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Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO

2015-06-11T12:56:27Z

Manosk4:

{{Infobox
|header1 = A19 Dishforth Project Profile, UK
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Brownfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Contract duration:
|data3 = 30 years (including construction period)
|header4 =
|label4 = Budget:
|data4 = GBP 29,4M (Cost to upgrade to the prescribed standard)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Case1.1.png|300px]]
|caption = Figure 1: A19 PPP road as part of the area network
| header5 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= Tender:
| data1 = 1995;
| label2= Contract Award:
| data2 = 14 October 1996;
| label3= Construction start:
| data3 = 24 February 1997;
| label4= Start of operations:
| data4 = 02 September1998;
}}
}}

==Introduction==

The A19 project was one of several PFI road projects let in the mid-1990s as part of the government’s Tranche 1A PFIs (Partnership UK, 2009). This tranche was more sophisticated than its predecessors, with scope for the private partner to improve the road through innovation and better service delivery.

The road is 118km in length and consists of 2 and 3 lane carriageways. The project is a DBFO scheme within the existing A19 carriageway alignment.

The project upgrades and maintains a vital economic link to Tyneside in the North East of England. The areas of Newcastle, Sunderland and Middleborough are major conurbations, and the A19 provides the main link between them.
The road required upgrading to meet capacity targets and industrial needs. The project also provides an alternative route to the more important A1(M), which is part of the East Coast route to Scotland.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The government department with controlling responsibility is the Department of Transport. The regulatory body responsible for contractual aspects on behalf of the government is the Highways Agency.

Following the formal inception of road PFIs by the Highways Agency in 1992 - initially for the maintenance and upgrading of existing road infrastructure - the Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) procurement model was adopted in 1994 (Highways Agency, 2012). The Highways Act 1980 and the New Road and Street Works Act 1991 allow the award of concessions for road infrastructure, and also permit tolling, although this was deemed to be impractical in this case.

As this was a wholly private investment, the Government’s role is that of the regulatory and legislative authority for the project. The Highways Agency has no stake in the special purpose vehicle (SPV).

==The Concessionaire (Private Party)==

The current owner of the SPV is Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd., although the original consortium included a number of companies.
The small size of the project means that, financing could be obtained by the contractor fairly easily. The original bank lenders were CIBC Bank from Canada and IBJ Bank from Japan.

==Users==

Both domestic and commercial traffic use this road, which links the smaller conurbations in the region. This gives better access to the network and an alternative route to Newcastle and the A1(M).

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

Value for money was the main driver for adoption of the PPP solution.

==Project Timing==

The early 1990s were a period of recession to which this area of the UK was particularly sensitive. The road upgrade was therefore needed to ensure that there was no barrier to the manufacturing base that dominated the area.

The call for tenders was issued in 1995, and the time from initial call to signing of the contract was 15 months.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

This project is significant from a local and regional perspective. The road network in this area is dominated by the A1(M) trunk road, and the A19 supports this route by providing additional capacity. The A19 also serves a number of communities within the North East with local traffic needs which cannot be met by the A1(M).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The contract was tendered based on performance objectives and bidders’ requirements for shadow tolls.

===Contract Structure===

The contract is fully privately financed and covers upgrading works, operations and maintenance. Although the project is a DBFO scheme, the small size of the initial capital investment means that the main emphasis is on the maintenance and operation phases.

Direct tolling was seen as inappropriate (Local government chronicle, 1993), so shadow tolling was used as the mechanism for repayment of the concessionaire. Revenues from shadow tolls are based on vehicle-km travelled, with penalty measures related to availability and safety performance.

The contract period was set at 30 years. This is longer than the estimated break-even period of 20 years needed to recover costs and repay debt, and includes a “cushion” to protect the investor against lower than expected returns if vehicle numbers fail to reach anticipated levels.

The issue of changes to the financial position of the SPV and its shareholders was not explicitly incorporated into the contract, although there are review processes, which give some protection to the government. However there was no provision for the Government to share in any “windfall profits” brought about by refinancing, which as in the case of the M6 Toll led to an enquiry by Parliament.

===Risk Allocation===

Design and construction risks - Local authorities have explicit funds and responsibilities for improving the roads within their jurisdiction, which includes sections of the network not covered by the DBFO. This restricts the ability of the private partner to make innovative improvements to the network.

[[Image:Case1.2.png]]

'''Figure 2. Risk Allocation'''

The main element of the contract is the maintenance of the road. Maintenance risks are borne mainly by the private partner, but affected by the actions of neighbouring local authorities. Operating risk is complex, as the private sector can gain increased net income when local authorities are assisting with the cost of maintenance.

The use of shadow tolls exposes the concessionaire to traffic risks. However revenues are more than covering costs. Finance is totally privately sourced, with the private partner bearing the whole of the risk.

Changes to the regulatory framework could impact upon the private sector. The government accepts this and indemnifies the private sector against it.

Risk is allocated as depicted in the figure 2.

===Performance===

The A1 portfolio of road PFI projects has a series of technical requirements related to: Availability; Safety; Compliance with legislation; Environmental constraints.

[[Image:Case1.3.png]]

'''Figure 3: Income generation (Bain, 2008)'''

Between 1996-2006 revenues totalled GBP 136M compared with the initial capital investment of GBP 29.4M.
Core requirements have to be achieved on a monthly basis, and there are penalties for failure. The contractual requirements are said to have been always achieved.

The limited availability of other published indicators makes it difficult to evaluate performance from a user perspective, and there is no measure of maintenance performance which is complicated by local highway authorities’ involvement in maintenance schemes.

A series of voluntary performance indicators offered by the private partner – including an incident response indicator - led to an amendment to the contract in 2009.

Financial performance has fluctuated significantly during the project’s 12 years of operation. Revenues were highest in the period 1998 to 2001, then fell considerably between 2001-3. There has been some recovery, but revenues have not yet returned to their 2001 level.

