of the Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in Saint Petersburg”
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 310 of March 24, 2010 “On Measures for the Conclusion of the Concession Agreement with the Participant of Open Competition for the Concession Agreement for the Design, Construction and Operation of the Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in Saint Petersburg”
* Decree of the Government of St. Petersburg No. 1090 of September 3, 2007 “On conclusion of the Concession Agreement in Relation to Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in Saint Petersburg”
* Decree of the Government of the Russian federation No. 695-r of 31.05.2007 “On Signing of Concession Agreement in relation to Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in St. Petersburg”
* JSC "WHSD".(2015) Orlovski Tunnel. URL:http://www.orlovtunnel.ru/index.php?lng=en&page=1
* Project Brief. Construction of the Orlovski Tunnel under the Neva River in St. Petersburg./ “ORLOVSKI TUNNEL” JSC. – September, 2007.

Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation

2016-10-11T10:00:07Z

Nimda: Created page with "{{Infobox |header1 = ORLOVSKI TUNNEL (under the River Neva in St, Petersburg), Russian Federation |header2 = |label2 = Project Type: |data2 = Greenfield |header3 = |label3 ..."

Case Studies

2016-10-11T09:54:52Z

Nimda: /* Bridges/Tunnels */

== Roads and Motorways ==

[[Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO|A19 Dishforth DBFO]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road |Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession|Horgos-Pozega, Toll Motorway Concession]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Ionia Odos Motorway|Ionia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: M6 Toll (BNRR)|M6 Toll (BNRR)]], England, UK

[[Case Studies: M80 Haggs to Stepps|M80 Haggs to Stepps]], UK

[[Case Studies: Olympia Odos Motorway|Olympia Odos Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Via-Invest Zaventem|Via-Invest Zaventem]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: E-39 Klett - Baardshaug|E-39 Klett-Baardshaug]], Norway

[[Case Studies: Istrian Y Toll Motorway|Istrian Y Toll Motorway]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Moreas Motorway, Greece|Moreas Motorway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Central Greece Motorway (E65), Greece|Central Greece Motorway (E65)]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road, Italy|Bre.Be.Mi. Toll Road]], Italy

[[Case Studies: E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand, Norway|E18 Grimstad-Kristiansand]], Norway

[[Case Studies: A2 Motorway, Poland|A2 Motorway]], Poland

[[Case Studies: A22 Algarve, Portugal|A22 Algarve]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: A23 Beira Interior, Portugal|A23 Beira Interior]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway, Spain|C-16 Terrassa-Manresa Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway, Spain|Radial 2 (R-2) Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: M-45 Toll Motorway, Spain|M-45 Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway, Spain|Eje Aeropuerto (M-12), Airport Axis Toll Motorway]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci, Serbia |Belgrade By-pass Project Section A: Batajnica-Dobanovci]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: H5 Koper-Izola Motorway, Slovenia| H5 Koper-Izola Motorway]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway , Slovenia| A5 Maribor - Pince Motorway ]], Slovenia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca , Serbia|Motorway E-75, Section: Donji Neradovac – Srpska Kuca ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase, Serbia|Motorway E-75 Horgos – Novi Sad, Second phase ]], Serbia

[[Case Studies: E18 Muurla-Lohja, Finland|E18 Muurla-Lohja ]], Finland

[[Case Studies: Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75, Finland | Helsinki-Lahti Main Road 4 / E75 ]], Finland

== Bridges/Tunnels ==

[[Case Studies: Rio-Antirio Bridge, Greece |Rio-Antirio Bridge]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Lusoponte Bridge, Portugal | Lusoponte Bridge ]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Blanka Tunnel Complex, Czech Republic| The Blanka Tunnel Complex]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: “Herrentunnel”Lübeck, Germany |“Herrentunnel”Lübeck]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Coen Tunnel|Coen Tunnel]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Orlovski Tunnel, Russian Federation| Orlovski Tunnel ]], Russian Federation

== Rail ==



[[Case Studies: FERTAGUS Train|FERTAGUS Train]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link|Liefkenshoekspoorverbinding Liefkenshoek Rail Link]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: Combiplan Nijverdal, The Netherlands | Combiplan Nijverdal]], The Netherlands

[[Case Studies: Gardermobanen, Norway | Gardermobanen ]], Norway

== Ports ==

[[Case Studies: Piraeus Container Terminal|Piraeus Container Terminal]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Sines Container Terminal|Sines Container Terminal]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: Valencia Cruise Terminal|Valencia Cruise Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock|Port of Antwerp Deurganckdock Lock]], Belgium


[[Case Studies: Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal, Rijeka, Croatia |Adriatic Gateway Container Terminal]], Croatia

[[Case Studies: Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development, Cyprus | Larnaca Port and Marina Re-development]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona, Spain | Muelle Costa Terminal, The Port of Barcelona]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal, Spain | Barcelona Europe South Container Terminal]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Durrës Port East Terminal, Albania | Durrës Port East Terminal]], Albania

[[Case Studies: OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende, Belgium | OW-plan Oostende-Integrated Coastal and Maritime Plan for Oostende ]], Belgium

== Urban Transport ==

[[Case Studies: Brabo 1, Flanders|Brabo 1, Flanders]], Belgium

[[Case Studies: The Caen' TVR|The Caen' TVR]], France

[[Case Studies: Metro Sul do Tejo|Metro Sul do Tejo]], Portugal

[[Case Studies: The Reims' Tramway|The Reims' Tramway]], France

[[Case Studies: SEVICI|SEVICI]], Spain

[[Case Studies: Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester, United Kingdom | Metrolink Light Rail Transport, Manchester]], United Kingdom

[[Case Studies: Athens Tramway, Greece | Athens Tramway]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part, Poland | Warsaw's Metro II-nd line – first stage: central part]], Poland

[[Case Studies: Vélo’v, France| Vélo’v ]], France

[[Case Studies: The Lyon's Tramway T4, France| The Lyon's Tramway T4 ]], France

[[Case Studies: Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe, Germany | Tram-Train “Kombilösung”, Karlsruhe ]], Germany

[[Case Studies: Metro do Porto S.A., Portugal | Metro do Porto S.A. ]], Portugal

== Airports ==

[[Case Studies: Larnaca and Paphos International Airports|Larnaca and Paphos International Airports]], Cyprus

[[Case Studies: Tirana International Airport|International Airport of Tirana]], Albania

[[Case Studies: Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”| Athens International Airport “Eleftherios Venizelos”]], Greece

[[Case Studies: Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, Germany | Berlin-Brandenburg Airport ]], Germany

== Terminals and Depots ==



[[Case Studies: Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen|Central Public Transport depot of the city of Pilsen]], Czech Republic

[[Case Studies: The Hague New Train Central Station |The Hague New Train Central Station]], The Netherlands

== Service Infrastructure ==

[[Case Studies: Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive), Albania | Vehicle Technical Control (SGS Automotive)]], Albania

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