== References ==

* C. Liyanage, C. Boles, 2013, A19 Dishforth DBFO In Roumboutsos, A., Farrell, S., Liyanage, C. L. and Macário, R, COST Action TU1001 Public Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory P3T3, 2013 Discussion Papers Part II Case Studies, ISBN978-88-97781-61-5, COST Office, Brussels available at http://www.ppptransport.eu
* A One Integrated Highway Services. (2012). About area 14. Retrieved 09 12, 2012, from A One: http://www.aone.uk.com/File/ourprojects.asp
* Bain, R. (2008). PRIVATE FINANCE RATES OF RETURN:EVIDENCE FROM THE UK’S PFI ROADS SECTOR. University of Leeds, Institute for Transport Studies. Leeds UK: RB Consult Ltd.
* HA knowledge Centre. (2012). A brief history of our roads. Retrieved 08 05, 2012, from Highways Agency Website: http://www.highways.gov.uk/knowledge/1813.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012). DBFO payment mechanisms. Retrieved 07 21, 2012, from Highways Agency Government website: http://www.highways.gov.uk/roads/33513.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012, 08 10). DBFO -Value in Roads. Retrieved 08 29, 2012, from The National Archives: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120810121037/http://www.highways.gov.uk/roads/2987.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012). Private Finance Initiatives - Design Build Finance and Operate (DBFO). Retrieved 08 15, 2012, from HA. Gov: http://www.highways.gov.uk/our-road-network/managing-our-roads/private-finance-initiatives-design-build-finance-and-operate-dbfo/
* HM Government. (1980). Highways Act . London UK: Parlimentary Press.
* HM government. (1991). New Roads and Street Works Act. London: Parlimentary Press.
* Local Government Chronicle. (1993, May 28). Paying for better Motorways . Retrieved 09 20, 2012, from LGC: http://www.lgcplus.com/lgc-news/paying-for-better-motorways/1653117.article
* Partnership UK . (2009). Advanced Search - roads. Retrieved 06 30, 2012, from PartnershipUK.org: http://www.partnershipsuk.org.uk/PUK-Projects-Database-advanced-search.aspx
[[Category:Case Studies]]

Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO

2015-06-11T12:56:14Z

Manosk4:

{{Infobox
|header1 = A19 Dishforth Project Profile, UK
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Brownfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Contract duration:
|data3 = 30 years (including construction period)
|header4 =
|label4 = Budget:
|data4 = GBP 29,4M (Cost to upgrade to the prescribed standard)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Case1.1.png|300px]]
|caption = Figure 1: A19 PPP road as part of the area network
| header5 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= Tender:
| data1 = 1995;
| label2= Contract Award:
| data2 = 14 October 1996;
| label3= Construction start:
| data3 = 24 February 1997;
| label4= Start of operations:
| data4 = 02 September1998;
}}
}}

==Introduction==

The. A19 project was one of several PFI road projects let in the mid-1990s as part of the government’s Tranche 1A PFIs (Partnership UK, 2009). This tranche was more sophisticated than its predecessors, with scope for the private partner to improve the road through innovation and better service delivery.

The road is 118km in length and consists of 2 and 3 lane carriageways. The project is a DBFO scheme within the existing A19 carriageway alignment.

The project upgrades and maintains a vital economic link to Tyneside in the North East of England. The areas of Newcastle, Sunderland and Middleborough are major conurbations, and the A19 provides the main link between them.
The road required upgrading to meet capacity targets and industrial needs. The project also provides an alternative route to the more important A1(M), which is part of the East Coast route to Scotland.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The government department with controlling responsibility is the Department of Transport. The regulatory body responsible for contractual aspects on behalf of the government is the Highways Agency.

Following the formal inception of road PFIs by the Highways Agency in 1992 - initially for the maintenance and upgrading of existing road infrastructure - the Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) procurement model was adopted in 1994 (Highways Agency, 2012). The Highways Act 1980 and the New Road and Street Works Act 1991 allow the award of concessions for road infrastructure, and also permit tolling, although this was deemed to be impractical in this case.

As this was a wholly private investment, the Government’s role is that of the regulatory and legislative authority for the project. The Highways Agency has no stake in the special purpose vehicle (SPV).

==The Concessionaire (Private Party)==

The current owner of the SPV is Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd., although the original consortium included a number of companies.
The small size of the project means that, financing could be obtained by the contractor fairly easily. The original bank lenders were CIBC Bank from Canada and IBJ Bank from Japan.

==Users==

Both domestic and commercial traffic use this road, which links the smaller conurbations in the region. This gives better access to the network and an alternative route to Newcastle and the A1(M).

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

Value for money was the main driver for adoption of the PPP solution.

==Project Timing==

The early 1990s were a period of recession to which this area of the UK was particularly sensitive. The road upgrade was therefore needed to ensure that there was no barrier to the manufacturing base that dominated the area.

The call for tenders was issued in 1995, and the time from initial call to signing of the contract was 15 months.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

This project is significant from a local and regional perspective. The road network in this area is dominated by the A1(M) trunk road, and the A19 supports this route by providing additional capacity. The A19 also serves a number of communities within the North East with local traffic needs which cannot be met by the A1(M).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The contract was tendered based on performance objectives and bidders’ requirements for shadow tolls.

===Contract Structure===

The contract is fully privately financed and covers upgrading works, operations and maintenance. Although the project is a DBFO scheme, the small size of the initial capital investment means that the main emphasis is on the maintenance and operation phases.

Direct tolling was seen as inappropriate (Local government chronicle, 1993), so shadow tolling was used as the mechanism for repayment of the concessionaire. Revenues from shadow tolls are based on vehicle-km travelled, with penalty measures related to availability and safety performance.

The contract period was set at 30 years. This is longer than the estimated break-even period of 20 years needed to recover costs and repay debt, and includes a “cushion” to protect the investor against lower than expected returns if vehicle numbers fail to reach anticipated levels.

The issue of changes to the financial position of the SPV and its shareholders was not explicitly incorporated into the contract, although there are review processes, which give some protection to the government. However there was no provision for the Government to share in any “windfall profits” brought about by refinancing, which as in the case of the M6 Toll led to an enquiry by Parliament.

===Risk Allocation===

Design and construction risks - Local authorities have explicit funds and responsibilities for improving the roads within their jurisdiction, which includes sections of the network not covered by the DBFO. This restricts the ability of the private partner to make innovative improvements to the network.

[[Image:Case1.2.png]]

'''Figure 2. Risk Allocation'''

The main element of the contract is the maintenance of the road. Maintenance risks are borne mainly by the private partner, but affected by the actions of neighbouring local authorities. Operating risk is complex, as the private sector can gain increased net income when local authorities are assisting with the cost of maintenance.

The use of shadow tolls exposes the concessionaire to traffic risks. However revenues are more than covering costs. Finance is totally privately sourced, with the private partner bearing the whole of the risk.

Changes to the regulatory framework could impact upon the private sector. The government accepts this and indemnifies the private sector against it.

Risk is allocated as depicted in the figure 2.

===Performance===

The A1 portfolio of road PFI projects has a series of technical requirements related to: Availability; Safety; Compliance with legislation; Environmental constraints.

[[Image:Case1.3.png]]

'''Figure 3: Income generation (Bain, 2008)'''

Between 1996-2006 revenues totalled GBP 136M compared with the initial capital investment of GBP 29.4M.
Core requirements have to be achieved on a monthly basis, and there are penalties for failure. The contractual requirements are said to have been always achieved.

The limited availability of other published indicators makes it difficult to evaluate performance from a user perspective, and there is no measure of maintenance performance which is complicated by local highway authorities’ involvement in maintenance schemes.

A series of voluntary performance indicators offered by the private partner – including an incident response indicator - led to an amendment to the contract in 2009.

Financial performance has fluctuated significantly during the project’s 12 years of operation. Revenues were highest in the period 1998 to 2001, then fell considerably between 2001-3. There has been some recovery, but revenues have not yet returned to their 2001 level.

== References ==

* C. Liyanage, C. Boles, 2013, A19 Dishforth DBFO In Roumboutsos, A., Farrell, S., Liyanage, C. L. and Macário, R, COST Action TU1001 Public Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory P3T3, 2013 Discussion Papers Part II Case Studies, ISBN978-88-97781-61-5, COST Office, Brussels available at http://www.ppptransport.eu
* A One Integrated Highway Services. (2012). About area 14. Retrieved 09 12, 2012, from A One: http://www.aone.uk.com/File/ourprojects.asp
* Bain, R. (2008). PRIVATE FINANCE RATES OF RETURN:EVIDENCE FROM THE UK’S PFI ROADS SECTOR. University of Leeds, Institute for Transport Studies. Leeds UK: RB Consult Ltd.
* HA knowledge Centre. (2012). A brief history of our roads. Retrieved 08 05, 2012, from Highways Agency Website: http://www.highways.gov.uk/knowledge/1813.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012). DBFO payment mechanisms. Retrieved 07 21, 2012, from Highways Agency Government website: http://www.highways.gov.uk/roads/33513.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012, 08 10). DBFO -Value in Roads. Retrieved 08 29, 2012, from The National Archives: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120810121037/http://www.highways.gov.uk/roads/2987.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012). Private Finance Initiatives - Design Build Finance and Operate (DBFO). Retrieved 08 15, 2012, from HA. Gov: http://www.highways.gov.uk/our-road-network/managing-our-roads/private-finance-initiatives-design-build-finance-and-operate-dbfo/
* HM Government. (1980). Highways Act . London UK: Parlimentary Press.
* HM government. (1991). New Roads and Street Works Act. London: Parlimentary Press.
* Local Government Chronicle. (1993, May 28). Paying for better Motorways . Retrieved 09 20, 2012, from LGC: http://www.lgcplus.com/lgc-news/paying-for-better-motorways/1653117.article
* Partnership UK . (2009). Advanced Search - roads. Retrieved 06 30, 2012, from PartnershipUK.org: http://www.partnershipsuk.org.uk/PUK-Projects-Database-advanced-search.aspx
[[Category:Case Studies]]

Case Studies: A19 Dishforth DBFO

2015-06-11T12:55:50Z

Manosk4:

{{Infobox
|header1 = A19 Dishforth Project Profile, UK
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Brownfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Contract duration:
|data3 = 30 years. (including construction period)
|header4 =
|label4 = Budget:
|data4 = GBP 29,4M (Cost to upgrade to the prescribed standard)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:Case1.1.png|300px]]
|caption = Figure 1: A19 PPP road as part of the area network
| header5 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= Tender:
| data1 = 1995;
| label2= Contract Award:
| data2 = 14 October 1996;
| label3= Construction start:
| data3 = 24 February 1997;
| label4= Start of operations:
| data4 = 02 September1998;
}}
}}

==Introduction==

The A19 project was one of several PFI road projects let in the mid-1990s as part of the government’s Tranche 1A PFIs (Partnership UK, 2009). This tranche was more sophisticated than its predecessors, with scope for the private partner to improve the road through innovation and better service delivery.

The road is 118km in length and consists of 2 and 3 lane carriageways. The project is a DBFO scheme within the existing A19 carriageway alignment.

The project upgrades and maintains a vital economic link to Tyneside in the North East of England. The areas of Newcastle, Sunderland and Middleborough are major conurbations, and the A19 provides the main link between them.
The road required upgrading to meet capacity targets and industrial needs. The project also provides an alternative route to the more important A1(M), which is part of the East Coast route to Scotland.

==The Contracting Authority (Public Party)==

The government department with controlling responsibility is the Department of Transport. The regulatory body responsible for contractual aspects on behalf of the government is the Highways Agency.

Following the formal inception of road PFIs by the Highways Agency in 1992 - initially for the maintenance and upgrading of existing road infrastructure - the Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) procurement model was adopted in 1994 (Highways Agency, 2012). The Highways Act 1980 and the New Road and Street Works Act 1991 allow the award of concessions for road infrastructure, and also permit tolling, although this was deemed to be impractical in this case.

As this was a wholly private investment, the Government’s role is that of the regulatory and legislative authority for the project. The Highways Agency has no stake in the special purpose vehicle (SPV).

==The Concessionaire (Private Party)==

The current owner of the SPV is Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd., although the original consortium included a number of companies.
The small size of the project means that, financing could be obtained by the contractor fairly easily. The original bank lenders were CIBC Bank from Canada and IBJ Bank from Japan.

==Users==

Both domestic and commercial traffic use this road, which links the smaller conurbations in the region. This gives better access to the network and an alternative route to Newcastle and the A1(M).

==Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection==

Value for money was the main driver for adoption of the PPP solution.

==Project Timing==

The early 1990s were a period of recession to which this area of the UK was particularly sensitive. The road upgrade was therefore needed to ensure that there was no barrier to the manufacturing base that dominated the area.

The call for tenders was issued in 1995, and the time from initial call to signing of the contract was 15 months.

==Project Locality and Market Geography==

This project is significant from a local and regional perspective. The road network in this area is dominated by the A1(M) trunk road, and the A19 supports this route by providing additional capacity. The A19 also serves a number of communities within the North East with local traffic needs which cannot be met by the A1(M).

==Procurement & Contractual Structure==

===Tendering===

The contract was tendered based on performance objectives and bidders’ requirements for shadow tolls.

===Contract Structure===

The contract is fully privately financed and covers upgrading works, operations and maintenance. Although the project is a DBFO scheme, the small size of the initial capital investment means that the main emphasis is on the maintenance and operation phases.

Direct tolling was seen as inappropriate (Local government chronicle, 1993), so shadow tolling was used as the mechanism for repayment of the concessionaire. Revenues from shadow tolls are based on vehicle-km travelled, with penalty measures related to availability and safety performance.

The contract period was set at 30 years. This is longer than the estimated break-even period of 20 years needed to recover costs and repay debt, and includes a “cushion” to protect the investor against lower than expected returns if vehicle numbers fail to reach anticipated levels.

The issue of changes to the financial position of the SPV and its shareholders was not explicitly incorporated into the contract, although there are review processes, which give some protection to the government. However there was no provision for the Government to share in any “windfall profits” brought about by refinancing, which as in the case of the M6 Toll led to an enquiry by Parliament.

===Risk Allocation===

Design and construction risks - Local authorities have explicit funds and responsibilities for improving the roads within their jurisdiction, which includes sections of the network not covered by the DBFO. This restricts the ability of the private partner to make innovative improvements to the network.

[[Image:Case1.2.png]]

'''Figure 2. Risk Allocation'''

The main element of the contract is the maintenance of the road. Maintenance risks are borne mainly by the private partner, but affected by the actions of neighbouring local authorities. Operating risk is complex, as the private sector can gain increased net income when local authorities are assisting with the cost of maintenance.

The use of shadow tolls exposes the concessionaire to traffic risks. However revenues are more than covering costs. Finance is totally privately sourced, with the private partner bearing the whole of the risk.

Changes to the regulatory framework could impact upon the private sector. The government accepts this and indemnifies the private sector against it.

Risk is allocated as depicted in the figure 2.

===Performance===

The A1 portfolio of road PFI projects has a series of technical requirements related to: Availability; Safety; Compliance with legislation; Environmental constraints.

[[Image:Case1.3.png]]

'''Figure 3: Income generation (Bain, 2008)'''

Between 1996-2006 revenues totalled GBP 136M compared with the initial capital investment of GBP 29.4M.
Core requirements have to be achieved on a monthly basis, and there are penalties for failure. The contractual requirements are said to have been always achieved.

The limited availability of other published indicators makes it difficult to evaluate performance from a user perspective, and there is no measure of maintenance performance which is complicated by local highway authorities’ involvement in maintenance schemes.

A series of voluntary performance indicators offered by the private partner – including an incident response indicator - led to an amendment to the contract in 2009.

Financial performance has fluctuated significantly during the project’s 12 years of operation. Revenues were highest in the period 1998 to 2001, then fell considerably between 2001-3. There has been some recovery, but revenues have not yet returned to their 2001 level.

== References ==

* C. Liyanage, C. Boles, 2013, A19 Dishforth DBFO In Roumboutsos, A., Farrell, S., Liyanage, C. L. and Macário, R, COST Action TU1001 Public Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory P3T3, 2013 Discussion Papers Part II Case Studies, ISBN978-88-97781-61-5, COST Office, Brussels available at http://www.ppptransport.eu
* A One Integrated Highway Services. (2012). About area 14. Retrieved 09 12, 2012, from A One: http://www.aone.uk.com/File/ourprojects.asp
* Bain, R. (2008). PRIVATE FINANCE RATES OF RETURN:EVIDENCE FROM THE UK’S PFI ROADS SECTOR. University of Leeds, Institute for Transport Studies. Leeds UK: RB Consult Ltd.
* HA knowledge Centre. (2012). A brief history of our roads. Retrieved 08 05, 2012, from Highways Agency Website: http://www.highways.gov.uk/knowledge/1813.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012). DBFO payment mechanisms. Retrieved 07 21, 2012, from Highways Agency Government website: http://www.highways.gov.uk/roads/33513.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012, 08 10). DBFO -Value in Roads. Retrieved 08 29, 2012, from The National Archives: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120810121037/http://www.highways.gov.uk/roads/2987.aspx
* Highways Agency. (2012). Private Finance Initiatives - Design Build Finance and Operate (DBFO). Retrieved 08 15, 2012, from HA. Gov: http://www.highways.gov.uk/our-road-network/managing-our-roads/private-finance-initiatives-design-build-finance-and-operate-dbfo/
* HM Government. (1980). Highways Act . London UK: Parlimentary Press.
* HM government. (1991). New Roads and Street Works Act. London: Parlimentary Press.
* Local Government Chronicle. (1993, May 28). Paying for better Motorways . Retrieved 09 20, 2012, from LGC: http://www.lgcplus.com/lgc-news/paying-for-better-motorways/1653117.article
* Partnership UK . (2009). Advanced Search - roads. Retrieved 06 30, 2012, from PartnershipUK.org: http://www.partnershipsuk.org.uk/PUK-Projects-Database-advanced-search.aspx
[[Category:Case Studies]]

Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road

2015-04-16T10:49:37Z

Manosk4: Undo revision 870 by Manosk4 (talk)

{{Infobox
|header1 = Attica Tollway (Athens Ring Road), Greece
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Contract duration:
|data3 = maximum of 25 years or earlier if the maximum Return on Equity has been reached.
|header4 =
|label4 = Budget:
|data4 = EUR 1300M (This budget includes Project Development Costs)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:attica1.png|300px]]
|caption = Photo Courtesy of Attica Tollway Figure 1: Overview of Attica Tollway (detail)
| header5 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= Conception:
| data1 = 1963;
| label2= Tender:
| data2 = 1992;
| label3= Contract Award:
| data3 = March 1996;
| label4= Date of contract ratification:
| data4 = 23/5/1996 Law 2445/1996;
| label5= Financial Close:
| data5 = 6 of March 2000;
| label6= Open to traffic (1st section):
| data6 = March 2001 to serve the new Athens International Airport;
| label7= Open to traffic (2nd section) and Project Completion:
| data7 = August 2004 in time for the Athens Olympic Games;
| label8= Works Completion Certificate (WCC) issued:
| data8 = 2 Dec. 2004
}}
}}

== Introduction ==

Attica Tollway in Greece forms part of the Trans European Network, as planned by the European Commission. It extends along 70 km and connects the 30 municipalities of the Attica basin. It actually constitutes the backbone of the entire transport network of the metropolitan area of Athens and it meets the transportation needs of millions of people on an annual basis.
Attica Tollway is an urban motorway, with three traffic lanes in each direction and an emergency lane. In the centre, it has a special traffic island, reserved for the operation of the suburban railway that has been constructed and is operated by another entity.

Attica Tollway has full control of its access points through toll stations and consists of three sections:
* The Elefsina – Stavros – Spata A/P motorway (ESSM), extending along approximately 52 km;
* The Imittos Western Peripheral Motorway (IWPM), extending along approximately 13 km; and
* The Egaleo Western Peripheral Motorway (EWPM), extending along approximately 5 km.
[[File:attica2.png]] 
'''Figure 2: Attica Tollway sections''' 
'''''Photo from [http://www.trg.soton.ac.uk/prime/attiki_odos/descr1.htm http://www.trg.soton.ac.uk/prime/attiki_odos/descr1.htm]'''''

The idea of building the Attica Tollway dates back to 1963, when Wilbur Smith came from the United States to undertake the first ever regional traffic planning study for the city of Athens and its metropolitan area. Sprawling development to the north of Athens over the years, the decision in the late 1970’s to build the new airport in its present location at Mesogeia and the decision to build a city connector road along the foothills of the Mountain of Imittos in the early 1990’s departed from the concept of a “ring” road, and transformed the Attica Tollway into an urban tollway that serves the heart of the city.

In addition, the Attica Tollway during its construction and operation introduced a number of innovations to the Greek construction and motorway operation sector. More specifically, construction within urbanized area under adverse geotechnical conditions called upon employing vibration recorders to restrict peak particle velocity below 6mm/sec in open-cast mining excavations; the ΝΑΤΜ (Drill & Blast) method, the tunnel construction method using Roadheader machinery was also applied to reduce vibrations (the peak particle velocity was limited to 0.7 mm/sec) and to avoid using explosives in areas of historical interest (monuments, churches etc.) for tunnel construction; the Incremental Launching System has also been used for constructing the superstructure of bridges; road pavement was constructed using the latest construction methods and mechanical equipment, reliable materials and specialized laboratory measurements and tests to ensure durability over time. A deep level sewer installation, employing a trenchless technology method (pipe-jacking) was used for the first time to drive sections over 200 m in length under the city. (Sofianos et al, 2004). In operations, the Attica Tollway was the first to introduce in Greece an electronic toll collection system.

Finally, the project was constructed in parallel with flood protection works (contract value of EUR 791M), as the Attica Tollway passes through the three large hydrographic basins of Attica (Thriasio Pedio, Athens basin and Mesogeia) and interrupts the surface runoff coming from the Parnitha, Penteli and Imittos mountains to the sea. The morphology of the aforementioned areas, now featuring minimum natural receptors, the exponential expansion of the land use and the various types of human interventions had rendered the construction of substantial extensive flood protection works within the scope of the Attica Tollway implementation imperative. The flood protection works constructed were dimensioned to be adequate for the existing and future land use.

== The Contracting Authority (Public Party) ==

The Attica Tollway project was planned on a central government level, by the Ministry of Development, Competiveness, Infrastructure and Transport Networks (previously called Ministry of Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works). Ε.Υ.D.Ε. / L.S.E.P is the special agency of the Ministry which undertakes the supervision of the motorway’s operation and maintenance.

== The Concessionaire (Private Party) ==

Initially, the project sponsors were 14 different construction companies: Aktor SA, Attikat, Egis Projects SA, Ergas, Meton SA, Sarantopoulos, TEV, Alte, Arax, Elliniki Technodomiki, Etheth, Pantechniki, TEG, and Zeus. Currently, the project sponsors are Ellaktor (60%), J&P AVAX (30%) and Piraeus-ATE Bank (10%).

The Concessionaire has established contracts back to back with the Concession Agreement with “ATTIKI ODOS CONSTRUCTION JOINT VENTURE” for the project construction and with “ATTIKES DIADROMES S.A.” (also known as Attica Tollway Operations Authority) for the operation and maintenance of the project.

== Users ==

Attica Tollway serves mainly passenger cars and the main purpose of travel of its users is commuting. It provides links to the Athens International Airport and to the two main National Roads (NR Athens –Thessaloniki and NR Athens-Corinth-Patras). In addition, many large logistics centers have emerged or relocated to the western part of the Tollway, since this location combines large open spaces and quick access to ports, railway and National Roads.

The Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) rose from 231,000 entries on the motorway in 2004 to a peak of 307,000 in 2009 prior to onset of the financial crisis in Greece. In 2010, traffic levels were just off to 281,000 AADT, which corresponds to approximately 6-10 % of the total traffic in the Athens metropolitan area (Harito and Morello, 2011).

== Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection ==

The Greek Authorities and the European Commission had agreed within the framework of the Community Support Framework 1994 -1999 (CSF II) to maximize private sector partnerships in the development of transport related infrastructure (PwC, 2005). For Greece, this provided funds and off-balance sheet debt. The Athens Tollway was an opportunity.

The hybrid structuring of the project was essential to the project’s success. The public sector, the Greek Government, wanted to allocate most of the project risks to the private sector. It was clear from the beginning, however, that due to several factors (e.g. this was the first PPP in the road sector in Greece, construction difficulties were envisaged, and help was needed in dealing with 30 local authorities), the project required strong state help. This financial help was necessary because, at that time, sponsors considered that the road traffic levels and the tolls the users were prepared to pay were not enough to provide an adequate return on the investment they were required to make.

[[File:attica3.png]] 
'''Figure 3. Attica Tollway Concession Structure'''

== Project Timing ==

After the 1960’s, decades passed by without any attempts to start the road project, mainly due to the lack of funding, coupled with its expected high cost. The project’s real advancement began in 1985, when it became part of the official transportation infrastructure plans for metropolitan Athens, along with the goal of obtaining the Centennial Olympic Games in 1996 (they marked the 100th anniversary of the modern Olympic Games). It was in the early 1990’s that the Greek Ministry of Public Works adopted the method of co-financing the road through a Build–Operate–Transfer contract.

The construction work started in 1997 and the motorway was given to traffic in sections. The first one opening to traffic was in March 2001, achieving the milestone of serving the new Athens International Airport. The last section was opened to traffic in 2004. Attica Tollway was built on time and within budget and it met the crucial deadline for the Athens Olympics Games in 2004.

== Project Locality and Market Geography ==

Attica Tollway is part of the Tran European Network (TEN) and it connects the 30 municipalities of the Attica basin, allowing quicker access to areas, which, before its construction, required a great amount of travel time.

== Procurement & Contractual Structure ==

=== Tendering ===

An international tender was announced in 1992 and in March 1996, the project was awarded to the lowest bidder of the three international consortia that participated in the process. The Concession Contract was ratified by law by the Greek Parliament on the 23rd of May 1996.

The Concession Agreement provides a maximum toll rate that can be charged. It also includes a safety mechanism, securing the interests of the Greek State through a maximum Return on Equity. The Concession period will extend for a maximum of 25 years (including construction period), or it will end earlier, in the case that the maximum Return on Equity (13.1%) has been reached.

=== Contract Structure ===

The project financing has been ensured through State contributions including EC Structural Cohesion Funds, private equity and loans. Construction cost of about EUR 1300 M was covered as follows: 33% Greek State contribution; 16% private equity and 51% loans (9% Commercial Banks loans and 42% EIB loans).

Commercial banks involved include: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, HypoVereinsbank, Commercial Bank of Greece, HSBC Athens, National Bank of Greece, Société Generale, European Investment Fund, ABN AMRO Bank NV, Agricultural Bank of Greece, Alpha Credit Bank, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (London), Bank of Scotland, De Nationale Investeringsbank NV, Piraeus Bank Greece, European Investment Bank, ING Bank NVand Ergobank.

Expropriation cost was undertaken entirely by the Greek State. Loan guarantees were provided by the concessionaire during construction and by the State for the operations phase.

=== Risk Allocation ===

A project of such scale met significant difficulties during its realisation. The financial close was delayed, mainly because of uncertainties surrounding the project. These uncertainties increased the risks for the banks, delaying the signing of the financial agreement and forcing the public sector to provide funds to the sponsors to begin construction before financial close was reached. Other difficulties were due to variation orders issued by the State, mainly for environmental reasons, which involved significant design changes.

Furthermore, the concession contract did not include mechanisms for extensions of time and delay make-up in case of State-instructed variations. Solutions were found after extensive negotiations between all parties involved, and amendments to the concession contract were introduced, leading to the satisfaction of the banks and reaching financial close.
Risk allocation is depicted in Figure 4.
[[File:attica4.png]] 
'''Figure 4: Risk allocation'''

=== Performance ===

The Independent Engineer was responsible for evaluating construction performance, along with the awarding authority, which is responsible for evaluating operating performance during the operations period.

Table 1 below shows the performance indicators set out in the Operation and Maintenance Agreement with the Attica Tollway Operation Authority.

Attica Tollway Operations Authority (Attikes Diadromes S.A.) has adopted an integrated monitoring system, based on measured Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The system consists of 35 indicators covering all the major aspects of operation, such as traffic management, toll operation, infrastructure maintenance, human resources, violation enforcement, etc. The results of the KPIs are widely used for the continuous improvement of the operation and the services provided to the Tollway users (Tyrogianni et al, 2012).

'''Table 1: Attica Tollway Performance Indicators'''
{| class="wikitable" style="width=100%"
! Ref.
! align="left"| Item
! align="left"| Planned Level of Service
|-
| 1 || Response time in case of incident || 20 minutes
|-
| 2 || Repair time for damage of equipment causing danger to users || Action shall start within 12 hours
|-
| 3 || Repair time for other serious damage of equipment || Action shall start within 24hours
|-
| 4 || Average waiting time in each Toll Station
Level A: waiting time between 0 and 120 seconds
Level B: waiting time above 120 seconds
|| Waiting Time Level B must not exceed 90 hours per year, unless due to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the Operator
|-
| 5 || Standards for money handling: Maximum Accepted Toll Collection Discrepancy (MATCD) between the system and the amount deposited in the Banks || MATCD as per the Manuals Phase B
|}
Furthermore, Attica Tollway considers carbon footprint assessment to be a very powerful tool in understanding the impact of the tollway’s operational activities on global warming. In this context, the company has installed measuring devices and carries out calculations of its carbon footprint (Mandalozis et al, 2012).

Finally, the tollway holds one of the best safety records in the world (Papaioannou, 2006). It serves over 250,000 users daily for short and long trips and has exceeded its forecasts by more than 30% (see figure 5).

== References ==

#B. Halkias, A. Roumboutsos, A. Pantelias, 2013, Attica Tollway, In Roumboutsos, A., Farrell, S., Liyanage, C. L. and Macário, R, COST Action TU1001 Public Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory P3T3, 2013 Discussion Papers Part II Case Studies, ISBN 978-88-97781-61-5, COST Office, Brussels available at http://www.ppptransport.eu
#Attiki Odos Contract, Greek Law 2445/1996 of the Official Gazette.
#Halkias, B., Tyrogianni, E., “PPP projects in Greece: The case of Attica Tollway” Routes/Roads PIARC, April 2009.
#Halkias, B., Tyrogianni, E., Kitsos, D., “A significant infrastructure project within the urban environment of Athens: The case of Attica Tollway” IABSE September 2008
#Harito, J. and Morello, S. (2011) Performance Plus, ITS International, 17(3) 44-45
#Mandalozis, D. Halkias, B., Tyrogianni, H. Kalfa, N. (2012) The Carbon Footprint of Attica Tollway, TRA-Europe 2012, Prodedia- Social and Behavioural Sciences, 48, 2988-2998
#Papaioannou, P. (2006) Recent Experience on Success and Failure Stories from Funding Large Transportation Projects in Greece, 1st International Conference on Funding Transportation Infrastructure, Banff, Alberta, Canada, 2-3 August 2006
#Papandreou, K., Tyrogianni, E., “Level of Service in Concession Motorway Projects” XXXV ASECAP Study and Information Days
#PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) Delivering the PPP promise*: A review of PPP issues and activity, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
#Sofianos, A.I., Loukas, P., Chantzkos, Ch. (2004) Pipe jacking a sewer under Athens, Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology, 19(2), 193-203
#Tyrogianni, H., Halkias, B. Politou, A., Kotzampassi, P. (2012) The Attica Tollway Operations Authority KPI Performance System, TRA-Europe 2012, Prodedia- Social and Behavioural Sciences, 48, 2999-3008
#www.aodos.gr
[[Category:Case Studies]]

Case Studies: Attica Tollway, The Athens Ring Road

2015-04-16T10:37:57Z

Manosk4:

{{Infobox
|header1 = Attica Tollway (Athens Ring Road), Greece
|header2 =
|label2 = Project Type:
|data2 = Greenfield
|header3 =
|label3 = Contract duration:
|data3 = maximum of 25 years or earlier if the maximum Return on Equity has been reached.
|header4 =
|label4 = Budget:
|data4 = EUR 1300M (This budget includes Project Development Costs)
|title = Project Overview
|image = [[Image:attica1.png|300px]]
|caption = Photo Courtesy of Attica Tollway Figure 1: Overview of Attica Tollway (detail)
| header5 = Project Time Line
{{Infobox
| child = yes
| label1= Conception:
| data1 = 1963;
| label2= Tender:
| data2 = 1992;
| label3= Contract Award:
| data3 = March 1996;
| label4= Date of contract ratification:
| data4 = 23/5/1996 Law 2445/1996;
| label5= Financial Close:
| data5 = 6 of March 2000;
| label6= Open to traffic (1st section):
| data6 = March 2001 to serve the new Athens International Airport;
| label7= Open to traffic (2nd section) and Project Completion:
| data7 = August 2004 in time for the Athens Olympic Games;
| label8= Works Completion Certificate (WCC) issued:
| data8 = 2 Dec. 2004
}}
}}

== Introduction ==

Attica Tollway in Greece forms part of the Trans European Network, as planned by the European Commission. It extends along 70 km and connects the 30 municipalities of the Attica basin. It actually constitutes the backbone of the entire transport network of the metropolitan area of Athens and it meets the transportation needs of millions of people on an annual basis.
Attica Tollway is an urban motorway, with three traffic lanes in each direction and an emergency lane. In the centre, it has a special traffic island, reserved for the operation of the suburban railway that has been constructed and is operated by another entity.

Attica Tollway has full control of its access points through toll stations and consists of three sections:
* The Elefsina – Stavros – Spata A/P motorway (ESSM), extending along approximately 52 km;
* The Imittos Western Peripheral Motorway (IWPM), extending along approximately 13 km; and
* The Egaleo Western Peripheral Motorway (EWPM), extending along approximately 5 km.
[[File:attica2.png]] 
'''Figure 2: Attica Tollway sections''' 
'''''Photo from [http://www.trg.soton.ac.uk/prime/attiki_odos/descr1.htm http://www.trg.soton.ac.uk/prime/attiki_odos/descr1.htm]'''''

The idea of building the Attica Tollway dates back to 1963, when Wilbur Smith came from the United States to undertake the first ever regional traffic planning study for the city of Athens and its metropolitan area. Sprawling development to the north of Athens over the years, the decision in the late 1970’s to build the new airport in its present location at Mesogeia and the decision to build a city connector road along the foothills of the Mountain of Imittos in the early 1990’s departed from the concept of a “ring” road, and transformed the Attica Tollway into an urban tollway that serves the heart of the city.

In addition,, the Attica Tollway during its construction and operation introduced a number of innovations to the Greek construction and motorway operation sector. More specifically, construction within urbanized area under adverse geotechnical conditions called upon employing vibration recorders to restrict peak particle velocity below 6mm/sec in open-cast mining excavations; the ΝΑΤΜ (Drill & Blast) method, the tunnel construction method using Roadheader machinery was also applied to reduce vibrations (the peak particle velocity was limited to 0.7 mm/sec) and to avoid using explosives in areas of historical interest (monuments, churches etc.) for tunnel construction; the Incremental Launching System has also been used for constructing the superstructure of bridges; road pavement was constructed using the latest construction methods and mechanical equipment, reliable materials and specialized laboratory measurements and tests to ensure durability over time. A deep level sewer installation, employing a trenchless technology method (pipe-jacking) was used for the first time to drive sections over 200 m in length under the city. (Sofianos et al, 2004). In operations, the Attica Tollway was the first to introduce in Greece an electronic toll collection system.

Finally, the project was constructed in parallel with flood protection works (contract value of EUR 791M), as the Attica Tollway passes through the three large hydrographic basins of Attica (Thriasio Pedio, Athens basin and Mesogeia) and interrupts the surface runoff coming from the Parnitha, Penteli and Imittos mountains to the sea. The morphology of the aforementioned areas, now featuring minimum natural receptors, the exponential expansion of the land use and the various types of human interventions had rendered the construction of substantial extensive flood protection works within the scope of the Attica Tollway implementation imperative. The flood protection works constructed were dimensioned to be adequate for the existing and future land use.

== The Contracting Authority (Public Party) ==

The Attica Tollway project was planned on a central government level, by the Ministry of Development, Competiveness, Infrastructure and Transport Networks (previously called Ministry of Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works). Ε.Υ.D.Ε. / L.S.E.P is the special agency of the Ministry which undertakes the supervision of the motorway’s operation and maintenance.

== The Concessionaire (Private Party) ==

Initially, the project sponsors were 14 different construction companies: Aktor SA, Attikat, Egis Projects SA, Ergas, Meton SA, Sarantopoulos, TEV, Alte, Arax, Elliniki Technodomiki, Etheth, Pantechniki, TEG, and Zeus. Currently, the project sponsors are Ellaktor (60%), J&P AVAX (30%) and Piraeus-ATE Bank (10%).

The Concessionaire has established contracts back to back with the Concession Agreement with “ATTIKI ODOS CONSTRUCTION JOINT VENTURE” for the project construction and with “ATTIKES DIADROMES S.A.” (also known as Attica Tollway Operations Authority) for the operation and maintenance of the project.

== Users ==

Attica Tollway serves mainly passenger cars and the main purpose of travel of its users is commuting. It provides links to the Athens International Airport and to the two main National Roads (NR Athens –Thessaloniki and NR Athens-Corinth-Patras). In addition, many large logistics centers have emerged or relocated to the western part of the Tollway, since this location combines large open spaces and quick access to ports, railway and National Roads.

The Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) rose from 231,000 entries on the motorway in 2004 to a peak of 307,000 in 2009 prior to onset of the financial crisis in Greece. In 2010, traffic levels were just off to 281,000 AADT, which corresponds to approximately 6-10 % of the total traffic in the Athens metropolitan area (Harito and Morello, 2011).

== Key Purpose for PPP Model Selection ==

The Greek Authorities and the European Commission had agreed within the framework of the Community Support Framework 1994 -1999 (CSF II) to maximize private sector partnerships in the development of transport related infrastructure (PwC, 2005). For Greece, this provided funds and off-balance sheet debt. The Athens Tollway was an opportunity.

The hybrid structuring of the project was essential to the project’s success. The public sector, the Greek Government, wanted to allocate most of the project risks to the private sector. It was clear from the beginning, however, that due to several factors (e.g. this was the first PPP in the road sector in Greece, construction difficulties were envisaged, and help was needed in dealing with 30 local authorities), the project required strong state help. This financial help was necessary because, at that time, sponsors considered that the road traffic levels and the tolls the users were prepared to pay were not enough to provide an adequate return on the investment they were required to make.

[[File:attica3.png]] 
'''Figure 3. Attica Tollway Concession Structure'''

== Project Timing ==

After the 1960’s, decades passed by without any attempts to start the road project, mainly due to the lack of funding, coupled with its expected high cost. The project’s real advancement began in 1985, when it became part of the official transportation infrastructure plans for metropolitan Athens, along with the goal of obtaining the Centennial Olympic Games in 1996 (they marked the 100th anniversary of the modern Olympic Games). It was in the early 1990’s that the Greek Ministry of Public Works adopted the method of co-financing the road through a Build–Operate–Transfer contract.

The construction work started in 1997 and the motorway was given to traffic in sections. The first one opening to traffic was in March 2001, achieving the milestone of serving the new Athens International Airport. The last section was opened to traffic in 2004. Attica Tollway was built on time and within budget and it met the crucial deadline for the Athens Olympics Games in 2004.

== Project Locality and Market Geography ==

Attica Tollway is part of the Tran European Network (TEN) and it connects the 30 municipalities of the Attica basin, allowing quicker access to areas, which, before its construction, required a great amount of travel time.

== Procurement & Contractual Structure ==

=== Tendering ===

An international tender was announced in 1992 and in March 1996, the project was awarded to the lowest bidder of the three international consortia that participated in the process. The Concession Contract was ratified by law by the Greek Parliament on the 23rd of May 1996.

The Concession Agreement provides a maximum toll rate that can be charged. It also includes a safety mechanism, securing the interests of the Greek State through a maximum Return on Equity. The Concession period will extend for a maximum of 25 years (including construction period), or it will end earlier, in the case that the maximum Return on Equity (13.1%) has been reached.

=== Contract Structure ===

The project financing has been ensured through State contributions including EC Structural Cohesion Funds, private equity and loans. Construction cost of about EUR 1300 M was covered as follows: 33% Greek State contribution; 16% private equity and 51% loans (9% Commercial Banks loans and 42% EIB loans).

Commercial banks involved include: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, HypoVereinsbank, Commercial Bank of Greece, HSBC Athens, National Bank of Greece, Société Generale, European Investment Fund, ABN AMRO Bank NV, Agricultural Bank of Greece, Alpha Credit Bank, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (London), Bank of Scotland, De Nationale Investeringsbank NV, Piraeus Bank Greece, European Investment Bank, ING Bank NVand Ergobank.

Expropriation cost was undertaken entirely by the Greek State. Loan guarantees were provided by the concessionaire during construction and by the State for the operations phase.

=== Risk Allocation ===

A project of such scale met significant difficulties during its realisation. The financial close was delayed, mainly because of uncertainties surrounding the project. These uncertainties increased the risks for the banks, delaying the signing of the financial agreement and forcing the public sector to provide funds to the sponsors to begin construction before financial close was reached. Other difficulties were due to variation orders issued by the State, mainly for environmental reasons, which involved significant design changes.

Furthermore, the concession contract did not include mechanisms for extensions of time and delay make-up in case of State-instructed variations. Solutions were found after extensive negotiations between all parties involved, and amendments to the concession contract were introduced, leading to the satisfaction of the banks and reaching financial close.
Risk allocation is depicted in Figure 4.
[[File:attica4.png]] 
'''Figure 4: Risk allocation'''

=== Performance ===

The Independent Engineer was responsible for evaluating construction performance, along with the awarding authority, which is responsible for evaluating operating performance during the operations period.

Table 1 below shows the performance indicators set out in the Operation and Maintenance Agreement with the Attica Tollway Operation Authority.

Attica Tollway Operations Authority (Attikes Diadromes S.A.) has adopted an integrated monitoring system, based on measured Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The system consists of 35 indicators covering all the major aspects of operation, such as traffic management, toll operation, infrastructure maintenance, human resources, violation enforcement, etc. The results of the KPIs are widely used for the continuous improvement of the operation and the services provided to the Tollway users (Tyrogianni et al, 2012).

'''Table 1: Attica Tollway Performance Indicators'''
{| class="wikitable" style="width=100%"
! Ref.
! align="left"| Item
! align="left"| Planned Level of Service
|-
| 1 || Response time in case of incident || 20 minutes
|-
| 2 || Repair time for damage of equipment causing danger to users || Action shall start within 12 hours
|-
| 3 || Repair time for other serious damage of equipment || Action shall start within 24hours
|-
| 4 || Average waiting time in each Toll Station
Level A: waiting time between 0 and 120 seconds
Level B: waiting time above 120 seconds
|| Waiting Time Level B must not exceed 90 hours per year, unless due to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the Operator
|-
| 5 || Standards for money handling: Maximum Accepted Toll Collection Discrepancy (MATCD) between the system and the amount deposited in the Banks || MATCD as per the Manuals Phase B
|}
Furthermore, Attica Tollway considers carbon footprint assessment to be a very powerful tool in understanding the impact of the tollway’s operational activities on global warming. In this context, the company has installed measuring devices and carries out calculations of its carbon footprint (Mandalozis et al, 2012).

Finally, the tollway holds one of the best safety records in the world (Papaioannou, 2006). It serves over 250,000 users daily for short and long trips and has exceeded its forecasts by more than 30% (see figure 5).

== References ==

#B. Halkias, A. Roumboutsos, A. Pantelias, 2013, Attica Tollway, In Roumboutsos, A., Farrell, S., Liyanage, C. L. and Macário, R, COST Action TU1001 Public Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory P3T3, 2013 Discussion Papers Part II Case Studies, ISBN 978-88-97781-61-5, COST Office, Brussels available at http://www.ppptransport.eu
#Attiki Odos Contract, Greek Law 2445/1996 of the Official Gazette.
#Halkias, B., Tyrogianni, E., “PPP projects in Greece: The case of Attica Tollway” Routes/Roads PIARC, April 2009.
#Halkias, B., Tyrogianni, E., Kitsos, D., “A significant infrastructure project within the urban environment of Athens: The case of Attica Tollway” IABSE September 2008
#Harito, J. and Morello, S. (2011) Performance Plus, ITS International, 17(3) 44-45
#Mandalozis, D. Halkias, B., Tyrogianni, H. Kalfa, N. (2012) The Carbon Footprint of Attica Tollway, TRA-Europe 2012, Prodedia- Social and Behavioural Sciences, 48, 2988-2998
#Papaioannou, P. (2006) Recent Experience on Success and Failure Stories from Funding Large Transportation Projects in Greece, 1st International Conference on Funding Transportation Infrastructure, Banff, Alberta, Canada, 2-3 August 2006
#Papandreou, K., Tyrogianni, E., “Level of Service in Concession Motorway Projects” XXXV ASECAP Study and Information Days
#PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) Delivering the PPP promise*: A review of PPP issues and activity, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
#Sofianos, A.I., Loukas, P., Chantzkos, Ch. (2004) Pipe jacking a sewer under Athens, Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology, 19(2), 193-203
#Tyrogianni, H., Halkias, B. Politou, A., Kotzampassi, P. (2012) The Attica Tollway Operations Authority KPI Performance System, TRA-Europe 2012, Prodedia- Social and Behavioural Sciences, 48, 2999-3008
#www.aodos.gr
[[Category:Case Studies]]